Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $433.38. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, a balance sheet and 2 receipts, Apr. 6, 1910.

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $1,886.23. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, an envelope addressed to the trust company, 3 pages of balance sheets and 4 receipts, July 11, 1910.

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $3,160.90. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, and 3 pages of balance sheets, Jan. 6, 1911.

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $3,160.90. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, and 3 pages of balance sheets, Jan. 8, 1912.

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $511.88. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, and 2 pages of balance sheets, Apr. 5, 1912.

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York

Letter to Mr. W.D. Woodruff from Henry Ahern of the United States Trust Company of New York (1 page, printed) which was sent with a cheque for $511.88. This is accompanied by an envelope addressed to Mr. Woodruff, and 2 pages of balance sheets, Apr. 7, 1914.

México, and the United States; their mutual relations and common interests 7

UANL

Federalism and Fiscal Equalization in Canada and the United States, 1990-1999.

Rapport de recherche

Promoting while checking self-interest : a conflict-based governance approach to rebalance corporate power disequilibria in Canada and the United States

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles.

Supplier Relations in Japan and the United States

This working paper was originally printed in the Working Paper Series of the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program

Japanese Scientific And Technology Information in the United States - Public Policy and Private Initiatives

In January 1983 a group of US government, industry and university information specialists gathered at MIT to take stock of efforts to monitor, acquire, assess, and disseminate Japanese scientific and technical information (JSTI). It was agreed that these efforts were uncoordinated and poorly conceived, and that a clearer understanding of Japanese technical information systems and a clearer sense of its importance to end users was necessary. That meeting led to formal technology assessments, Congressinal hearings, and legislation; it also helped stimulate several private initiatives in JSTI provision. Four years later there exist better coordinated and better conceived JSTI programs in both the public and private sectors, but there remains much room for improvement. This paper will recount their development and assess future directions.