980 resultados para steady-state operation
Resumo:
Recent attempts to incorporate optimal fiscal policy into New Keynesian models subject to nominal inertia, have tended to assume that policy makers are benevolent and have access to a commitment technology. A separate literature, on the New Political Economy, has focused on real economies where there is strategic use of policy instruments in a world of political conflict. In this paper we combine these literatures and assume that policy is set in a New Keynesian economy by one of two policy makers facing electoral uncertainty (in terms of infrequent elections and an endogenous voting mechanism). The policy makers generally share the social welfare function, but differ in their preferences over fiscal expenditure (in its size and/or composition). Given the environment, policy shall be realistically constrained to be time-consistent. In a sticky-price economy, such heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of one policy maker utilising (nominal) debt strategically to tie the hands of the other party, and influence the outcome of any future elections. This can give rise to a deficit bias, implying a sub-optimally high level of steady-state debt, and can also imply a sub-optimal response to shocks. The steady-state distortions and inflation bias this generates, combined with the volatility induced by the electoral cycle in a sticky-price environment, can significantly
Resumo:
We consider optimal monetary and scal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, rstly, that this is even when true when allowing for in ation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.
Resumo:
This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a disinfl ation by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated disinfl ation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting structure.
Resumo:
We introduce duration dependent skill decay among the unemployed into a New-Keynesian model with hiring frictions developed by Blanchard/Gali (2008). If the central bank responds only to (current, lagged or expected future) inflation and quarterly skill decay is above a threshold level, determinacy requires a coefficient on inflation smaller than one. The threshold level is plausible with little steady-state hiring and firing ("Continental European Calibration") but implausibly high in the opposite case ("American calibration"). Neither interest rate smoothing nor responding to the output gap helps to restore determinacy if skill decay exceeds the threshold level. However, a modest response to unemployment guarantees determinacy. Moreover, under indeterminacy, both an adverse sunspot shock and an adverse technology shock increase unemployment extremely persistently.
Resumo:
This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.
Resumo:
In Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable under adaptive learning, and unstable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. In the current paper a modified model is presented that includes a locally stable stagnation regime as a possible outcome arising from large expectation shocks. Policy implications are examined. Sufficiently large temporary increases in government spending can dislodge the economy from the stagnation regime and restore the natural stabilizing dynamics. More specific policy proposals are presented and discussed.
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The unconditional expectation of social welfare is often used to assess alternative macroeconomic policy rules in applied quantitative research. It is shown that it is generally possible to derive a linear - quadratic problem that approximates the exact non-linear problem where the unconditional expectation of the objective is maximised and the steady-state is distorted. Thus, the measure of pol icy performance is a linear combinat ion of second moments of economic variables which is relatively easy to compute numerically, and can be used to rank alternative policy rules. The approach is applied to a simple Calvo-type model under various monetary policy rules.
Resumo:
Until recently, the airways were thought to be sterile unless infected; however, a shift towards molecular methods for the quantification and sequencing of bacterial DNA has revealed that the airways harbour a unique steady-state microbiota. This paradigm shift is changing the way that respiratory research is approached, with a clear need now to consider the effects of host-microorganism interactions in both healthy and diseased lungs. We propose that akin to recent discoveries in intestinal research, dysbiosis of the airway microbiota could underlie susceptibility to, and progression and chronicity of lung disease. In this Opinion article, we summarize current knowledge of the airway microbiota and outline how host-microorganism interactions in the lungs and other tissues might influence respiratory health and disease.
Resumo:
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.
Resumo:
Neonatal diabetes mellitus can be transient or permanent. The severe form of permanent neonatal diabetes mellitus can be associated with pancreas agenesis. Normal pancreas development is controlled by a cascade of transcription factors, where insulin promoter factor 1 (IPF1) plays a crucial role. Here, we describe two novel mutations in the IPF1 gene leading to pancreas agenesis. Direct sequence analysis of exons 1 and 2 of the IPF1 gene revealed two point mutations within the homeobox in exon 2. Genetic analysis of the parents showed that each mutation was inherited from one parent. Mutations localized in helices 1 and 2, respectively, of the homeodomain, decreased the protein half-life significantly, leading to intracellular IPF1 levels of 36% and 27% of wild-type levels. Both mutant forms of IPF1 were normally translocated to the nucleus, and their DNA binding activity on different known target promoters was similar to that of the wild-type protein. However, transcriptional activity of both mutant IPF1 proteins, alone or in combination with HNF3 beta/Foxa2, Pbx1, or the heterodimer E47-beta 2 was reduced, findings accounted for by decreased IPF1 steady state levels and not by impaired protein-protein interactions. We conclude that the IPF1 level is critical for human pancreas formation.
Resumo:
Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models suggests that it is optimal to allow steady-state debt to follow a random walk. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2012) consider the nature of the timeinconsistency involved in such a policy and its implication for discretionary policy-making. We show that governments are tempted, given inflationary expectations, to utilize their monetary and fiscal instruments in the initial period to change the ultimate debt burden they need to service. We demonstrate that this temptation is only eliminated if following shocks, the new steady-state debt is equal to the original (efficient) debt level even though there is no explicit debt target in the government’s objective function. Analytically and in a series of numerical simulations we show which instrument is used to stabilize the debt depends crucially on the degree of nominal inertia and the size of the debt-stock. We also show that the welfare consequences of introducing debt are negligible for precommitment policies, but can be significant for discretionary policy. Finally, we assess the credibility of commitment policy by considering a quasi-commitment policy which allows for different probabilities of reneging on past promises. This on-line Appendix extends the results of this paper.
Resumo:
La 3,4-Metilendioximetanfetamina (MDMA, éxtasis) es un derivado anfetamínico sintético ampliamente usado como droga recreativa, que produce neurotoxicidad serotonérgica en animales y posiblemente también en humanos. El mecanismo subyacente de neurotoxicidad, incluye la formación de especies reactivas de oxigeno (ROS), pero la fuente de generación de estos es un punto de controversia. Se postula que la neurotoxicidad inducida por la MDMA es mediada por la formación de metabolitos bioreactivos. Específicamente, los metabolitos primarios de tipo catecol, la 3,4- dihidroximetanfetamina (HHMA) y la 3,4-dihidroxianfetamina (HHA), que luego dan lugar a la formación de conjugados con el glutatión y la N-acetilcisteína, y que conservan la capacidad de entrar en el ciclo redox y presentan neurotoxicidad serotonérgica en ratas. Aunque la presencia de dichos metabolitos se demostró recientemente en microdialisados de cerebros de ratas, su formación en humanos no se ha reportado aun. Este trabajo describe la detección de N-acetil-cisteína-HHMA (NAC-HHMA) y N-acetil-cisteína-HHA (NAC-HHA) en orina humana de 15 consumidores recreacionales de MDMA (1.5 mg/kg) en un entorno controlado. Los resultados revelan que en las primeras 4 horas después del consumo de MDMA aproximadamente el 0.002% de la dosis administrada es recuperada como aductos tioéter. Los polimorfismos genéticos en la expresión de las enzimas CYP2D6 y COMT, que en conjunto son las principales determinantes de los niveles estables de HHMA y HHA, posiblemente expliquen la variabilidad interindividual observada en la recuperación de la NAC-HHMA y la NAC-HHA en orina. Resumiendo, por primera vez se demuestra la formación de aductos tioéteres neurotóxicos de la MDMA en humanos. Estos resultados apoyan la hipótesis de que la bioactivación de la MDMA a metabolitos neurotóxicos es el mecanismo relevante para la generación de la neurotoxicidad en humanos.
Resumo:
We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent fiscal authority must determine the optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the ability to bond finance deficits. Households and the fiscal authority have risk sensitive preferences. We find that outcomes are affected importantly by the household's risk sensitivity, but not by the fiscal authority's. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its effects on fluctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little effect on the provision of government services, it does cause the fiscal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
Resumo:
This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which nominal government debt pays an inflation risk premium. The model predicts that the inflation risk premium will be higher in economies which are exposed to unanticipated inflation through nominal asset holdings. In particular, the inflation risk premium is higher when government debt is primarily nominal, steady-state inflation is low, and when cash and nominal debt account for a large fraction of consumers' retirement portfolios. These channels do not appear to have been highlighted in previous models or tested empirically. Numerical results suggest that the inflation risk premium is comparable in magnitude to standard representative agent models. These findings have implications for management of government debt, since the inflation risk premium makes it more costly for governments to borrow using nominal rather than indexed debt. Simulations of an extended model with Epstein-Zin preferences suggest that increasing the share of indexed debt would enable governments to permanently lower taxes by an amount that is quantitatively non-trivial.
Resumo:
This paper studies the wasteful e ffect of bureaucracy on the economy by addressing the link between rent-seeking behavior of government bureaucrats and the public sector wage bill, which is taken to represent the rent component. In particular, public o fficials are modeled as individuals competing for a larger share of those public funds. The rent-seeking extraction technology in the government administration is modeled as in Murphy et al. (1991) and incorporated in an otherwise standard Real-Business-Cycle (RBC) framework with public sector. The model is calibrated to German data for the period 1970-2007. The main fi ndings are: (i) Due to the existence of a signi ficant public sector wage premium and the high public sector employment, a substantial amount of working time is spent rent-seeking, which in turn leads to signifi cant losses in terms of output; (ii) The measures for the rent-seeking cost obtained from the model for the major EU countries are highly-correlated to indices of bureaucratic ineffi ciency; (iii) Under the optimal scal policy regime,steady-state rent-seeking is smaller relative to the exogenous policy case, as the government chooses a higher public wage premium, but sets a much lower public employment, thus achieving a decrease in rent-seeking.