Receipt from E. Poole, Photographer, St. Catharines

Receipt from E. Poole, Photographer, St. Catharines for payment on account, March 25, 1887.

Receipt from The Big 22, St. Catharines

Receipt from The Big 22, St. Catharines for payment on account, March 31, 1887.

Receipt from McSloy Bros., St. Catharines

Receipt from McSloy Bros., St. Catharines for payment on account, April 2, 1887.

Receipt from W.S. Downey, M.D., St. Catharines

Receipt from W.S. Downey, M.D., St. Catharines for payment on account, July 14, 1887.

Receipt from Henry O’Laughlin, dealer in Anthracite and Bituminous Coals, St. Catharines

Receipt from Henry O’Laughlin, dealer in Anthracite and Bituminous Coals, St. Catharines for payment on account, Nov. 15, 1887.

Bond between Isaac Sterling of the Township of Salt fleet to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Queenston

Bond (1 page, printed) between Isaac Sterling of the Township of Salt fleet to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Queenston (regarding the Last Will and Testament of Robert Hamilton) for payment of 153 pounds, 12 shillings and 3 pence to be made to Dickson and Clark, May 21, 1819.

Bond between Archibald Johnston of the Township of Bertie to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Queenston

Bond (1 page, printed) between Archibald Johnston of the Township of Bertie to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Queenston (regarding the Last Will and Testament of Robert Hamilton) for payment of 75 pounds to be made to Dickson and Clark, June 7, 1821.

Bond between Daniel Cornell of the County of Oxford to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Stamford

Bond (1 page, printed) between Daniel Cornell of the County of Oxford to William Dickson of Niagara and Thomas Clark of Stamford (regarding the Last Will and Testament of Robert Hamilton) for payment of 103 pounds, 11 shillings and 1 penny to be made to Dickson and Clark, July 12, 1822.

Bill from Geoghegan and Co. Importers of Table Linen and Shirt and Stock Makers

Bill from Geoghegan and Co. Importers of Table Linen and Shirt and Stock Makers for clothing including cravats and hosiery, June 23, 1847 attached to receipt for Receipt from Family Linen Drapery, Shirt and Stock Warehouse, London England for payment on account, July 7, 1847.

Letter to Messrs. Summer and Nelles of Grimsby from T.A. Stayner

Letter to Messrs. Summer and Nelles of Grimsby from T.A. Stayner, Postmaster General stating that the accompanying letter [letter is not enclosed] has been returned to the writer on payment of postage. (1 page, printed). This letter is barely legible. Much of the text is missing, July 1848.

Letter to Mr. Robert Nelles from Robert Heron

Letter to Mr. Robert Nelles from Robert Heron regarding 10 pounds, 12 shillings and 6 pence that Mr. Heron owes to Mr. Nelles. He is asking for 6 weeks of indulgence as he is not able to make the payment at present, Aug. 7, 1849.

Letter to Robert Nelles from John McLelland

Letter to Robert Nelles from John McLelland saying that he is sending 3 pounds and to please let him know when the next payment is due, May 29, 1850.

Letter to Robert F. Nelles from James C. Henderson and Co

Letter to Robert F. Nelles from James C. Henderson and Co. acknowledging payment, Jan. 25, 1851.

Bill to Mr. R. Nelles from Wm. Atkinson and Co.,

Bill to Mr. R. Nelles from Wm. Atkinson and Co., Importers of Hardware, Hamilton for miscellaneous hardware item. There is a note on the bottom of the invoice from Wm. Atkinson requesting payment, Jan. 1850.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.