Economic benefits and costs of Sustainable Land Management Technologies: An analysis of WOCAT's global data

Perceived profitability is a key factor in explaining farmers' decision to adopt or not adopt sustainable land management (SLM) technologies. Despite this importance, relatively little is known about the economics of SLM. This paper contributes to the literature by analysing data on costs and perceived cost/benefit ratios of SLM technologies. Data are taken from the World Overview of Conservation Approaches and Technologies technology database and cover 363 case studies conducted in a variety of countries between 1990 and 2012. Based on an in-depth descriptive analysis, we determine what costs accrue to local stakeholders and assess perceived short-term and long-term cost/benefit ratios. Our results show that a large majority of the technologies in our sample are perceived as being profitable: 73% were perceived to have a positive or at least neutral cost/benefit ratio in the short term, while 97% were perceived to have a positive or very positive cost/benefit ratio in the long term. An additional empirical analysis confirms that economic factors are key determinants of land users' decisions to adopt or not adopt SLM technologies. We conclude that a wide range of existing SLM practices generate considerable benefits not only for land users, but for other stakeholders as well. High initial investment costs associated with some practices may, however, constitute a barrier to their adoption; short-term support for land users can help to promote these practices where appropriate.

A case-control study to estimate the effects of acute clinical infection with the Schmallenberg virus on milk yield, fertility and veterinary costs in Swiss dairy herds.

Schmallenberg virus (SBV) was first detected in Switzerland in July 2012 and many Swiss dairy farmers reported acute clinical signs in dairy cattle during the spread of the virus until December 2012. The objectives of the present study were to investigate the effects of an acute infection with SBV on milk yield, fertility and veterinary costs in dairy farms with clinical signs of SBV infection (case farms), and to compare those farms to a matched control group of dairy farms in which cattle did not show clinical signs of SBV infection. Herd size was significantly (p<0.001) larger in case farms (33 cows, n=77) than in control farms (25 cows, n=84). Within case herds, 14.8% (median) of the cows showed acute clinical signs. Managers from case farms indicated to have observed a higher abortion rate during the year with SBV (6.5%) than in the previous year (3.7%). Analysis of fertility parameters based on veterinary bills and data from the breeding associations showed no significant differences between case and control farms. The general veterinary costs per cow from July to December 2012 were significantly higher (p=0.02) in case (CHF 19.80; EUR 16.50) than in control farms (CHF 15.90; EUR 13.25). No differences in milk yield were found between groups, but there was a significant decrease in milk production in case farms in the second half year in 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 (p<0.001) and 2013 (p=0.009). The average daily milk yield per cow (both groups together) was +0.73kg higher (p=0.03) in the second half year 2011 and +0.52kg (p=0.12) in the second half year 2013 compared to the same half year 2012. Fifty-seven percent of the cows with acute clinical signs (n=461) were treated by a veterinarian. The average calculated loss after SBV infection for a standardized farm was CHF 1606 (EUR 1338), which can be considered as low at the national level, but the losses were subject to great fluctuations between farms, so that individual farms could have very high losses (>CHF 10,000, EUR 8333).

Trade Costs, Quality, and The Skill Premium

We develop a monopolistic competition model with nonhomothetic factor input bundles where increasing quality requires increasing use of skilled workers. As a result more skill abundant countries export higher quality, higher priced goods. Using a multicountry dataset we test and confirm the findings in Schott (2004) of a positive effect of skill abundance on unit values identified with US data. We extend the core model with per unit trade costs leading to the Washington-apples effect that goods shipped over larger distance are of higher quality. The combination of high-quality goods being relatively skill intensive with the Washington-apples effect implies that countries at a larger distance from their trading partners display a higher skill premium. Simulating our model we find that a doubling of distance of a country relative to all its trading partners raises the skill premium in a country by about 2.3 percent.

Scaling the Costs of 404 Testing to Fit the Needs of Small Public Companies

In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company's internal controls. Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps less than $75 million. Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, interest groups are calling for the requirements to be 'scaled' to better fit the needs of these companies. While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets. Increased guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap companies and their auditors be aware of best practices. Also, exempting industries that already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance requirements could help. Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-cap companies. Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time

No abstract available.

Varying Injurer Costs of Care, Negligence, and Self-Selection

Standard economic models of negligence set a single standard of care to which all injurers must conform. When injurers differ in their costs of care, this leads to distortions in individual care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a negligence rule that induces optimal care by all injurers by means of self-selection. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as care falls below this standard. The results are consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates an interdependency between the care taken by injurers and victims that operates through the effects of each on the expected accident loss. This paper considers situations in which each party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's cost of taking precaution. Generalizing the economic model of tort law in this way allows for a more complete analysis of when standard tort rules can and cannot induce optimal precaution. When this additional externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm (where all accident losses are borne by the victim), none of the standard tort liability rules induces socially optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of litigation in equilibrium. A 'tort-like' liability rule that induces socially optimal behavior by both parties is then characterized; this involves a payment by victims to non-negligent injurers whenever an accident occurs. The model is then extended to consider the case of bilateral harm (where both parties suffer accident losses). It is shown that, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both parties.

Bankruptcy Costs, Liability Dollarization, and Vulnerability to Sudden Stops

Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors. ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

The local safety net, health insurance, preventable hospitalizations and costs: Harris County (Houston), Texas

The aim of this study was to examine the association between determinants of access to healthcare and preventable hospitalizations, based on Davidson et al.'s framework for evaluating the effects of individual and community determinants on access to healthcare. The study population consisted of the low income, non-elderly, hospitalized adults residing in Harris County, Texas in 2004. The objectives of this study were to examine the proportion of the variance in preventable hospitalizations at the ZIP-code level, to analyze the association between the proximity to the nearest safety net clinic and preventable hospitalizations, to examine how the safety net capacity relates to preventable hospitalizations, to compare the relative strength of the associations of health insurance and the proximity to the nearest safety net clinic with preventable hospitalizations, and to estimate and compare the costs of preventable hospitalizations in Harris County with the average cost in the literature. The data were collected from Texas Health Care Information Collection (2004), Census 2000, and Project Safety Net (2004). A total of 61,841 eligible individuals were included in the final data analysis. A random-intercept multi-level model was constructed with two different levels of data: the individual level and the ZIP-code level. The results of this study suggest that ZIP-code characteristics explain about two percent of the variance in preventable hospitalizations and safety net capacity was marginally significantly associated with preventable hospitalizations (p= 0.062). Proximity to the nearest safety net clinic was not related to preventable hospitalizations; however, health insurance was significantly associated with a decreased risk of preventable hospitalization. The average direct cost was $6,466 per preventable hospitalization, which is significantly different from reports in the literature. ^