Science policy : USA/USSR / [report prepared for National Science Foundation, Directorate for Scientific, Technological and International Affairs, Division of International Programs].

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Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary final environmental impact statement/management plan / Sanctuaries and Reserves Division.

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Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary final environmental impact statement/management plan / Sanctuaries and Reserves Division.

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Contractions in the 2-wasserstein lenght space and thermalization of granular media

An algebraic decay rate is derived which bounds the time required for velocities to equilibrate in a spatially homogeneous flow-through model representing the continuum limit of a gas of particles interacting through slightly inelastic collisions. This rate is obtained by reformulating the dynamical problem as the gradient flow of a convex energy on an infinite-dimensional manifold. An abstract theory is developed for gradient flows in length spaces, which shows how degenerate convexity (or even non-convexity) | if uniformly controlled | will quantify contractivity (limit expansivity) of the flow.

Contractive metrics for a Boltzmann equation for granular gases: diffusive equilibriaThe Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

We quantify the long-time behavior of a system of (partially) inelastic particles in a stochastic thermostat by means of the contractivity of a suitable metric in the set of probability measures. Existence, uniqueness, boundedness of moments and regularity of a steady state are derived from this basic property. The solutions of the kinetic model are proved to converge exponentially as t→ ∞ to this diffusive equilibrium in this distance metrizing the weak convergence of measures. Then, we prove a uniform bound in time on Sobolev norms of the solution, provided the initial data has a finite norm in the corresponding Sobolev space. These results are then combined, using interpolation inequalities, to obtain exponential convergence to the diffusive equilibrium in the strong L¹-norm, as well as various Sobolev norms.

The Patterson-Sullivan embedding and minimal volume entropy for outer space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Metrics on diagram groups and uniform embeddings in a Hilbert space

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt".

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.