Semiotics of Communication: From Semiosis of Nature to Culture

Communication Studies currently undergoes a crisis of paradigms that requires an ontological review that must begin with a debate about the conditions of possibility of every communicational phenomena. In this article we argue that semiosis offers a conceptual framework that allows for the study of communication as qualitative action. Semiosis, or the action of the sign, is here defined as a fundamental process based on perception that models the world of species, creating cognition and culture. At the core of semiosis are dynamic structures that the authors have defined as 'ontological diagrams'. The first purpose of Semiotics of Communication is to understand how these modeling systems evolve ontologically and phylogenically, producing, in the case of human culture, means of communication ever more varied and technologically advanced.

Examining The Genetic, Social-Cognitive, And Neural Correlates Of Autism Spectrum Disorder Behaviors In Typically Developing Chi

Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are pervasive developmental disorders that affect approximately 1 in 50 children (Blumberg et al., 2013). Due to the social nature of the deficits that characterize the disorders, many have classified them as disorders of social cognition, which is the process that individuals use in order to successfully interact with members of their own species (Frith & Frith, 2007). Previous research has typically neglected the spectrum nature of ASD in favor of a more categorical approach of ¿autistic¿ versus ¿non-autistic,¿ but the spectrum requires a more continuous approach. Thus, the present study sought to examine the genetic, social-cognitive, and neural correlates of ASD-like traits as well as the relationship between these dimensions in typically developing children. Parents and children completed several quantitative measures examining several areas of social-cognitive functioning, including theory of mind and social functioning, restricted/repetitive behaviors and interests, and adaptive/maladaptive functioning. Children were also asked to undergo an EEG and both parents and children contributed a saliva sample that was used to sequence four single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) of the OXTR gene, rs1042778, rs53576, rs2254298, and rs237897. We successfully demonstrated a significant relationship between behavioral measures of social-cognition and differences in face perception via the N170. However, the directionality of these relationships varied based on the behavioral measure and particular N170 difference scores. We also found support for the associations between the G_G allelic combination of rs1042778 and the A_A and A_G allelic combinations of rs2254298 and increased ASD-like behavior with decreased social-cognitive functioning. In contrast, our results contradict previous findings with rs237897 and imply that individuals with the A_A and A_G genotypes are less similar to those with ASD and have higher social cognitive functioning than those with the G_G genotype. In conclusion, we have demonstrated the existence of ASD-like traits in typically developing children and have shown a link between behavioral, genetic, and neural correlates of social-cognition. These findings demonstrate the importance of considering autism as a spectrum disorder and provide support for the move to a more continuous approach to neurodevelopmental disorders.

The contributions of the amygdala, orbital frontal cortex and hippocampal formation to primate social cognition

Deficits in social cognition are prominent symptoms of many human psychiatric disorders, but the origin of such deficits remains largely unknown. To further current knowledge regarding the neural network mediating social cognition, the present research program investigated the individual contributions of two temporal lobe structures, the amygdala and hippocampal formation, and one frontal lobe region, the orbital frontal cortex (Areas 11 and 13), to primate social cognition. Based on previous research, we hypothesized that the amygdala, hippocampal formation and orbital frontal cortex contribute significantly to the formation of new social relationships, but less to the maintenance of familiar ones. ^ Thirty-six male rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) served as subjects, and were divided into four experimental groups: Neurotoxic amygdala lesion (A-ibo, n = 9), neurotoxic or aspiration orbital frontal cortex lesion (O, n = 9), neurotoxic hippocampal formation lesion (H-ibo, n = 9) or sham-operated control (C, n = 9). Six social groups (tetrads) were created, each containing one member from each experimental group. The effect of lesion on established social relationships was assessed during pre- and post-surgical unrestrained social interactions, whereas the effect of lesion on the formation of new relationships was assessed during an additional phase of post-surgical testing with shuffled tetrad membership. Results indicated that these three neural structures each contribute significantly to both the formation and maintenance of social relationships. Furthermore, the amygdala appears to primarily mediate normal responses to threatening social signals, whereas the orbital frontal cortex plays a more global role in social cognition by mediating responses to both threatening and affiliative social signals. By contrast, the hippocampal formation seems to contribute to social cognition indirectly by providing access to previous experience during social judgments. ^ These conclusions were further investigated with three experiments that measured behavioral and physiological (stress hormone) reactivity to threatening stimuli, and three additional experiments that measured subjects' ability to flexibly alter behavioral responses depending on the incentive value of a food reinforcer. Data from these six experiments further confirmed and strengthened the three conclusions originating from the social behavior experiments and, when combined with the current literature, helped to formulate a simple, but testable, theoretical model of primate social cognition. ^

Aristotelian predicables, universality and realism: the logic of comparison in topics as denying the view that Aristotle was a realist

Aristotle is reportedly held to have been a Moderate Realist in that he would maintain that a concept derives from an act of grasping a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow inside of the many different things which the concept is predicated of. As far as a universal is independent of mind, it would stand for the proper object of a concept that subsumes a given number of things as its own instantiations. But we claim that Aristotle rejected such a view and instead did perceive and comprehend universality as a feature of thought rather than as a feature of reality in its own right. As showed in the chapters of Topics regarding the so-called logic of comparison (with the support of Albert the Great’s commentary), each predicate can be more or less consistent with the attribute of the subject of which it may be predicated. Both essential and accidental attributes assume a definite degree of being related to the degree of belonging to substance. Unlike particular things, the universality of a concept is to be understood always in comparison with another concept according to a hierarchy of predicates in terms of universality degree arranged by comparative terms such as ‘more’, ‘less’, and ‘likewise’. What is really mind-independent are the truth conditions which make a universal true when exclusively referring to a set of things identically meant by the same predicate whose universality is given by the place occupied in the hierarchy of predicates.

Philosophy and development of religion /

"Translation of the Lectures from my German manuscript"--Pref.

Critical essays on a few subjects connected with the history and present condition of speculative philosophy /

Locke and the transcendentalists -- Kant and his philosophy -- Fichte's exposition of Kant : philosophy applied to theology -- The philosophy of Cousin -- Paley : the argument for the being of a God -- Subject continued : the union of theology and metaphysics -- Berkeley and his philosophy -- Elements of moral science -- Political ethics.

Studies in southern history and politics; inscribed to William Archibald Dunning, PH.D., LL.D., Lieber professor of history and political philosophy in Columbia university,

Deportation and colonization: an atempted solution of the race problem, by W.L. Fleming.--The literary movement for secession, by U.B. Phillips.--The frontier and secession, by C.W. Ramsdell.--The French consuls in the Confederate States, M.L. Bonham, jr.--The judicial interpretation of the Confederate constitution, by S.D. Brummer.--Southern legislation in respect to freedmen, 1865-1866, by J.G. de R. Hamilton.--Carpet-baggers in the United States Senate, by C. Mildred Thompson.--Grant's southern policy, by E.C. Woolley.--The federal enforcement acts, by W.W. Davis.--Negro suffrage in the South, by W.R. Smith.--Some phases of educational history in the South since 1865, by W.K. Boyd.--The new South, economic and social, by H. Thompson.--The political philosophy of John C. Calhoun, by C.E. Merriam.--Southern political theories, by D.Y. Thomas.--Southern politics since the civil war, by J.W. Garner.

The collected works of Dugald Stewart.

v. 1. Dissertation: exhibiting the progress of metaphysical, ethical, and political philosophy, since the revival of letters in Europe. 1854.--v. 2-4. Elements of the philosophy of the human mind ... To which is prefixed introduction and part first of the Outlines of moral philosophy. 1854.--v. 5. Philosophical essays. 1855.--v. 6-7. The philosophy of the active and moral powers of man ... To which is prefixed part second of the Outlines of moral philosophy. 1855.--v. 8-9. Lectures on political economy ... To which is prefixed part third of the Outlines of moral philosophy. 1855.56.--v. 10. Biographical memoirs of Adam Smith, William Robertson, Thomas Reid. To which is prefixed a Memoir of Dugald Stewart, with selections from his correspondence. By J. Veitch. 1858.--v. 11. Translations of the passages in foreign languages contained in the collected works of Dugald Stewart. With general index. 1860.

Experience as a moderator of involvement and satisfaction on brand loyalty in a business-to-business setting 02-314R

This paper examines the relative influence of two key antecedents of brand loyalty-satisfaction and involvement and the moderating role of experience, using a sample of business buyers. The central argument of this paper is that the strength of the effect of these variables on attitudinal brand loyalty will vary with the level of customer experience with purchasing the service. Building on previous research which examined low-risk, customer product settings [Kim, J., Lim, J.S., & Bhargava, M. (1998). The role of affect in attitude formation: A classical conditioning approach. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 26 (2): pp. 143-152; Shiv, B., & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and mind in conflict: The interplay of affect and cognition in consumer decision-making. Journal of Consumer Research 26: 278], this study shows that for a high-risk setting, involvement with the service category will be more dominant in its influence on brand loyalty than satisfaction with the preferred brand. Furthermore, it was found that experience moderated the influence of involvement and satisfaction on attitudinal brand loyalty for a high-risk business-to-business service. This study provides new insights into the theory and practice of buyer behavior and business-to-business brands. Crown Copyright (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

How primatology can inform us about the evolution of the humand mind

Humans are primates. We have evolved from common ancestors and the evolution of the human body is becoming increasingly clear as the archeological record expands. But for most people the gap between humans and animals lies in the mind, not in the body. And minds do not fossilise. To reconstruct the evolution of mind, scholars have thus increasingly looked to our closest relatives for clues. Here I discuss four ways in which the study of primates may inform such reconstruction: fact-finding, phylogenetic reconstruction, analogy, and regression models. Knowledge about primates can help us bridge the gap. Extinction of our closest relatives, on the other hand, would not only deplete that source of information but also increase the apparent differences between animal and human minds. It is likely that we have a long history of displacing closely related species, including the other hominids, leading us to appear ever more unique.

Levinas and the defination of philosophy: An ethical approach

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy.

An overview of psychological and neurobiological mechanisms by which early negative experiences increase risk of mood disorders

Objective: Early life experiences are associated with severe and long-lasting effects on behavioural and emotional functioning, which in turn are thought to increase the risk for unipolar depression and other disorders of affect regulation. The neurobiological and psychological mechanisms through which adverse early life experiences confer risk are poorly understood. Method: Alterations in brain structure and function in limbic and prefrontal cortical regions have been linked to early negative experiences and to mood disorders. Results: There are a number of psychological domains that may be dysfunctional in people with mood disorders, and which, if the dysfunction occurs prior to onset of mood symptoms, may signify a risk factor for depression. Cognitive dysfunction has been examined in patients with mood disorders, with some suggestion that changes in cognitive function may antedate the onset of mood symptoms, and may be exacerbated in those who experienced early negative trauma. Social cognition, including emotion comprehension, theory of mind and empathy, represent under-studied domains of psychological function that may be negatively influenced by early adverse experience. Temperament and personality factors may also leave people vulnerable to mood instability. Conclusion: This review summarizes the evidence for dysfunction in each of these domains for people with mood disorders.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.