Oysters, and all about them : being a complete history of the titular subject, exhaustive on all points of necessary and curious information from the earliest writers to those of the present time, with numerous additions, facts, and notes /

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Oysters, and all about them : being a complete history of the titular subject, exhaustive on all points of necessary and curious information from the earliest writers to those of the present time, with numerous additions, facts, and notes /

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Barriers to innovation and public policy in Catalonia

The present paper analyses the link between firms’ decisions to innovate and the barriers that prevent them from being innovative. The aim is twofold. First, it analyses three groups of barriers to innovation: the cost of innovation projects, lack of knowledge and market conditions. Second, it presents the main steps taken by Catalan Government to promote the creation of new firms and to reduce barriers to innovation. The data set used is based on the 2004 official innovation survey of Catalonia which was taken from the Spanish CIS-4 sample. This sample includes individual information on 2,954 Catalan firms in manufacturing industries and knowledge-intensive services (KIS). The empirical analysis reveals pronounced differences regarding a firm’s propensity to innovate and its perception of barriers. Moreover, the results show that cost and knowledge barriers seem to be the most important and that there are substantial sectoral differences in the way that firms react to barriers. The results of this paper have important implications for the design of future public policy to promote entrepreneurship and innovation together.

Communication for Public Goods

This paper studies information transmission between multiple agents with di¤erent preferences and a welfare maximizing decision maker who chooses the quality or quantity of a public good (e.g. provision of public health service; carbon emissions policy; pace of lectures in a classroom) that is consumed by all of them. Communication in such circumstances suffers from the agents' incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences relative to the average of the other agents, since the decision maker's reaction to each agent's message is weaker than in one-to-one communication. As the number of agents becomes larger the quality of information transmission diminishes. The use of binary messages (e.g. "yes" or "no") is shown to be a robust mode of communication when the main source of informational distortion is exaggeration.

Public Sector Pay in Finland

This study analyses the forces determining public and private sector pay in Finland. The data used is a 7 per cent sample taken from the Finnish 2001 census. It contains information on 42 680 male workers, of which 8 759 are employed in public and 33 921 in the private sector. The study documents and describes data by education, occupation and industry. We estimate earnings equations for the whole sample as well as for four industries (construction, real estate, transportation and health) that provide an adequate mix of both public and sector workers. The results suggest that the private-public sector pay gap of about one per cent can be accounted for by differences in observable characteristics between the sectors (3.4 per cent) and lower returns from these characteristics (-2.3 per cent). However, the industry-level analysis indicates that the earnings gaps vary across industries, and are negative in some cases. These inter-industry differences in public-private gaps persist even when the usual controls are introduced. This suggests that public sector wage setters need greater local flexibility, which should result in less uniform wages within the public sector.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Effects of Experience, Knowledge and Signals on Willingness to Pay for a Public Good

This paper compares how increases in experience versus increases in knowledge about a public good affect willingness to pay (WTP) for its provision. This is challenging because while consumers are often certain about their previous experiences with a good, they may be uncertain about the accuracy of their knowledge. We therefore design and conduct a field experiment in which treated subjects receive a precise and objective signal regarding their knowledge about a public good before estimating their WTP for it. Using data for two different public goods, we show qualitative equivalence of the effect of knowledge and experience on valuation for a public good. Surprisingly, though, we find that the causal effect of objective signals about the accuracy of a subject’s knowledge for a public good can dramatically affect their valuation for it: treatment causes an increase of $150-$200 in WTP for well-informed individuals. We find no such effect for less informed subjects. Our results imply that WTP estimates for public goods are not only a function of true information states of the respondents but beliefs about those information states.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual’s decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one’s private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighbourhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.

Information Design

There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure for the designer - the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure: it is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals; the optimal information structure may be a public signal or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.

Peut-on faire confiance à l'administration ? Une analyse du concept de confiance, appliqué au secteur public

D'une manière générale, la confiance est un « lubrifiant » (Arrow, 1974) facilitant les relations sociales (eg Luhmann, 1968, Giddens, 1984, Zucker, 1986). D'un point de vue économique, un environnement institutionnel bénéficiant d'une confiance élevée serait corrélé avec la performance de l'économie nationale (eg Dyer and Chu, 2003). La confiance, en tant que capital social, permettrait et engendrerait des comportements altruistes et coopératifs impactant et soutenant la prospérité économique d'une communauté (Fukuyama, 1995). Dans un cadre organisationnel, la confiance engendre une communication plus ouverte et facilite l'échange d'information (eg Smith and Barclay, 1997, Currall and Judge, 1995), facilite la gestion des conflits (eg Blomqvist, 2002), l'apprentissage commun (eg Bijlsma-Frankema, 2004) ou diminue les coûts d'intégration (eg Bidault and Jarillo, 1995), par exemple.

Public policy for entrepreneurship and innovation: impact in managed and entrepreneurial economies

Many of the most advanced economies of the world have undergone significant transformation in the last few decades. Globalization and technological changes, especially developments in information technologies, have helped to stimulate this transformation. These have contributed to changing institutional frameworks in many respects within the economies including adjustments to economic policies. The results of these transformations take many different forms and are manifested in different areas of an economy. At the heart of these changes however, has been the increasingly important role of entrepreneurship in the economy. The transformed ("new") economy stimulates and supports activities in innovation and entrepreneurship and is labelled the entrepreneurial economy. The "old" economy on the other hand restricts such activities and is referred to as the managed economy (Audretsch & Thurik, 2001).

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

TcruziDB, an Integrated Database, and the WWW Information Server for the Trypanosoma cruzi Genome Project

Data analysis, presentation and distribution is of utmost importance to a genome project. A public domain software, ACeDB, has been chosen as the common basis for parasite genome databases, and a first release of TcruziDB, the Trypanosoma cruzi genome database, is available by ftp from ftp://iris.dbbm.fiocruz.br/pub/genomedb/TcruziDB as well as versions of the software for different operating systems (ftp://iris.dbbm.fiocruz.br/pub/unixsoft/). Moreover, data originated from the project are available from the WWW server at http://www.dbbm.fiocruz.br. It contains biological and parasitological data on CL Brener, its karyotype, all available T. cruzi sequences from Genbank, data on the EST-sequencing project and on available libraries, a T. cruzi codon table and a listing of activities and participating groups in the genome project, as well as meeting reports. T. cruzi discussion lists (tcruzi-l@iris.dbbm.fiocruz.br and tcgenics@iris.dbbm.fiocruz.br) are being maintained for communication and to promote collaboration in the genome project

L'information en droit médical : étude de droit suisse

Introduction : S'il est des questions qui plongent les juristes et les médecins dans l'embarras, celle de l'information à délivrer au patient, composante de la théorie du consentement éclairé, occupe une place de choix. Depuis plusieurs années, les exigences relatives aux droits des patients, notamment le droit à l'information médicale, ont évolué parallèlement aux progrès vertigineux de la médecine et de la science. Il y a trente ans, ce principe était pratiquement inconnu de notre ordre juridique. En 1979, le Tribunal fédéral se pose formellement la question des limites du devoir d'information incombant au médecin. Soulignons qu'en 1940 déjà, les juges fédéraux avaient abordé l'existence d'un devoir d'information du thérapeute tout en niant son existence dans le cas d'espèce au motif que le patient n'aurait pas renoncé à l'intervention s'il avait été correctement informé du risque normal et minime que celle-ci comportait. Depuis lors, ce principe a été consacré par l'ensemble des législations sanitaires cantonales. La médecine humaine étant de la compétence des cantons, il a fallu attendre 1992 pour voir la création d'une norme constitutionnelle attribuant la première compétence à la Confédération dans le domaine du génie génétique et de la procréation médicalement assistée. La Confédération a ensuite reçu des compétences législatives en matière de médecine de transplantation. Enfin, un futur article 118a Cst permettant à la Confédération de légiférer dans le domaine de la recherche sur l'homme sera prochainement soumis aux votes du peuple et des cantons. Ces nouvelles lois fédérales concrétisent les principes généraux en matière d'information dégagés par le Tribunal fédéral au fil de sa jurisprudence et lui octroient une place importante s'agissant de domaines pointus où l'individu n'est que profane. Ces trente dernières années ont été marquées par un accroissement important des droits des patients corollairement lié à un affaiblissement du pouvoir des médecins. A ce jour, le point d'équilibre ne semble pas être atteint, la tendance étant de pratiquer de la médecine dite défensive, promouvant le consentement éclairé au rôle de protection juridique du thérapeute, oubliant sa fonction première de garantie du libre choix du patient. GUILLOD, dans une thèse faisant autorité en Suisse, ayant pour thème : le consentement éclairé du patient, Autodétermination ou paternalisme ? s'était déjà penché en 1986 sur la problématique de l'information. A cette période, la jurisprudence en la matière était peu importante, le droit fédéral était pratiquement inexistant et le droit cantonal commençait à émerger. Nous avons dès lors décidé de consacrer notre travail de doctorat au devoir d'information du médecin, eu égard au nombre considérable de décisions rendues en la matière et à l'évolution de la législation tant fédérale que cantonale. Pratiquement, cette étude se subdivise en trois parties. La première permettra d'analyser les différents fondements juridiques du devoir d'information. Nous nous proposons de commencer par un aperçu de la théorie des droits de la personnalité avant de l'appliquer au devoir d'information. Puis, nous examinerons le devoir d'information dans les autres domaines du droit, tels que le droit pénal, le droit des contrats, le droit public ou le droit international. De plus, vu l'importance des normes déontologiques dans ce domaine, celles-ci feront l'objet d'une analyse spécifique. Dans une deuxième partie, il s'agira de dessiner les contours de l'information médicale. Nous commencerons par déterminer les parties à cette information avant de déterminer l'étendue et le contenu du devoir incombant au médecin. Puis, nous aborderons successivement la question des modalités de l'information et la problématique du fardeau de la preuve. Ensuite, les limitations et les cas particuliers seront examinés. La suite du travail portera sur l'exigence d'un consentement libre et éclairé en sa qualité de corollaire à l'information. Enfin, nous terminerons par un examen du droit d'accès au dossier médical. La troisième partie consacre spécifiquement le devoir d'information dans les nouvelles lois fédérales médicales (LPMA, LRCS, LAGH, LTO, LSter, LPTh, AP LRH). Dans ce dernier volet, nous nous proposons de commencer par un examen des compétences de la Confédération en médecine humaine, puis nous analyserons ces différentes lois, essentiellement sous trois aspects : leur champ d'application, l'information et le consentement du patient.