Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

Empirical Evidence of the Distributional Effects of the CAP in the New EU Member States. Factor Markets Working Document No. 58, August 2013

This study, carried out in the context of the Factor Markets research project, investigates the impact of the SAPS (Single Area Payment Scheme) on farmland rental rates in the new EU member states. Using a unique set of farm level panel data with 20,930 observations for 2004 and 2005 we are able to control for important sources of endogeneity. According to our results, the SAPS has a positive and statistically significant impact on land rents in the EU. However, the estimated incidence is smaller than predicted theoretically. Land rents capture only 19 cents of the marginal SAPS euro, and around 10% of the SAPS benefit non-farming landowners through higher farmland rental prices. As the share of rented land is higher in corporate farms than individual ones, family farms benefit more from the SAPS than corporate farms do.

Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles syndrome’. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 58, November 2014

Russia alleges that at the end of the Cold War it underwent a soft version of a Versailles Treaty, pushing it into the periphery of global politics and cutting it out of European decision-making. The crisis in Ukraine is about the survival of Putin’s regime and the dismantling of the post-Cold War settlement. We should not accept the fallacious narrative of victimhood propagated by the Kremlin’s Versailles syndrome. Even so, it is time to explore practical ways of coexisting with Russia. The Helsinki Process and the disarmament and arms control agreements of the Cold War could serve as a model for a mutually acceptable security architecture.