The tug of war. Russia's response to changes on the European gas market. OSW Study 50/2014

Russia, being aware of the evolution of the EU gas market and the fluctuations in trends that accompany it, and in an attempt to maintain its position on the European gas market, is sticking to a dichotomous strategy. On the one hand, Moscow has taken an offensive approach: it continues its traditionally critical rhetoric with regard to the legal and institutional changes; by negating the legitimacy of the new rules, it has been making efforts to undermine them by employing legal and political measures; Russia has used such traditional economic means as investments in assets and pushing through the implementation of new gas pipeline construction projects. On the other hand, the evolution of the EU gas market has forced Russia to take steps to adapt to a certain extent: partial changes in the operation of the internal gas sector; promises to further curb Gazprom’s dominant position; the concessions made in trade negotiations with European partners; partial adjustments to the EU’s so called third energy package regulations. Hoping that the unfolding situation on the gas markets will contribute to slowing down the recent liberalisation tendencies in the EU and that EU member states won’t make progress in decreasing their dependence on Russian gas, Moscow is thus preparing itself for the ‘long game’ in gas with its European partners.

The declared end of South Stream and why nobody seems to care. CEPS Commentary, 5 December 2014

More than seven years after the South Stream pipeline project was first announced in June 2007, it finally seems to have been dropped by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin on his visit to Turkey this week. This CEPS Commentary looks at the ostensible reasons for President Putin’s decision as well as on what’s potentially behind them. It concludes that the EU may actually benefit from this decision in being able to secure more gas with less political interference from Russia.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

At any price: Russia is embarking on the construction of South Stream. OSW Commentary No. 98, 2012-12-07

Gazprom is determined to continue its efforts to build the South Stream gas pipeline regardless of the slump on the European gas market and the fact that there is sufficient capacity already in the existing transport infrastructure. The official inauguration of the maritime section of South Stream was held on 7 December this year, but the construction itself will commence in 2014. The agreements concluded so far, both intergovernmental and between corporations, are necessary for the launch of the construction of the new pipeline, but still do not guarantee that the project will be completed on time. First of all, some legal problems have yet to be resolved, such as the evaluation of the compliance of the planned actions with the ‘third energy package’ or the fact that ecological surveys required under European law need to be carried out. Secondly, given the present situation on the European gas market and medium-term forecasts, the high cost of implementation of this project and the maintenance expenses of existing pipelines – which are not being used to full capacity – the new project seems to be unfeasible. However, Gazprom’s determination in its efforts to build the pipeline proves that Russia is ready to take a high economic risk to maintain its dominant position on the European gas supply market; it will restrict the possibilities of alternative infrastructural projects being implemented (above all, the EU’s Southern Corridor) and use the construction of new pipelines as an instrument of political pressure on the present transit countries (especially Ukraine).

Ukraine and Russia: a hindered rapprochement. OSW Commentary No. 44, 2010-12-15

The policy of rapprochement with Russia that President Victor Yanukovych and his entourage had been actively promoting in the first months of his presidency has slowed down notably. One of the reasons for this lowered pace is that current talks between Russia and Ukraine concern the spheres in which Kyiv is not ready to make concessions to Russia. Despite numerous top-level meetings, recent months have failed to bring a breakthrough in energy issues of key importance. First of all, no compromise was reached in gas issues where the divergence of interests is particularly large and where Ukraine has adopted a tough stance to negotiate the best conditions possible. Even though some agreements were signed during the October session of the inter-governmental committee presided over by the prime ministers (the agreement on linking the two states’ aircraft production and on the joint construction of a nuclear fuel production plant), these resulted from prior agreements. Economic negotiations will continue in the coming months but the observed deadlock is not likely to be broken any time soon. The results of these talks are likely to reflect the interests of both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the competition among Ukrainian business groups, some of which opt for closer cooperation with their Eastern neighbour. Ukraine’s consent to send oil to Belarus along the Odessa-Brody pipeline shows that the government in Kyiv is ready to engage in projects they consider profitable, even those that run counter to Russian interests. Ukraine’s adoption of this stance may trigger irritation in Moscow and lead to a cooling in bilateral relations.

Bulgarian-Russian games in the energy sector: an outcome is getting closer. OSW Commentary No. 61, 2011-10-5

Bulgaria and Russia are entering the final phase of setting the conditions of their co-operation in the energy sector. A new gas contract is being negotiated because the currently applicable agreements will have expired by the end of 2012. The fate of two major energy projects – whose implementation depends on good co-operation between Sofia and Moscow: the Burgas– –Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the construction of a Bulgarian nuclear power plant in Belene with Russian participation – is currently being decided. Another issue ever-present on the agenda is the future of the South Stream gas pipeline promoted by Russia, which is to run through Bulgarian territory. The outcome of all the aforementioned discussions and negotiations will determine for years the model of Bulgarian-Russian relations and may strongly affect the shape of the oil, gas and electricity markets in South-Eastern Europe.

Southern Gas Corridor managed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. OSW Commentary No. 86, 2012-07-18

The Southern Gas Corridor is a European Commission initiative with the aim of facilitating the diversification of the routes and sources of gas imported into Europe in the hope of reducing the EU’s dependence on Russia. Although the Southern Gas Corridor – alongside the EU’s flagship Nabucco project, which constitutes a part of the Corridor – was originally conceived as a means of furthering the interests of the West (officially the EU but in practice also the US), the implementation of the project has become possible almost exclusively thanks to measures taken by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Consequently, a project which the EU had hoped would protect its political interests has indirectly given Azerbaijan and Turkey considerable influence over the EU, since it is those two countries that have effectively begun to define the shape of the Southern Corridor. This became particularly clear when the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was signed on 26 June 2012. If the EU wishes to ensure that the implementation of the Southern Gas Corridor project retains at least some of its original design, Brussels has little choice but to take into account the preferences of Azerbaijan and Turkey at the expense of its own original plans.

Promises and hurdles in EU-Kazakhstan energy cooperation. EUCAM Commentary No. 20, November 2011

Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Massimov, once referred to energy cooperation as the ‘core’ of relations between his country and the European Union (EU). Indeed, there is great mutual interest in this area. Six percent of the EU’s crude oil imports and 16 percent of its uranium imports come from Kazakhstan. And around 80 percent of the latter’s oil exports go towards Europe. For Kazakhstani producers, access to European lucrative and reliable markets is of utmost importance. Over the last several years, the thrust of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was aimed at increasing the capacity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) that pumps Kazakhstani oil to Europe. Moreover, Kazmunaigaz’s (KMG) – the national oil and gas company – major external investment was in the Romanian oil company Rompetrol.

Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Europe's LNG Strategy in the Wider EU Gas Market. CEPS Policy Brief No. 333, October 2015

In its Communication on an Energy Union published in February 2015, the European Commission committed itself to “explore the full potential of liquefied natural gas (LNG), including as a back-up in crisis situations when insufficient gas is coming into Europe through the existing pipeline system” and to address the potential of gas storage in Europe by developing a comprehensive LNG and storage strategy by the end of 2015 or early in 2016. This is a comprehensible move in the current context. Geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia explain the EU’s willingness to further diversify its supply sources of natural gas to reinforce its long-term energy security on the one hand, and to strengthen its ability to solve future crises on the other hand. Moreover, the current market dynamics could support diversification towards LNG. Increasing the flexibility of LNG trade, decreasing LNG prices and LNG charter rates and an apparent price convergence between the European and the Asia-Pacific LNG imports would all reinforce the economic viability of such a strategy. This Policy Brief makes three main points: • For the LNG and gas storage strategy to work, it needs to be embedded in the realities of the natural gas market. • The key to a successful LNG strategy is to develop sufficient infrastructure. • The LNG strategy needs an innovation component.

The Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU. OSW POINT OF VIEW 53, 2015-08-20

The Southern Gas Corridor is a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects controlled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, each at a different stage of implementation. The crisis in EU-Russia relations over Ukraine has made the two players interested in the Southern Gas Corridor once again. Brussels views it as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of gas supplies and a way to reinforce its position against Russia. In turn, Moscow’s proposal for Turkey and Greece to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project changes the energy map of the regional projects, which indirectly affects the Southern Gas Corridor. This has raised concern in Azerbaijan, which has been making efforts to manoeuvre between the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

End of an energy honeymoon: what’s next for Russia-Turkey energy relations? EPC Commentary, 7 December 2015

Back in the autumn of 2014, the deal between Russia and Turkey on the Turkish Stream pipeline was expected to start a period of close energy cooperation between the two countries, potentially able to change the energy game in the region and consolidate political relations in a long-term perspective. One year later, after announcing the project’s size would be reduced by half, Moscow suspended the negotiations in retaliation to the downing of a Russian fighter jet by the Turkish Air Force at the border between Turkey and Syria. This seems to complement growing doubts about Turkish Stream, which already started as a result of Russia’s military involvement in Syria. From an EU perspective, recent developments raise doubts about Turkey’s role in the Union’s energy strategy.

Satellite applications as an ocean and coastal zone management tool: three cases studies

La presente investigación es un estudio de tres aplicaciones de los satélites del océano y las zonas costeras (OCzM). Los sensores de radar que se utilizan en la exploración batimétrica son útiles en la industria de las tuberías de petróleo y en la navegación costera. Térmica y la imagen de radar se han utilizado para detectar indirectamente la distribución de los recursos de las pesquerías de atún y últimamente también otras pesquerías. El sistema de posicionamiento global (GPS) y de comunicaciones de datos de seguimiento de la flota actual de permisos, aunque el enfoque de esta tesis es sobre la flota pesquera. El desarrollo de cualquier sistema de monitoreo de la flota puede seguir el mismo principio.

List of size fractionated eukaryotic plankton community samples and associated metadata (Database W1)

The present data set provides an Excel file in a zip archive. The file lists 334 samples of size fractionated eukaryotic plankton community with a suite of associated metadata (Database W1). Note that if most samples represented the piconano- (0.8-5 µm, 73 samples), nano- (5-20 µm, 74 samples), micro- (20-180 µm, 70 samples), and meso- (180-2000 µm, 76 samples) planktonic size fractions, some represented different organismal size-fractions: 0.2-3 µm (1 sample), 0.8-20 µm (6 samples), 0.8 µm - infinity (33 samples), and 3-20 µm (1 sample). The table contains the following fields: a unique sample sequence identifier; the sampling station identifier; the Tara Oceans sample identifier (TARA_xxxxxxxxxx); an INDSC accession number allowing to retrieve raw sequence data for the major nucleotide databases (short read archives at EBI, NCBI or DDBJ); the depth of sampling (Subsurface - SUR or Deep Chlorophyll Maximum - DCM); the targeted size range; the sequences template (either DNA or WGA/DNA if DNA extracted from the filters was Whole Genome Amplified); the latitude of the sampling event (decimal degrees); the longitude of the sampling event (decimal degrees); the time and date of the sampling event; the device used to collect the sample; the logsheet event corresponding to the sampling event ; the volume of water sampled (liters). Then follows information on the cleaning bioinformatics pipeline shown on Figure W2 of the supplementary litterature publication: the number of merged pairs present in the raw sequence file; the number of those sequences matching both primers; the number of sequences after quality-check filtering; the number of sequences after chimera removal; and finally the number of sequences after selecting only barcodes present in at least three copies in total and in at least two samples. Finally, are given for each sequence sample: the number of distinct sequences (metabarcodes); the number of OTUs; the average number of barcode per OTU; the Shannon diversity index based on barcodes for each sample (URL of W4 dataset in PANGAEA); and the Shannon diversity index based on each OTU (URL of W5 dataset in PANGAEA).