890 resultados para Theory and Algorithms
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The paper investigates which of Shannon’s measures (entropy, conditional entropy, mutual information) is the right one for the task of quantifying information flow in a programming language. We examine earlier relevant contributions from Denning, McLean and Gray and we propose and motivate a specific quantitative definition of information flow. We prove results relating equivalence relations, interference of program variables, independence of random variables and the flow of confidential information. Finally, we show how, in our setting, Shannon’s Perfect Secrecy theorem provides a sufficient condition to determine whether a program leaks confidential information.
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Research has shown that belief in an afterlife, a form of symbolic immortality, can alleviate the negative emotions associated with one’s mortality (Deschesne et. al, 2003). We found this aspect of TMT particularly interesting, but lacking any substantial research. Therefore, we set out to determine if belief in an afterlife could diminish the effects of mortality salience. As far as we know, our study is the first to use a pre-screening process to determine participants’ prior beliefs. One prediction might be that those who believe in an afterlife will be less affected by the effects of mortality salience.
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The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it intends to provide theoretical elements to analyze the relation between real exchange rates and economic development. Our main hypothesis is very much in line with the Dutch disease literature, and states that competitive currencies contribute to the existence and maintenance of the anufacturing sector in the economy. This, in turn, brings about higher growth rates in the long run, given the existence of increasing returns in the industrial sector, and its importance in generating echnological change and increasing productivity in the overall economy. The second objective of this paper is empirical. It intends to analyze examples of successful exchange rate policies, such as Chile and Indonesia in the eighties, as a benchmark for comparison with countries where currency overvaluation has taken place, such as Brazil. In the latter case, the local currency is being inflated by large capital inflows, due to high domestic interest rates and to a boom in demand and prices of commodities in the international markets. It will be argued that the industrial sector bears most of the burden when the currency appreciates, and that Brazil risks at deindustrialization if there are no changes in the exchange rate regime
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We develop portfolio choice theory taking into consideration the first p~ moments of the underIying assets distribution. A rigorous characterization of the opportunity set and of the efficient portfolios frontier is given, as well as of the solutions to the problem with a general utility function and short sales allowed. The extension of c1assical meanvariance properties, like two-fund separation, is also investigated. A general CAPM is derived, based on the theoretical foundations built, and its empirical consequences and testing are discussed
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We develop a framework to explain the private capital flows between the rest of the world and an emerging economy. The model, based on the monetary premium theory, relates an endogenous supply of foreign capitals to an endogenous differential of interest rates; its estimation uses the econometric techniques initiated by Heckman. Four questions regarding the capital flows phenomenon are explored, including the statistical process that governs the events of default and the impact of the probability of default on the interest rate differential. Using the methodology, we analyse the dynamics of foreign capital movements in Brazil during the 1991- 1998 period.
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Motivated by a novel stylized fact { countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance { we provide a framework of endogenous institutional choice based on the idea that elites are constrained by the threat of rebellion, and that this threat is rendered less e ective by distance from the seat of political power. In established democracies, the threat of insurgencies is not a binding constraint, and the model predicts no correlation between isolated capitals and misgovernance. In contrast, a correlation emerges in equilibrium in the case of autocracies. Causality runs both ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence the elite has less of an incentive to protect its position by isolating the capital city; conversely, a more isolated capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in terms of rents that would have to be shared, are larger. We show evidence that this pattern holds true robustly in the data. We also show that isolated capitals are associated with less power sharing, a larger income premium enjoyed by capital city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory.
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Esta tese contém dois capítulos, cada um lidando com a teoria e a história dos bancos e arranjos financeiros. No capítulo 1, busca-se extender uma economia Diamond-Dybvig com monitoramento imperfeito dos saques antecipados e realizar uma comparação do bem estar social em cada uma das alocações possíveis, como proposto em Presscott and Weinberg(2003). Esse monitoramento imperfeito é implementado a partir da comunicação indireta ( através de um meio de pagamento) entre os agentes e a máquina de depósitos e saques que é um agregado do setor produtivo e financeiro. A extensão consiste em estudar alocações onde uma fração dos agentes pode explorar o monitoramento imperfeito e fraudar a alocação contratada ao consumirem mais cedo além do limite, usando múltiplos meios de pagamento. Com a punição limitada no período de consumo tardio, essa nova alocação pode ser chamada de uma alocação separadora em contraste com as alocações agregadoras onde o agente com habilidade de fraudar é bloqueado por um meio de pagamento imune a fraude, mas custoso, ou por receber consumo futuro suficiente para tornar a fraude desinteressante. A comparação de bem estar na gama de parâmetros escolhida mostra que as alocações separadoras são ótimas para as economias com menor dotação e as agregadoras para as de nível intermediário e as ricas. O capítulo termina com um possível contexto histórico para o modelo, o qual se conecta com a narrativa histórica encontrada no capítulo 2. No capítulo 2 são exploradas as propriedade quantitativas de um sistema de previsão antecedente para crises financeiras, com as váriaveis sendo escolhidas a partir de um arcabouço de ``boom and bust'' descrito mais detalhadamente no apêndice 1. As principais variáveis são: o crescimento real nos preços de imóveis e ações, o diferencial entre os juros dos títulos governamentais de 10 anos e a taxa de 3 meses no mercado inter-bancário e o crescimento nos ativos totais do setor bancário. Essas variáveis produzem uma taxa mais elevada de sinais corretos para as crises bancárias recentes (1984-2008) do que os sistemas de indicadores antecedentes comparáveis. Levar em conta um risco de base crescente ( devido à tendência de acumulação de distorções no sistema de preços relativos em expansões anteriores) também provê informação e eleva o número de sinais corretos em países que não passaram por uma expansão creditícia e nos preços de ativos tão vigorosa.
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This paper presents a simple theory of the provision of incentives in firms in which the principal optimally chooses both compensation contracts and the composition of the work force. Assuming that individuals display group loyalty, a less diverse (more homogeneous) work force will be more cooperative. Simple comparative statics provide some testable implications relating risk, diversity and incentive pay. I also analyze the case in which workers’ characteristics cannot be readily observed ex ante. The theory then predicts that firms are more likely to prevent workers from interacting with each other when workers are expected to have similar characteristics. This shows a surprising effect of diversity in the workplace: more diverse firms will promote more interactions between workers of different types, i.e. they will be less segregated. I test the main predictions of the model using a cross-sectional sample of corporate boards. I use the proportion of women on boards as a measure of diversity. There are three main empirical findings: (1) a significant negative correlation between firm risk and diversity, (2) a significant positive relationship between performance-based compensation and diversity and (3) a significant positive correlation between the number of board meetings (a measure of interactions among directors) and diversity. The evidence is broadly consistent with the implications of the theory.