Étude des mouvements de sédiments le long de la Grande Côte Nord du Sénégal, entre Saint Louis et Potou : contribution à la connaissance de l'enviornnement pour améliorer la production agricole

Project de Coopération Internationale pour le Développement complété par l'Université de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ULPGC) et l'Université Gaston Berger, financié par la Direction Générale pour les relations avec l'Afrique du Gouvernement des Canaries et géré par le Centre Universitaire de Coopération Internationale pour le Développement (CUCID) de l'ULPGC et l'FULP, Setembre 2010-Février 2012.

Amenagement du territoire autour des sites Seveso: comparaison entre les approches en Italie et en region Wallonne

Il continuo verificarsi di gravi incidenti nei grandi impianti industriali ha spinto gli Stati membri dell’Unione Europea a dotarsi di una politica comune in materia di prevenzione dei grandi rischi industriali. Anche a seguito della pressione esercitata dall’opinione pubblica sono state implementate, nel corso degli ultimi quarant’anni, misure legislative sempre più efficaci per la prevenzione e la mitigazione dei rischi legati ad attività industriali particolarmente pericolose. A partire dagli ultimi anni dello scorso secolo, l’Unione Europea ha emanato una serie di direttive che obbligano gli Stati membri ad essere garanti della sicurezza per l’uomo e per l’ambiente nelle zone circostanti a stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante. In quest’ottica è stata pubblicata nel 1982 la Direttiva Seveso I [82/501/EEC], che è stata ampliata nel 1996 dalla Direttiva Seveso II [96/82/CE] ed infine emendata nel dicembre 2003 dalla Direttiva Seveso III [2003/105/CE]. Le Direttive Seveso prevedono la realizzazione negli Stati membri di una valutazione dei rischi per gli stabilimenti industriali che sono suscettibili a incendi, esplosioni o rilasci di gas tossici (quali, ad esempio, le industrie chimiche, le raffinerie, i depositi di sostanze pericolose). La Direttiva Seveso II è stata trasposta in legge belga attraverso “l’Accord de Coopération” del 21 giugno 1999. Una legge federale nel giugno del 2001 [M.B. 16/06/2001] mette in vigore “l’Accord de Coopération”, che è stato in seguito emendato e pubblicato il 26 aprile del 2007 [M.B. 26/04/2007]. A livello della Regione Vallona (in Belgio), la tematica del rischio di incidente rilevante è stata inclusa nelle disposizioni decretali del Codice Vallone della Pianificazione Territoriale, dell’Urbanismo e del Patrimonio [CWATUP]. In questo quadro la Regione Vallona ha elaborato in collaborazione con la FPMs (Faculté Polytechnique de Mons) una dettagliata metodologia di analisi del rischio per gli stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante. In Italia la Direttiva Seveso II è stata recepita dal Decreto Legislativo n°334 emanato nell’agosto del 1999 [D. Lgs. 334/99], che ha introdotto per la prima volta nel quadro normativo italiano i concetti fondamentali di “controllo dell’urbanizzazione” e “requisiti minimi di sicurezza per la pianificazione territoriale”. Il Decreto Legislativo 334/99 è attualmente in vigore, modificato ed integrato dal Decreto Legislativo n°238 del 21 settembre 2005 [D. Lgs. 238/05], recepimento italiano della Direttiva Seveso III. Tra i decreti attuativi del Decreto Legislativo 334/99 occorre citare il Decreto Ministeriale n°151 del 2001 [D. M. 151/01] relativo alla pianificazione territoriale nell’intorno degli stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante. L’obiettivo di questo lavoro di tesi, che è stato sviluppato presso la Faculté Polytechnique di Mons, è quello di analizzare la metodologia di quantificazione del rischio adottata nella Regione Vallona, con riferimento alla pianificazione territoriale intorno agli stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante, e di confrontarla con quella applicata in Italia. La metodologia applicata in Vallonia è di tipo “probabilistico” ovvero basata sul rischio quale funzione delle frequenze di accadimento e delle conseguenze degli scenari incidentali. Il metodo utilizzato in Italia è “ibrido”, ovvero considera sia le frequenze che le conseguenze degli scenari incidentali, ma non la loro ricomposizione all’interno di un indice di rischio. In seguito al confronto teorico delle due metodologie, se ne è effettuato anche una comparazione pratica tramite la loro applicazione ad un deposito di GPL. Il confronto ha messo in luce come manchino, nella legislazione italiana relativa agli stabilimenti a rischio di incidente rilevante, indicazioni di dettaglio per la quantificazione del rischio, a differenza di quanto accade nella legislazione belga. Ciò lascia all’analista di rischio italiano una notevole arbitrarietà nell’effettuare ipotesi ed assunzioni che rendono poi difficile la comparazione del rischio di stabilimenti differenti. L’auspicio è che tale lacuna possa essere rapidamente superata.

Knowledge-Production Processes in Practice Research - Outcomes and Critical Elements

The welfare sector has seen considerable changes in its operational context. Welfare services respond to an increasing number of challenges as citizens are confronted with life’s uncertainties and a variety of complex situations. At the same time the service-delivery system is facing problems of co-operation and the development of staff competence, as well as demands to improve service effectiveness and outcomes. In order to ensure optimal user outcomes in this complex, evolving environment it is necessary to enhance professional knowledge and skills, and to increase efforts to develop the services. Changes are also evident in the new emergent knowledge-production models. There has been a shift from knowledge acquisition and transmission to its construction and production. New actors have stepped in and the roles of researchers are subject to critical discussion. Research outcomes, in other words the usefulness of research with respect to practice development, is a topical agenda item. Research is needed, but if it is to be useful it needs to be not only credible but also useful in action. What do we know about different research processes in practice? What conceptions, approaches, methods and actor roles are embedded? What is the effect on practice? How does ‘here and now’ practice challenge research methods? This article is based on the research processes conducted in the institutes of practice research in social work in Finland. It analyses the different approaches applied by elucidating the theoretical standpoints and the critical elements embedded in them, and reflects on the outcomes in and for practice. It highlights the level of change and progression in practice research, arguing for diverse practice research models with a solid theoretical grounding, rigorous research processes, and a supportive infrastructure.

La philanthropie: alliée ou concurrente des politiques sociales étatiques (I, 1880-1945)

La philanthropie joue actuellement un rôle très important en Suisse. On estime que la moitié des personnes domiciliées en Suisse est active dans le champ d’action du bénévolat. Toutefois, cet objet d’études a longtemps été délaissé par les historiens. Ces deux panels viseront à rendre compte des recherches récentes en s’intéressant à la dimension comparative et transnationale de la philanthropie en Suisse de 1880 à nos jours. Deux dimensions seront privilégiées. D’une part, l’accent sera mis sur les rapports entre les associations philanthropiques privées et l’Etat social. Les études tendent le plus souvent à mettre l’accent sur l’opposition, dans le domaine social, entre activités de bienfaisance ou de bénévolat et les politiques publiques. Or, les relations entre ces deux pôles ne se résument pas à cette opposition et oscillent, selon les lieux et les périodes, entre coopération étroite et concurrence acharnée, à moins que ne s’instaure, comme cela semble le cas de la Suisse, une division du travail plus ou moins institutionnalisée. D’autre part, une attention toute particulière sera mise sur les jeux d’échelle. Les activités des associations philanthropiques couvrent des espaces géographiques très différents : certaines se concentrent sur un quartier urbain, d’autres se focalisent sur l’ensemble de la planète. Toutefois, nous postulons que cette spatialisation ne se confine pas à un antagonisme local/global. Bien au contraire, les différentes échelles – locale, nationale, globale ou transnationale – interagissent étroitement. Des contributions d’historiens étrangers permettront d’inscrire le cas suisse dans une perspective comparative.

Proposal for an International Molybdenum Isotope Measurement Standard and Data Representation

Molybdenum isotopes are increasingly widely applied in Earth Sciences. They are primarily used to investigate the oxygenation of Earth's ocean and atmosphere. However, more and more fields of application are being developed, such as magmatic and hydrothermal processes, planetary sciences or the tracking of environmental pollution. Here, we present a proposal for a unifying presentation of Mo isotope ratios in the studies of mass-dependent isotope fractionation. We suggest that the δ98/95Mo of the NIST SRM 3134 be defined as +0.25‰. The rationale is that the vast majority of published data are presented relative to reference materials that are similar, but not identical, and that are all slightly lighter than NIST SRM 3134. Our proposed data presentation allows a direct first-order comparison of almost all old data with future work while referring to an international measurement standard. In particular, canonical δ98/95Mo values such as +2.3‰ for seawater and −0.7‰ for marine Fe–Mn precipitates can be kept for discussion. As recent publications show that the ocean molybdenum isotope signature is homogeneous, the IAPSO ocean water standard or any other open ocean water sample is suggested as a secondary measurement standard, with a defined δ98/95Mo value of +2.34 ± 0.10‰ (2s). Les isotopes du molybdène (Mo) sont de plus en plus largement utilisés dans les sciences de la Terre. Ils sont principalement utilisés pour étudier l'oxygénation de l'océan et de l'atmosphère de la Terre. Cependant, de plus en plus de domaines d'application sont en cours de développement, tels que ceux concernant les processus magmatiques et hydrothermaux, les sciences planétaires ou encore le suivi de la pollution environnementale. Ici, nous présentons une proposition de présentation unifiée des rapports isotopiques du Mo dans les études du fractionnement isotopique dépendant de la masse. Nous suggérons que le δ98/95Mo du NIST SRM 3134 soit définit comme étant égal à +0.25 ‰. La raison est que la grande majorité des données publiées sont présentés par rapport à des matériaux de référence qui sont similaires, mais pas identiques, et qui sont tous légèrement plus léger que le NIST SRM 3134. Notre proposition de présentation des données permet une comparaison directe au premier ordre de presque toutes les anciennes données avec les travaux futurs en se référant à un standard international. En particulier, les valeurs canoniques du δ98/95Mo comme celle de +2,3 ‰ pour l'eau de mer et de -0,7 ‰ pour les précipités de Fe-Mn marins peuvent être conservés pour la discussion. Comme les publications récentes montrent que la signature isotopique moyenne du molybdène de l'océan est homogène, le standard de l'eau océanique IAPSO ou tout autre échantillon d'eau provenant de l'océan ouvert sont proposé comme standards secondaires, avec une valeur définie du δ98/95 Mo de 2.34 ± 0.10 ‰ (2s).

Politique étrangère suisse

Le conseiller fédéral Didier Burkhalter a pris la direction du Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (DFAE). – Le parlement a octroyé un crédit de 11.35 milliards de francs pour la coopération internationale 2013-2016. – Le Conseil fédéral a activé la clause de sauvegarde envers les Etats de l’UE-8. – Les questions institutionnelles ont continué à bloquer les relations bilatérales avec l’UE. – L’Allemagne et les Etats-Unis ont maintenu la pression sur la place financière suisse lors des négociations d’accords de double-imposition. – Le peuple a refusé l’initiative de l’ASIN « La parole au peuple ! ». – La Suisse a pris position sur le conflit syrien en instaurant des sanctions contre le régime. – La Suisse a fêté ses 10 ans d’adhésion à l’ONU et a reçu son secrétaire général Ban Ki-Moon. – La Suisse a accueilli à Berne le Prix Nobel de la Paix Aung San Suu Kyi et a ouvert une ambassade au Myanmar.

An initiative for participatory monitoring of large scale acquisitions: Opportunities and results thus far

Increasing commercial pressures on land are provoking fundamental and far-reaching changes in the relationships between people and land. Much knowledge on land-oriented investments projects currently comes from the media. Although this provides a good starting point, lack of transparency and rapidly changing contexts mean that this is often unreliable. The International Land Coalition, in partnership with Oxfam Novib, Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD), University of Pretoria, Centre for Development and Environment of the University of Bern (CDE), and GIZ, started to compile an inventory of land-related investments. This project aims to better understand the extent, trends and impacts of land-related investments by supporting an ongoing and systematic stocktaking exercise of the various investment projects currently taking place worldwide. It involves a large number of organizations and individuals working in areas where land transactions are being made, and able to provide details of such investments. The project monitors land transactions in rural areas that imply a transformation of land use rights from communities and smallholders to commercial use, and are made both by domestic and foreign investors (private actors, governments, government-back private investors). The focus is on investments for food or agrofuel production, timber extraction, carbon trading, mineral extraction, conservation and tourism. A novel way of using ITC to document land acquisitions in a spatially explicit way and by using an approach called “crowdsourcing” is being developed. This approach will allow actors to share information and knowledge directly and at any time on a public platform, where it will be scrutinized in terms of reliability and cross checked with other sources. Up to now, over 1200 deals have been recorded across 96 countries. Details of such transactions have been classified in a matrix and distributed to over 350 contacts worldwide for verification. The verified information has been geo-referenced and represented in two global maps. This is an open database enabling a continued monitoring exercise and the improvement of data accuracy. More information will be released over time. The opportunities arise from overcoming constraints by incomplete information by proposing a new way of collecting, enhancing and sharing information and knowledge in a more democratic and transparent manner. The intention is to develop interactive knowledge platform where any interested person can share and access information on land deals, their link to involved stakeholders, and their embedding into a geographical context. By making use of new ICT technologies that are more and more in the reach of local stakeholders, as well as open access and web-based spatial information systems, it will become possible to create a dynamic database containing spatial explicit data. Feeding in data by a large number of stakeholders, increasingly also by means of new mobile ITC technologies, will open up new opportunities to analyse, monitor and assess highly dynamic trends of land acquisition and rural transformation.

Vom Wettermacher zum Ökosystemgestalter - Biodiversität und Klimawandel aus der Sicht der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit

Die internationale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist im Umbruch. Die drohenden Auswirkungen des globalen Wandels halten uns vor Augen, wie klein und verletzlich unsere Erde ist. Es wird höchste Zeit, dass die Weltgemeinschaft die Kräfte für ein koordiniertes Vorgehen zu Gunsten einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung auf allen Ebenen bündelt. Dieser Beitrag zeigt einige wesentliche Elemente der Herausforderung und entwirft eine Positionierung aus Sicht einer internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, welche der Armutsbekämpfung und der nachhaltigen Entwicklung verpflichtet ist.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists