Molecular mechanisms of classical fear conditioning : GABAergic factors and their role in fear-related network activities

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2010

Programmierschnittstellen für eingebettete Netzwerke in Mehrbenutzerbetriebssystemen am Beispiel des Controller Area Network

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Informatik, Diss., 2011

Funktionelle, strukturelle und elektrische Veränderungen bei herzinsuffizienten Patienten mit Linksschenkelblock : Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung mittels elektromechanischem Mapping und Magnetresonanztomografie

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2006

Optimization-based solutions to constrained trajectory-tracking and path-following problems

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Elektrotechnik und Informationstechnik, Diss., 2012

Advanced production systems : developing context-oriented method and adaptation capabilities for enhanced supply network

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2014

A Wireless Mesh Network NS-3 Simulation Model: Implementation and Performance Comparison With a Real Test-Bed

Wireless mesh networks present an attractive communication solution for various research and industrial projects. However, in many cases, the appropriate preliminary calculations which allow predicting the network behavior have to be made before the actual deployment. For such purposes, network simulation environments emulating the real network operation are often used. Within this paper, a behavior comparison of real wireless mesh network (based on 802.11s amendment) and the simulated one has been performed. The main objective of this work is to measure performance parameters of a real 802.11s wireless mesh network (average UDP throughput and average one-way delay) and compare the derived results with characteristics of a simulated wireless mesh network created with the NS-3 network simulation tool. Then, the results from both networks are compared and the corresponding conclusion is made. The corresponding results were derived from simulation model and real-worldtest-bed, showing that the behavior of both networks is similar. It confirms that the NS-3 simulation model is accurate and can be used in further research studies.

Mapping of the healthy immunoglobulin repertoire over the course of B cell maturation by deep pyrosequencing

Healthy immunoglobulin repertoire has not been extensively evaluated reflecting in part the challenge of generating sufficiently robust data sets by conventional clonal sequencing. Deep sequencing has revolutionized the capacity to evaluate the depth and breadth of the Ig repertoire along the B cell developmental pathway, and can be used to pin point defect(s) of primary or acquired B-cell associated diseases. In this study healthy IgM and IgG repertoires were studied by 454-pyrosequencing to establish the healthy controls for diseased repertoires. (...)

power network concept : a theoretical and empirical approach to strategy in the global network economy

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014

The Barcelonnettes: an example of network-entrepreneurs in XIX century Mexico. An explanation based on a theory of bounded rational choice with social embeddedness

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or "spin-off system" is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of "inheriting" the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

Chaotic dynamics in credit constrained emerging economies

This paper analyzes the role of financial development as a source of endogenous instability in small open economies. By assuming that firms face credit constraints, our model displays a complex dynamic behavior for intermediate values of the parameter representing the level of financial development of the economy. The basic implication of our model is that economies experiencing a process of financial development are more unstable than both very underdeveloped and very developed economies. Our instability concept means that small shocks have a persistent effect on the long run behavior of the model and also that economies can exhibit cycles with a very high period or even chaotic dynamic patterns.

Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

The Spread of free-riding behavior in a social network

We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.

Preliminary study of cooperation in hybrid ad-hoc networks

In this paper, we present a first approach to evolve a cooperative behavior in ad hoc networks. Since wireless nodes are energy constrained, it may not be in the best interest of a node to always accept relay requests. On the other hand, if all nodes decide not to expend energy in relaying, then network throughput will drop dramatically. Both these extreme scenarios are unfavorable to the interests of a user. In this paper we deal with the issue of user cooperation in ad hoc networks by developing the algorithm called Generous Tit-For-Tat. We assume that nodes are rational, i.e., their actions are strictly determined by self-interest, and that each node is associated with a minimum lifetime constraint. Given these lifetime constraints and the assumption of rational behavior, we study the added behavior of the network.