The views of rich Europeans are more likely to be reflected by political parties than those of poorer citizens

How does income inequality affect political representation? Jan Rosset, Nathalie Giger and Julian Bernauer examine whether politicians represent the views of poorer and richer citizens equally. They find that in 43 out of the 49 elections included in their analysis, the preferences of low-income citizens are located further away from the policy positions of the closest political party than those with mid-range incomes. This suggests that income inequality may spill-over into political inequalities, although it is less clear whether this effect is likely to get better or worse as a result of the Eurozone crisis.

The Limits of Issue Ownership Dynamics : The Constraining Effect of Party Preference

Issue ownership theory argues that when a voter considers a party to be the most competent amongst others to deal with an issue (that is, the party "owns" the issue), chances are the voter will vote for that party. Recent work has shown that perceptions of issue ownership are dynamic: they are affected by the media coverage of party messages. However, based on the broad literature on partisan bias, we predict that parties' efforts to change issue ownership perceptions will have a difficult time breaching the perceptual screen created by a voter's party preference. Using two separate experiments with a similar design we show that the effect of partisan issue messages on issue competence is moderated by party preference. The effect of issue messages is reinforced when people already like a party, and blocked when people dislike a party.

DCI Voter Fraud Investigations Report, May 8, 2014.

In March of 2012, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office compared Iowa’s voter registration records with the driver’s license record s of individuals that identified themselves as non-citizens with the Iowa Department of Transportation. After comparing those records, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office found that more than 3,000 individuals registered to vote that had previously identified themselves as non-citizens. More than 1,000 of these individuals had also cast a ballot. The Iowa Secretary of State’s office was not given timely access to the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)database, and therefore was unable to determine if any of these individuals had become citizens before they registered to vote or cast a ballot. On June 21, 2012, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office entered into an agreement with the Iowa Department of Public Safety’s Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) to review potential election misconduct crimes and improve the administration of federal elections. Over the last two years,DCI agents have reviewed thousands of instances of possible election misconduct. DCI’s review included cases referred by the Iowa Secretary of State’s office as well as by other state and local government agencies.

Miten äänestäjät valitsevat puolueen?

Abstract: How electors choose thier party in general elections

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Puolueiden vaalikampanjat vuoden 2004 europarlamenttivaaleissa

Abstract: Parties' campaigns in European elections of 2004

Kuka edustaa EU:n vastustajia? Euroopan parlamentin vaalit 2004

Abstract: Who represents Eurosceptical voters? The 2004 elections to the European Parliament

El sistema electoral de les Corts Valencianes: orígens i reforma

[cat] Aquest article vol refutar la hipòtesi que els partits decideixen sistemes electorals majoritaris i que decideixen també mantenir-los invariables, sempre que el sistema de partits s"aproximi al bipartidisme i cap dels dos grans partits pugui perdre la seva posició a favor d"un nou competidor. De manera inversa, els sistemes electorals proporcionals són la conseqüència del multipartidisme, en el qual cap partit té opcions de rebre la majoria dels vots. El cas valencià, però, confirma només parcialment la hipòtesi: els partits van aprovar el 1982 regles proporcionals perquè les eleccions dels parlaments autonòmics eren considerades secundàries, no només pel multipartidisme existent aleshores. En canvi, sí que es confirma que el canvi iniciat el 2006 amb la reforma estatutària manté, de moment, l"status quo per no alterar la formació de majories parlamentàries. Encara queda pendent, però, que es modifiqui la Llei Electoral, de la qual depèn quin mínim de vots per entrar a les Corts s"establirà.

Strategia, relevanssi ja merkitys: televisiomainonnan kontekstuaalisuudesta vuoden 2004 eurovaalikampanjoissa

Abstract: Strategy, relevance and meaning: on the use of context in the Finnish TV spots for the European parliamentary elections

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

The VOP Voice, Vol. 9,2014

Voter Rights Continuing Education

Vaalit ja verkko : verkkokampanjointi Sauli Niinistön eduskuntavaalikampanjassa 2007

Opinnäytetyö käsittelee kampanjointiviestintää eduskuntavaaleissa 2007 painottuen kampanjointikeinoihin verkossa. Itse olin keskeisesti mukana Sauli Niinistön eduskuntavaalikampanjassa työskentelemällä hänen kampanjansa tiimivastaavana ja kampanjatoimiston vetäjänä neljän kuukauden ajan. Niinistön kampanjassa käytettiin monipuolisesti hyödyksi Internetiä ja sen tarjoamia mahdollisuuksia. Muun nettikampanjoinnin lisäksi tuotettiin 19 uutisvideota. Tässä opinnäytetyössä tarkastelen Sauli Niinistön verkossa tapahtunutta vaalikampanjointia sekä Saulin Tietotoimiston Uutisia osana kokonaisuutta. Arvioin myös sitä, millaisia erilaisia kampanjointikeinoja ehdokkaat käyttävät verkossa ja miten ne toimivat Sauli Niinistön eduskuntavaalikampanjassa. Perehdyn myös tarkemmin näiden vaalien uutuuteen, verkkovideoihin sekä arvioin, millaista lisäarvoa nettiuutisilla saatiin Niinistön kampanjaan. Kontekstina työssäni on yleisesti kampanjakeinojen kehittyminen Internetissä 2000-luvun aikana. Verkosta on tullut entistä varteenotettavampi kampanjointipaikka sitä mukaa kuin äänestäjät ovat alkaneet kuluttaa entistä enemmän aikaa verkossa. Vaalikampanjoidenkin sisällön täytyy olla entistä ammattimaisemmin tuotettua. Vaalikampanjat käydään yhä enenevässä määrin median kautta. Median osuus on huomattava myös eduskuntavaaleissa, etenkin vaalipiireissä, joissa on paljon asukkaita. Tästä syystä kampanjaorganisaatiolta vaaditaan yhä enemmän viestintätaitoja. Organisaatiosta on löydyttävä ihmisiä, jotka ehdokkaan lisäksi voivat kommentoida kampanjaa eri välineille luontevasti. Moniosaajuuden merkitys siis korostuu myös vaalityössä.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

Uuden osakeyhtiölain verovaikutukset

Suomen uusi osakeyhtiölaki tuli voimaan 1.9.2006. Tutkielmassa on selvitetty uuden osakeyhtiölain keskeisimpiä vaikutuksia osakeyhtiöiden ja niiden osakkaiden verotukseen. Tutkielmassa on tarkasteltu uuden osakeyhtiölain nimellisarvotonta pääomajärjestelmää, varojenjakotapoja sekä yritysjärjestelytilanteita yhtiö- ja vero-oikeudelliselta kannalta. Valtiovarainministeriön asettama yritysverotuksen kehittämistyöryhmä on muistiossaan ehdottanut muutoksia verolakeihin uuden osakeyhtiölain vuoksi. Työryhmä on ehdottanut mm. osinkoverotuksen alaa ja peitellyn osingonjaonverottamista laajennettavaksi ja laittoman varojenjaon verotusta kiristettäväksi. Tutkielmassa on tarkasteltu työryhmän ehdotuksia ja pohdittu ehdotusten vaikutusta käytännön yritystoimintaan elinkeinoverolain näkökulmasta. Työryhmän ehdotukset eivät kuitenkaan kata kaikkia tilanteita. OYL:ssa mahdollistetut uudet yritysmuodonmuutos- ja yritysjärjestelytilanteet eivät toistaiseksi ole toteutettavissa veroneutraalisti. Verolainsäädännön joustamattomuuden vuoksi useat uuden lain mahdollistamattoimintavaihtoehdot eivät ole yhtiöiden käytettävissä. Muutoksia verolakeihin on odotettavissa aikaisintaan vuoden 2007 eduskuntavaalien jälkeen. Ennen verolakien uudistamista verotuskäytäntö on epävarmaa, mikä tehokkaasti estää uusien toimintamahdollisuuksien toteuttamisen.