The European Investment Bank and SMEs: key lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean

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Securitization and Special Purpose Vehicles in an International Setting: a Systemic View

The present work tries to display a comprehensive and comparative study of the different legal and regulatory problems involved in international securitization transactions. First, an introduction to securitization is provided, with the basic elements of the transaction, followed by the different varieties of it, including dynamic securitization and synthetic securitization structures. Together with this introduction to the intricacies of the structure, a insight into the influence of securitization in the financial and economic crisis of 2007-2009 is provided too; as well as an overview of the process of regulatory competition and cooperation that constitutes the framework for the international aspects of securitization. The next Chapter focuses on the aspects that constitute the foundations of structured finance: the inception of the vehicle, and the transfer of risks associated to the securitized assets, with particular emphasis on the validity of those elements, and how a securitization transaction could be threatened at its root. In this sense, special importance is given to the validity of the trust as an instrument of finance, to the assignment of future receivables or receivables in block, and to the importance of formalities for the validity of corporations, trusts, assignments, etc., and the interaction of such formalities contained in general corporate, trust and assignment law with those contemplated under specific securitization regulations. Then, the next Chapter (III) focuses on creditor protection aspects. As such, we provide some insights on the debate on the capital structure of the firm, and its inadequacy to assess the financial soundness problems inherent to securitization. Then, we proceed to analyze the importance of rules on creditor protection in the context of securitization. The corollary is in the rules in case of insolvency. In this sense, we divide the cases where a party involved in the transaction goes bankrupt, from those where the transaction itself collapses. Finally, we focus on the scenario where a substance over form analysis may compromise some of the elements of the structure (notably the limited liability of the sponsor, and/or the transfer of assets) by means of veil piercing, substantive consolidation, or recharacterization theories. Once these elements have been covered, the next Chapters focus on the regulatory aspects involved in the transaction. Chapter IV is more referred to “market” regulations, i.e. those concerned with information disclosure and other rules (appointment of the indenture trustee, and elaboration of a rating by a rating agency) concerning the offering of asset-backed securities to the public. Chapter V, on the other hand, focuses on “prudential” regulation of the entity entrusted with securitizing assets (the so-called Special Purpose vehicle), and other entities involved in the process. Regarding the SPV, a reference is made to licensing requirements, restriction of activities and governance structures to prevent abuses. Regarding the sponsor of the transaction, a focus is made on provisions on sound originating practices, and the servicing function. Finally, we study accounting and banking regulations, including the Basel I and Basel II Frameworks, which determine the consolidation of the SPV, and the de-recognition of the securitized asset from the originating company’s balance-sheet, as well as the posterior treatment of those assets, in particular by banks. Chapters VI-IX are concerned with liability matters. Chapter VI is an introduction to the different sources of liability. Chapter VII focuses on the liability by the SPV and its management for the information supplied to investors, the management of the asset pool, and the breach of loyalty (or fiduciary) duties. Chapter VIII rather refers to the liability of the originator as a result of such information and statements, but also as a result of inadequate and reckless originating or servicing practices. Chapter IX finally focuses on third parties entrusted with the soundness of the transaction towards the market, the so-called gatekeepers. In this respect, we make special emphasis on the liability of indenture trustees, underwriters and rating agencies. Chapters X and XI focus on the international aspects of securitization. Chapter X contains a conflicts of laws analysis of the different aspects of structured finance. In this respect, a study is made of the laws applicable to the vehicle, to the transfer of risks (either by assignment or by means of derivatives contracts), to liability issues; and a study is also made of the competent jurisdiction (and applicable law) in bankruptcy cases; as well as in cases where a substance-over-form is performed. Then, special attention is also devoted to the role of financial and securities regulations; as well as to their territorial limits, and extraterritoriality problems involved. Chapter XI supplements the prior Chapter, for it analyzes the limits to the States’ exercise of regulatory power by the personal and “market” freedoms included in the US Constitution or the EU Treaties. A reference is also made to the (still insufficient) rules from the WTO Framework, and their significance to the States’ recognition and regulation of securitization transactions.

Foreign and Domestic Bank Performances: An Ideal Decomposition of Industry Dynamics

The aggregate performance of the banking industry depends on the underlying microlevel dynamics within that industry. adjustments within banks, reallocations between banks, entries of new banks, and exits of existing banks. This paper develops a generalized ideal dynamic decomposition and applies it to the return on equity of foreign and domestic commercial banks in Korea from 1994 to 2000. The sample corresponds to the Asian financial crisis and the final stages of a long process of deregulation and privatization in the Korean banking industry. The comparison of our findings reveals that the overall performance of Korean banks largely reflects individual bank efficiencies, except immediately after the Asian financial crisis where restructuring played a more important role on average bank performance. Moreover, Korean regional banks started the restructuring process about one year before the Korean nationwide banks. Foreign bank performance, however, largely reflected individual bank efficiencies, even immediately after the Asian financial crisis.

Bank restructuring and financial institution reform in Indonesia

The banking sector underwent drastic reform in post-crisis Indonesia. Bank restructuring, driven by IMF conditionalities, resulted in the exit of insolvent banks and ownership changes of major private banks. Through recapitalization and sales of government-held shares, foreign-owned banks emerged as leading actors in the place of business-group-affiliated banks. As part of the restructuring process, an exit rule was created. The central bank, which up to that time had been given only partial authority under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance, now gained a full range of authority over banks. The central bank's supervision system on banks, risk management systems at individual banks, and their efforts to build risk management capacities, began to function. This is totally different from the old financial institution under the Soeharto regime, where banks had no incentive to control risks, as the regime tacitly ensured their survival.

Excess capital and bank behavior : evidence from Indonesia

The Indonesian banking sector has been restructured since Asian financial crisis and restored to soundness. The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) returned to a sound level; however, the average excess capital has become too high, while credit disbursement has remained low. This paper investigates the determinants of excess capital among Indonesian banks and its effects on credit growth during the 2000s. The results indicate that the determinants of excess capital vary widely depending on bank type. Return on equity (ROE) affects excess capital negatively among domestic banks, and the effect of non-performing loans is mixed, differing for various bank types. Excess capital affects credit growth positively, except among foreign banks.

Risk sharing with Multilateral Financial Institutions in infrastructure and energy project financing : effect on capital relief for commercial banks

(Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analyse the main instruments for risk mitigation in infrastructure financing with Multilateral Financial Institutions (MFIs). Their review coincided with the global financial crisis of 2007-08, and is highly relevant in current times considering the sovereign debt crisis, the lack of available capital and the increases in bank regulation in Western economies. The current macroeconomic environment has seen a slowdown in the level of finance for infrastructure projects, as they pose a higher credit risk given their requirements for long term investments. The rationale for this work is to look for innovative solutions that are focused on the credit risk mitigation of infrastructure and energy projects whilst optimizing the economic capital allocation for commercial banks. This objective is achieved through risk-sharing with MFIs and looking for capital relief in project finance transactions. This research finds out the answer to the main question: "What is the impact of risk-sharing with MFIs on project finance transactions to increase their efficiency and viability?", and is developed from the perspective of a commercial bank assessing the economic capital used and analysing the relevant variables for it: Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). An overview of project finance for the infrastructure and energy sectors in terms of the volume of transactions worldwide is outlined, along with a summary of risk-sharing financing with MFIs. A review of the current regulatory framework beneath risk-sharing in structured finance with MFIs is also analysed. From here, the impact of risk-sharing and the diversification effect in infrastructure and energy projects is assessed, from the perspective of economic capital allocation for a commercial bank. CreditMetrics (J. P. Morgan, 1997) is applied over an existing well diversified portfolio of project finance infrastructure and energy investments, working with the main risk capital measures: economic capital, RAROC, and EVA. The conclusions of this research show that economic capital allocation on a portfolio of project finance along with risk-sharing with MFIs have a huge impact on capital relief whilst increasing performance profitability for commercial banks. There is an outstanding diversification effect due to the portfolio, which is combined with risk mitigation and an improvement in recovery rates through Partial Credit Guarantees issued by MFIs. A stress test scenario analysis is applied to the current assumptions and credit risk model, considering a downgrade in the rating for the commercial bank (lender) and an increase of default in emerging countries, presenting a direct impact on economic capital, through an increase in expected loss and a decrease in performance profitability. Getting capital relief through risk-sharing makes it more viable for commercial banks to finance infrastructure and energy projects, with the beneficial effect of a direct impact of these investments on GDP growth and employment. The main contribution of this work is to promote a strategic economic capital allocation in infrastructure and energy financing through innovative risk-sharing with MFIs and economic pricing to create economic value added for banks, and to allow the financing of more infrastructure and energy projects. This work suggests several topics for further research in relation to issues analysed. (Matsukawa and Habeck, 2007) analizan los principales instrumentos de mitigación de riesgos en las Instituciones Financieras Multilaterales (IFMs) para la financiación de infraestructuras. Su presentación coincidió con el inicio de la crisis financiera en Agosto de 2007, y sus consecuencias persisten en la actualidad, destacando la deuda soberana en economías desarrolladas y los problemas capitalización de los bancos. Este entorno macroeconómico ha ralentizado la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras. El actual trabajo de investigación tiene su motivación en la búsqueda de soluciones para la financiación de proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, mitigando los riesgos inherentes, con el objeto de reducir el consumo de capital económico en los bancos financiadores. Este objetivo se alcanza compartiendo el riesgo de la financiación con IFMs, a través de estructuras de risk-sharing. La investigación responde la pregunta: "Cuál es el impacto de risk-sharing con IFMs, en la financiación de proyectos para aumentar su eficiencia y viabilidad?". El trabajo se desarrolla desde el enfoque de un banco comercial, estimando el consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos y analizando las principales variables del riesgo de crédito, Probability of Default, Loss Given Default and Recovery Rates, (Altman, 2010). La investigación presenta las cifras globales de Project Finance en los sectores de infraestructuras y de energía, y analiza el marco regulatorio internacional en relación al consumo de capital económico en la financiación de proyectos en los que participan IFMs. A continuación, el trabajo modeliza una cartera real, bien diversificada, de Project Finance de infraestructuras y de energía, aplicando la metodología CreditMet- rics (J. P. Morgan, 1997). Su objeto es estimar el consumo de capital económico y la rentabilidad de la cartera de proyectos a través del RAROC y EVA. La modelización permite estimar el efecto diversificación y la liberación de capital económico consecuencia del risk-sharing. Los resultados muestran el enorme impacto del efecto diversificación de la cartera, así como de las garantías parciales de las IFMs que mitigan riesgos, mejoran el recovery rate de los proyectos y reducen el consumo de capital económico para el banco comercial, mientras aumentan la rentabilidad, RAROC, y crean valor económico, EVA. En escenarios económicos de inestabilidad, empeoramiento del rating de los bancos, aumentos de default en los proyectos y de correlación en las carteras, hay un impacto directo en el capital económico y en la pérdida de rentabilidad. La liberación de capital económico, como se plantea en la presente investigación, permitirá financiar más proyectos de infraestructuras y de energía, lo que repercutirá en un mayor crecimiento económico y creación de empleo. La principal contribución de este trabajo es promover la gestión activa del capital económico en la financiación de infraestructuras y de proyectos energéticos, a través de estructuras innovadoras de risk-sharing con IFMs y de creación de valor económico en los bancos comerciales, lo que mejoraría su eficiencia y capitalización. La aportación metodológica del trabajo se convierte por su originalidad en una contribución, que sugiere y facilita nuevas líneas de investigación académica en las principales variables del riesgo de crédito que afectan al capital económico en la financiación de proyectos.

Infrastructure Finance in Developing Countries by State and Multilateral Development Banks

Infrastructure concession is an alternative widely used by governments to increase investment. In the case of the road sector, the main characteristics of the concessions are: long-term projects, high investments in the early years of the contract and high risks. A viability analysis must be carried out for each concession and consider the characteristics of the project. When the infrastructure is located in a developing country, political and market growth uncertainties should be add in the concession project analysis, as well as economic instability, because they present greater risks. This paper is an analysis of state bank participation in road infrastructure finance in developing countries. For this purpose, we studied road infrastructure financing and its associated risks, and also the features of developing countries. Furthermore, we considered the issue of state banks and multilateral development banks that perform an important role by offering better credit lines than the private banks, in terms of cost, interest and grace period. Based on this study, we analyzed the Brazilian Development Bank - BNDES – and their credit supply to road infrastructure concessions. The results show that BNDES is the main financing agent for long-term investment in the sector, offering loans with low interest rates in Brazilian currency. From this research we argue that a single state bank should not alone support the increasing demand for finance in Brazil. Therefore, we conclude that there is a need to expand the supply of credit in Brazil, by strengthening private banks in the long-term lending market.

Tough love for sinners in the eurozone banking union. CEPS Commentary, 1 July 2013

The ministers of finance and the economy of the eurozone have now agreed on the main features of a new ESM instrument for the direct recapitalisation of euro area banks (Eurogroup, 2013) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions (Council of the European Union, 2013). However, as Stefano Micossi explains in this Commentary, the text that has come out of the frantic late-night negotiations in the Ecofin Council seems to leave unwelcome uncertainty as to the real scope of the new rules in the different national jurisdictions, while the lack of depositor preference in the bail-in pecking order may result in destabilisation. The proposed system appears not only highly intrusive but it also places a considerable burden of aid to the failing institution on the member state, raising doubts about its ability to “break the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.

The Impact of Banking Structural Reform on Household Retail Finance. ECRI Commentary No. 13, 7 October 2014

There are two main objectives behind the EC proposal on banking structural reform: the financial stability objective and the economic efficiency objective. If it is implemented, the reform should reinforce the stability and economic efficiency of household retail activities through lower contagion, better resolvability in the event of failure, more harmonised supervisory practices across the EU and more resilient household demand for retail loans. However, it could also trigger counterproductive effects that could partly undermine the expected benefits. These potential negative effects are not appropriately assessed in the impact study of the proposal published in January 2014 and will require further consideration in the coming months. In particular, the stability of household retail finance could be strengthened by placing more emphasis on bankruptcy risks of retail banks; the transfer of existing systemic activities towards less regulated and supervised markets and reputational risk. A better analysis of the borrowing costs for households (impacted by the potential decreasing diversification of the funding base of banks and scarcer liquidity) and implementation costs could help regulators to achieve the objective of efficient household activities.

Banks at the Service of the Economy? European Policy Brief No. 17, November 2013

This Policy Brief discusses a few simple measures to improve both the commercial and investment banking landscapes, with or without formal separation. Covering deposits with quality collateral would make them safer and would help create an easier guarantee and resolution mechanism at the larger eurozone level. Strong central counterparties and transparency requirements would improve market mechanisms and market discipline in capital markets and investment banking. Specific governance measures would also help improve the financial sector. Finally, a better control of bank solvency, together with improved capital market transparency and accessibility, should encourage the progressive deleveraging of commercial banks, and enhance the long term funding of the economy by capital markets.

The Great Financial Plumbing: From Northern Rock to Banking Union. CEPS Paperback, 19 October 2015

The financial and economic crises have led to an enormous plumbing exercise, involving a fundamental re-design of the global and European regulatory and supervisory system. This book systematically assesses the big items on the G-20 and EU agendas and the effectiveness with which they have been implemented in the EU. Its publication coincides with the demand by European Commissioner Jonathan Hill, in the context of the Capital Markets Union, for a 'comprehensive review' of the impact and coherence of EU legislation in the area of financial services. Karel Lannoo argues in the book that much has been done by European policy-makers to make the financial system safer and to prevent banking crises of the magnitude that erupted in 2008 and 2011, but that the new framework puts an enormous burden on banks and supervisors to implement and enforce it correctly. With the huge amount of secondary or 'level-2' legislation in place, this process has spiralled out of control, and as member states always find new ways of ‘gold-plating’ EU rules, the EU always finds further reasons to achieve a 'single rulebook'. This process has to be brought to a halt, and mutual recognition, a basic single-market principle, reinforced. The new framework also brings huge advantages, which should offer benefits to all parties. Banking Union is a huge step forward, which introduces 'one-stop shopping' for banks in the eurozone, another basic single market principle, and a true single supervisor. The clarity of the new resolution framework should, if correctly applied, trigger early intervention and bring an end to forbearance, thereby enforcing market discipline in the banking sector. It should also avoid reliance on taxpayers' money to bail-out banks in trouble, which totalled 14% of EU GDP during the crisis.

Firmer foundations for a stronger European Banking Union. Bruegel Working Paper 2015/13, November 2015

The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and resolution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data, however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU countries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the Banking Union are held in other EU countries.While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely been completed, the crisis-management framework remains incomplete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum oversight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of clarity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance (and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

Annual Report, Relative to Banks

Title varies: -1851, 1854- The Annual Statements of the Several Banks of the State of New Jersey; 1852-1853, Report of the Bank Commissioners of New Jersey; -1867, Annual Reports of the Banks of the State of New Jersey; 1864-1866, Annual Statements of the Bank [etc]; -1890, Annual Statements of the Banks and Savings Institutions [etc]; 1891-1894, 1897-1989, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, relative to Savings Banks, Discount Banks and Trust Companies (1897-1898 include also deposit banks); 1895, Report of the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance; 1899-1950, Annual Report [etc] relative to Savings Banks, Trust Companies, and State Banks of Discount and Deposit. (varies slightly)