The Financial Conference on Inflation, Washington, D.C., September 20, 1974 : held at the request of President Gerald R. Ford and the Congress of the United States /

One of a series of pre-summit sector conferences held prior to the summit Conference on Inflation, Washington, D.C., 1974.

The effect of deficits on prices of financial assets : theory and evidence /

"March 1984."

First concurrent resolution on the budget, fiscal year 1980 : hearings before the Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session.

Includes indexes.

Inflation expectations, interest rates and arbitrary income transfers

Unexpected inflation, disinflation or deflation cause arbitrary income transfers between an economy's borrowers and lenders. This redistribution results from distorted real interest rates that are too high when price level changes are over-predicted and too low when they are under-predicted. This article shows that in Australia's case, inflation expectations were mostly biased upwards throughout the 1990s, according to the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research series and to a new derived series based on bond yields, implying that real interest rates were too high over this time. In turn, this caused substantial arbitrary income transfers from debtors to creditors, estimated to have averaged up to 3 per cent of gross domestic product over the period.

The productivity-inflation nexus: The case of the Australian mining sector

This paper examines the causal links between productivity growth and two price series given by domestic inflation and the price of mineral products in Australia's mining sector for the period 1968/1969 to 1997/1998. The study also uses a stochastic translog cost frontier to generate improved estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth. The results indicate negative unidirectional causality running from both price series to mining productivity growth. Regression analysis further shows that domestic inflation has a small but adverse effect on mining productivity growth, thus providing some empirical support for Australia's 'inflation first' monetary policy, at least with respect to the mining sector. Inflation in mineral price, on the other hand, has a greater negative effect on mining productivity growth via mineral export growth.

Is there a case for low inflation-induced productivity growth in selected Asian economies?

The authors examine the evidence on the relationship between inflation and productivity growth for nine Asian economies using causality analysis in a multivariate model with money supply as a possible effective monetary policy tool. The inflation-productivity growth relationship is found to be non-uniform, as the evidence of uni-directional, bi-directional, and no causality between the two variables is varied and significant for some countries and insignificant for others. An attempt is made to explain the inflation-productivity nexus for these countries and to discuss implications for anti-inflationary policies such as inflation targeting.

IDENTIFICAÇÃO DE SURPRESAS MONETÁRIAS E SEUS IMPACTOS SOBRE A ESTRUTURA A TERMO DA TAXA DE JUROS

A reação dos mercados às alterações na taxa básica de juros é relevante para toda a economia. O entendimento da relação entre a política monetária e as taxas de juros é de extrema importância, uma vez que surpresas monetárias, ou seja, os erros de previsão do mercado a respeito das alterações da meta da Taxa Selic, podem afetar as taxas de juros de diferentes maturidades ou vencimentos, impactando diretamente a Administração Financeira. O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar a variação da Estrutura a Termo da Taxa de Juros (ETTJ) quando verificadas surpresas monetárias na ocasião da decisão do Comitê de Política Monetária (Copom) a respeito da meta da Taxa Selic. Para isso, foi desenvolvido um estudo descritivo quantitativo, que considerou as 88 reuniões ordinárias do Copom realizadas no período de janeiro de 2004 a dezembro de 2013. As surpresas monetárias foram identificadas através de duas formas distintas. Na primeira forma foram consideradas as taxas do contrato de DI1 referente ao último negócio realizado no pregão da data da reunião do Copom, e a taxa do primeiro negócio realizado no pregão seguinte. Desta maneira foram identificadas 11 surpresas monetárias. Na segunda forma foram consideradas as taxas médias verificadas nos mesmos contratos e ocasiões citados anteriormente, sendo assim identificadas 10 surpresas monetárias. Já para a análise da relação entre as variações da ETTJ e as surpresas monetárias foram considerados os vencimentos de 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 e 24 meses. Como resultado foi possível observar que as surpresas monetárias e as variações na ETTJ são diretamente proporcionais, movendo-se na mesma direção, para as duas formas distintas de surpresas monetárias identificadas neste estudo. Além disso, foi empregada nas análises a questão da unanimidade na decisão do Copom, com o objetivo testar o seu conteúdo informacional, e observou-se como resultado uma menor variação da ETTJ em ocasiões em que a decisão do Copom foi unânime. Em resumo, entende-se que os resultados encontrados no presente estudo estão em linha aos apresentados por outros autores, sendo possível comprovar a correlação existente entre as variações da ETTJ e as surpresas monetárias, bem como verificar que a magnitude das variações diminui ao longo da ETTJ, fato este que pode ser relacionado à transparência da política monetária nacional e à experiência na vigência do sistema de metas para a inflação.

Az európai gazdasági kormányzás előtt álló kihívások. A hármas tagadás lehetetlensége (Challenges of European economic governance. The impossible trinity of denial.)

Az európai gazdasági integráció folyamata olyan kényszerhelyzetekben formálódott a múltban, amelyek a közgazdaságtudományban jól ismert lehetetlen háromság alapján is leírhatók. Az Európai Monetáris Rendszer a rögzített árfolyam-mechanizmusra és önálló jegybanki politikára épített, korlátozva a tőkemozgásokat. A Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió ugyanakkor a tőke szabad áramlásával és az árfolyamok visszavonhatatlan rögzítésével felszámolta a tagállami szintű jegybanki autonómiát. Az euróövezet működése egyszersmind arra a háromszoros tagadásra épül(t), hogy 1. nem lehetséges az euróövezetből való kilépés, 2. nem engedélyezett a kimentés és 3. nem kerülhet sor államcsődre. A 2008-ban Európát is elérő pénzügyi és gazdasági válság azonban elemi erővel mutatott rá e hármas tiltás tarthatatlanságára. A gazdasági kormányzás körül kibontakozott viták így jól közelíthetők a három tiltó szabály egyidejű érvényesülése lehetetlenségének bemutatásával, számba véve az egyes opciók költségeit és lehetséges hasznait. / === / The process of economic integration in the EU has been shaped by the well-known theorem of the impossible trinity. Accordingly, the European Monetary System was built upon a mix of a fixed exchange-rate regime and an autonomous monetary policy, thereby constraining capital mobility. In launching the EMU project, the EU countries decided to fix national currencies irrevocably and maintain full capital mobility, in exchange for delegating their monetary policy upwards to a supranational level. The introduction of the Euro zone, however, has simultaneously meant denial of the following three elements: (1) exit, (2) bail-out, and (3) default. Nevertheless, the 2008–9 financial and economic crisis has demonstrated mercilessly that these three pillars are incompatible with each other. So the current debates on reshaping economic governance in the EU can be modelled by introducing the “impossible trinity of denial”, concentrating on the benefits and the costs of each option.

Megmenthető-e az euróövezet? (Can the eurozone be saved?)

Az euró válságának szélesebb globális összefüggései vannak, mind a kiváltó okait, mind a nemzetközi pénzügyi rendszer működésének hiányosságait illetően. Az európai monetáris integráció szilárd reálgazdasági alapokon nyugszik. Az euró teljesítménye mind az árstabilitás, mind az árfolyamok ingadozása tekintetében megfelelőnek tekinthető. Az euróválság szuverénadósság-válság, és leginkább a zóna egyes (déli) országait érinti. Az euróválság okai többrétűek: ezek között az eurózóna hibás konstrukcióját, téves koncepcionális feltételezéseit, a politikai kompromisszumokkal folyamatosan megnyomorított működését említhetjük leginkább. A közös pénz önmagában nem oka a válságnak és nem is bűvös ellenszer. A hibás gazdaságpolitikáért belül ugyanúgy bűnhődni kell, mint kívül. Görögország, vagy Írország elsősorban nem azért került válságba, mert tagjai az eurózónának, hanem mert hibás gazdaságpolitikát folytattak. Nem zárható ki az eurózóna szétesése, de kicsi az esélye. / === / The euro crisis has broad global connections, both in terms of deficiencies of the international monetary system, and of the crisis of the global financial markets. The European monetary integration is based on strong real-economic foundations. The performance of the euro has been satisfactory both in terms of price and exchange rate stability. The present crisis is a sovereign debt crisis, and it is concentrated mainly on some Southern members. The causes of the crisis are manifold: wrong institutional and policy structures, mistaken conceptual assumptions, and the distortion of its operation by continuous political compromises. The contradictions between common monetary policy and the national fiscal policies, the failure of disciplining role of the markets, the weakness of control of national fiscal policies, the dangers of "one size fits all" monetary policy, the failure of finding the proper national policy mixes, particularly in terms of income and structural policies, and the underestimation of social and cultural differences, can be particularly stressed. The common monetary policy failed to secure the necessary equilibrium among liquidity, stability and growth. Greece and Ireland got in crisis not because they are members of the euro zone, but because of their mistaken economic policies. The collapse of the euro zone cannot be excluded, but the chances of it are limited.

Kiigazítás recesszió nélkül. Esettanulmány a magyar stabilizációról = Adjustment without recession: A Case Study of Hungarian Stabilization

1995. március 12-én a magyar kormány és a központi bank szigorú kiigazítási és stabilizációs programot hirdetett meg. A cikk az első eredmények számbavételére tesz kísérletet. A program meghirdetése előtt Magyarország két egymást követő év- ben hatalmas fizetésimérleg-hiányt mutatott fel, és nemzetközi megítélése romlani kezdett. A program radikális intézkedései nyomán elkerülhetővé vált a mexikói vál- sághoz hasonló pénzügyi katasztrófa. Sok makrogazdasági mutató jól érzékelhető javulást jelez: lényegesen csökkent a kereskedelmi mérleg és a folyó fizetési mérleg hiánya, a költségvetés elsődleges egyenlege pozitív lett. Az ilyesféle stabilizációs programokat rendszerint súlyos visszaesés és a munkanélküliség nagy növekedése kíséri. Magyarország elkerülte ezeket a mellékhatásokat: a GDP drasztikus vissza- esés helyett valamelyest tovább növekedett, és a munkanélküliség változatlan ma- radt. A javulásnak nagy ára volt: az életszínvonal erőteljes csökkenése, az infláció felgyorsulása, bár a magyarországi infláció még mindig a kézben tartott, mérsékelt infláció sávjában maradt. A cikk ismerteti a program heterodox módszereit: 1. nagy leértékelés, az előre meghirdetett csúszó árfolyam rezsimjének bevezetése, valamint ideiglenes import- vámpótlék kivetése; 2. határozott jövedelempolitika, amely 12 százalékos reálbércsök- kenést kényszerített ki; 3. fiskális intézkedések, köztük jóléti jogosultságok csök- kentése (a program meghirdetése előtt ezek a jogosultságok tabuk voltak); 4. a hitel- kínálat átcsoportosítása a vállalati szektor javára, a jövedelmezőség növekedése; 5. feszített (bár nem mértéktelenül feszített) monetáris politika, amely lehetővé tette a sikeres vállalatok expanzióját; 6. a privatizáció felgyorsítása, nagy és sikeres lépé- sek egyes kulcsszektorok (energia, telekommunikáció) privatizációjában. Végezetül a tanulmány óva int a túlzott magabiztosságtól és felhívja a figyelmet a potenciális veszélyekre. A makrogazdasági javulás még törékeny. A magyar fejlődés legbiztatóbb sajátossága a termelékenység erőteljes és folyamatos növekedése. / === / On March 12, 1995 Hungary s government and central bank announced a tough program of adjustment and stabilization. This study is an attempt to asses the first results. Before the announcement of the program Hungary had a huge current account deficit for two consecutive years, and her international reputation started to decline. The program s radical measures made it possible to avoid a Mexico-style financial catastrophe. Many macroeconomic indicators show tangible improvement: the trade deficit and the deficit on the current account have been reduced significantly, the primary budget shifted to surplus. These kinds of adjustment programs are usually associated with deep recession and a large increase of unemployment. Hungary avoided these adverse side-effects: GDP instead of a drastic decline, continued to grow somewhat, and unemployment remained unchanged. There was a high price for the improvement: a sharp decline in the standard of living, and an acceleration of inflation, although Hungary is still in the range of controlled, moderate inflation. The paper describes the heterodox instruments of the program: (1) large devaluation, followed by a new exchange rate regime of pre-announced crawling peg, and a temporary import surcharge, (2) energetic income policy, enforcing a 12% cut in real wages; (3) fiscal measures, including cuts in welfare entitlements. That happened for the first time: before the program entitlements had been regarded as taboo ; (4) reallocation of credit supply in favor of the enterprise sector; increase of profitability; (5) tight (but not excessively tight) monetary policy, allowing the expansion of successful private busi- ness; (6) acceleration of privatisation, including large and successful steps in the privatisation of some key sectors (energy, telecommunication). Finally the paper warns against excessive self- confidence and draws the attention to potential dangers. The macroeconomic improvement is still fragile. The most reassuring feature of Hungary s development is the impressive and persistent improvement of productivity.

The factors affecting the international judgement of the Forint and Zloty in the light of the financial crisis of year 2008

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shaken both money and capital markets. Its consequences have not even left European markets untouched and divided spirits in the financial world. In some countries efforts by the monetary policy to protect the national currency throughout the crisis seemed to be ineffective. In the present paper we are investigating the effect of the most important macroeconomic and economic policy factors on the exchange rate of the forint and zloty in the last decade. For an analysis of exchange rates we are relying on some preceding research results based on equilibrium exchange rate theories.

The Euro Area's Tightrope Walk: Debt and Competitiveness in Italy and Spain

- Competitiveness adjustment in struggling southern euro-area members requires persistently lower inflation than in major trading partners, but low inflation worsens public debt sustainability. When average euro-area inflation undershoots the two percent target, the conflict between intra-euro relative price adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe. - In our baseline scenario, the projected public debt ratio reduction in Italy and Spain is too slow and does not meet the European fiscal rule. Debt projections are very sensitive to underlying assumptions and even small negative deviations from GDP growth, inflation and budget surplus assumptions can easily result in a runaway debt trajectory. - The case for a greater than five percent of GDP primary budget surplus is very weak. Beyond vitally important structural reforms, the top priority is to ensure that euro-area inflation does not undershoot the two percent target, which requires national policy actions and more accommodative monetary policy. The latter would weaken the euro exchange rate, thereby facilitating further intra-euro adjustment. More effective policies are needed to foster growth. But if all else fails, the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions could reduce borrowing costs.