Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

A subsampling approach to estimating the distribution of diversing statistics with application to assessing financial market risks

In this paper we propose a subsampling estimator for the distribution ofstatistics diverging at either known rates when the underlying timeseries in strictly stationary abd strong mixing. Based on our results weprovide a detailed discussion how to estimate extreme order statisticswith dependent data and present two applications to assessing financialmarket risk. Our method performs well in estimating Value at Risk andprovides a superior alternative to Hill's estimator in operationalizingSafety First portofolio selection.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890-1920)

The subject "Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890--1920)" should evoke several names and debates in the reader's mind. For a long time, Western scholars have been aware that the Russian economists Tugan-Baranovsky and Bortkiewicz were active participants to the Marxian transformation problem, that the mathematical models of Dmitriev prefigured forthcoming neoricardian based models, and that many Russian economists were either supporting the Marxian labour theory of value or being revisionists. Moreover, these ideas were preparing the ground for Soviet planning. Russian scholars additionally knew that this period was the time of introduction of marginalism in Russia, and that, during this period, economists were active in thinking the relation of ethics with economic theory. All these issues are well covered in the existing literature. But there is a big gap that this dissertation intends to fill. The existing literature handles these pieces separately, although they are part of a single, more general, history. All these issues (the labour theory of value, marginalism, the Marxian transformation problem, planning, ethics, mathematical economics) were part of what this dissertation calls here "The Russian synthesis". The Russian synthesis (in the singular) designates here all the attempts at synthesis between classical political economy and marginalism, between labour theory of value and marginal utility, and between value and prices that occurred in Russian economic thought between 1890 and 1920, and that embraces the whole set of issues evoked above. This dissertation has the ambition of being the first comprehensive history of that Russian synthesis. In this, this contribution is unique. It has always surprised the author of the present dissertation that such a book has not yet been written. Several good reasons, both in terms of scarce availability of sources and of ideological restrictions, may accounted for a reasonable delay of several decades. But it is now urgent to remedy the situation before the protagonists of the Russian synthesis are definitely classified under the wrong labels in the pantheon of economic thought. To accomplish this task, it has seldom be sufficient to gather together the various existing studies on aspects of this story. It as been necessary to return to the primary sources in the Russian language. The most important part of the primary literature has never been translated, and in the last years only some of them have been republished in Russian. Therefore, most translations from the Russian have been made by the author of the present dissertation. The secondary literature has been surveyed in the languages that are familiar (Russian, English and French) or almost familiar (German) to the present author, and which are hopefully the most pertinent to the present investigation. Besides, and in order to increase the acquaintance with the text, which was the objective of all this, some archival sources were used. The analysis consists of careful chronological studies of the authors' writings and their evolution in their historical and intellectual context. As a consequence, the dissertation brings new authors to the foreground - Shaposhnikov and Yurovsky - who were traditionally confined to the substitutes' bench, because they only superficially touched the domains quoted above. In the Russian synthesis however, they played an important part of the story. As a side effect, some authors that used to play in the foreground - Dmitriev and Bortkiewicz - are relegated to the background, but are not forgotten. Besides, the dissertation refreshes the views on authors already known, such as Ziber and, especially, Tugan-Baranovsky. The ultimate objective of this dissertation is to change the opinion that one could have on "value and prices in Russian economic thought", by setting the Russian synthesis at the centre of the debates.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.