Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Reprisals remembered: German-Greek conflict and car sales during the Euro crisis

During the Greek debt crisis after 2010, the German government insisted on harshausterity measures. This led to a rapid cooling of relations between the Greekand German governments. We compile a new index of public acrimony betweenGermany and Greece based on newspaper reports and internet search terms. Thisinformation is combined with historical maps on German war crimes during theoccupation between 1941 and 1944. During months of open conflict between Germanand Greek politicians, German car sales fell markedly more than those of cars fromother countries. This was especially true in areas affected by German reprisals duringWorldWar II: areas where German troops committed massacres and destroyed entirevillages curtailed their purchases of German cars to a greater extent during conflictmonths than other parts of Greece. We conclude that cultural aversion was a keydeterminant of purchasing behavior, and that memories of past conflict can affecteconomic choices in a time-varying fashion. These findings are compatible withbehavioral models emphasizing the importance of salience for individual decision-making.

Declining labor force attachment and downward trends in unemployment and participation

The US labor market witnessed two apparently unrelated secular movements in thelast 30 years: a decline in unemployment between the early 1980s and the early 2000s,and a decline in participation since the early 2000s. Using CPS micro data and a stock-flow accounting framework, we show that a substantial, and hitherto unnoticed, factorbehind both trends is a decline in the share of nonparticipants who are at the margin ofparticipation. A lower share of marginal nonparticipants implies a lower unemploymentrate, because marginal nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through unemployment,while other nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through employment.

Labor market heterogeneity and the aggregate matching function

The matching function -a key building block in models of labor market frictions- impliesthat the job finding rate depends only on labor market tightness. We estimate such amatching function and find that the relation, although remarkably stable over 1967-2007,broke down spectacularly after 2007. We argue that labor market heterogeneities are notfully captured by the standard matching function, but that a generalized matching functionthat explicitly takes into account worker heterogeneity and market segmentation is fullyconsistent with the behavior of the job finding rate. The standard matching function canbreak down when, as in the Great Recession, the average characteristics of the unemployedchange too much, or when dispersion in labor market conditions -the extent to which somelabor markets fare worse than others- increases too much.

Las relaciones económicas internacionales de la "España Europea"

[eng] Since the year 1986 in which Spain became full member of the European Communities, the quantity and quality of the Spanish international economic relations measured in terms of Balance of Payments have change dramatically. In the past Spanish workers moved to Europe. Now Spain is among the three major countries attracting immigrants from developing countries. In the past Spain received a lot of Foreign Investment, today many Spanish companies are investing abroad. The changes are not only due to membership to the EU but also to the Spanish accommodation to the Globalization.

Las relaciones económicas internacionales de la "España Europea"

[eng] Since the year 1986 in which Spain became full member of the European Communities, the quantity and quality of the Spanish international economic relations measured in terms of Balance of Payments have change dramatically. In the past Spanish workers moved to Europe. Now Spain is among the three major countries attracting immigrants from developing countries. In the past Spain received a lot of Foreign Investment, today many Spanish companies are investing abroad. The changes are not only due to membership to the EU but also to the Spanish accommodation to the Globalization.

Structural development accounting

We construct and estimate a unified model combining three of the main sources ofcross-country income disparities: differences in factor endowments, barriers to technologyadoption and the inappropriateness of frontier technologies to local conditions. The keycomponents are different types of workers, distortions to capital accumulation, directedtechnical change, costly adoption and spillovers from the world technology frontier. Despiteits parsimonious parametrization, our empirical model provides a good fit of GDP data forup to 86 countries in 1970 and 122 countries in 2000. Removing barriers to technologyadoption would increase the output per worker of the average non-OECD country relativeto the US from 0.19 to 0.61, while increasing skill premia in all countries. Removing barriersto trade in goods amplifies income disparities, induces skill-biased technology adoptionand increases skill premia in the majority of countries. These results are reverted if tradeliberalization is coupled with international IPR protection.

Conditional predictive density evaluation in the presence of instabilities

We propose new methods for evaluating predictive densities. The methods includeKolmogorov-Smirnov and Cram?r-von Mises-type tests for the correct specification ofpredictive densities robust to dynamic mis-specification. The novelty is that the testscan detect mis-specification in the predictive densities even if it appears only overa fraction of the sample, due to the presence of instabilities. Our results indicatethat our tests are well sized and have good power in detecting mis-specification inpredictive densities, even when it is time-varying. An application to density forecastsof the Survey of Professional Forecasters demonstrates the usefulness of the proposedmethodologies.

Clusters of entrepreneurship

Employment growth is strongly predicted by smaller average establishment size, both acrosscities and across industries within cities, but there is little consensus on why this relationshipexists. Traditional economic explanations emphasize factors that reduce entry costs or raiseentrepreneurial returns, thereby increasing net returns and attracting entrepreneurs. A secondclass of theories hypothesizes that some places are endowed with a greater supply of entrepreneurship. Evidence on sales per worker does not support the higher returns for entrepreneurshiprationale. Our evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is higher when fixed costs are lower andwhen there are more entrepreneurial people.

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Heterogeneity, selection and labor market disparities

We study the incentives to acquire skill in a model where heterogeneous firmsand workers interact in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and costlyscreening. When effort in acquiring skill raises both the mean and the variance of theresulting ability distribution, multiple equilibria may arise. In the high-effort equilibrium, heterogeneity in ability is sufficiently large to induce firms to select the bestworkers, thereby confirming the belief that effort is important for finding good jobs.In the low-effort equilibrium, ability is not sufficiently dispersed to justify screening,thereby confirming the belief that effort is not so important. The model has implications for wage inequality, the distribution of firm characteristics, sorting patternsbetween firms and workers, and unemployment rates that can help explaining observedcross-country variation in socio-economic and labor market outcomes.

Gifts of Mars: Warfare and Europe's early rise to riches

Today, per capita income differences around the globe are large ? varying by as much as a factor of 35 across countries (Hall and Jones 1999). These differentials mostly reflect the "Great Divergence" (Sam Huntingon) ? the fact that Western Europe and former European colonies grew rapidly after 1800, while other countries grew much later or stagnated. What is less well-known is that a "First Divergence" preceded the Great Divergence: Western Europe surged ahead of the rest of the world long before technological growth became rapid. Europe in 1500 was already twice as rich on a per capita basis as Africa, and one-third richer than most of Asia (Maddison 2007). In this essay, we explain how Europe's tumultuous politics and deadly penchant for warfare translated into a sustained advantage in per capita incomes.

Out-of-sample forecast tests robust to the choice of window size

This paper proposes new methodologies for evaluating out-of-sample forecastingperformance that are robust to the choice of the estimation window size. The methodologies involve evaluating the predictive ability of forecasting models over a wide rangeof window sizes. We show that the tests proposed in the literature may lack the powerto detect predictive ability and might be subject to data snooping across differentwindow sizes if used repeatedly. An empirical application shows the usefulness of themethodologies for evaluating exchange rate models' forecasting ability.

The changing relationship between commodity prices and equity prices in commodity exporting

We explore the linkage between equity and commodity markets, focusing in particular on its evolution over time. We document that a country's equity market valuehas significant out-of-sample predictive ability for the future global commodity priceindex for several primary commodity-exporting countries. The out-of-sample predictive ability of the equity market appears around 2000s. The results are robust to usingseveral control variables as well as firm-level equity data. Finally, our results indicatethat exchange rates are a better predictor of commodity prices than equity markets,especially at very short horizons.

Exchange rate predictability

The main goal of this article is to provide an answer to the question: "Does anything forecast exchange rates, and if so, which variables?". It is well known thatexchange rate fluctuations are very difficult to predict using economic models, andthat a random walk forecasts exchange rates better than any economic model (theMeese and Rogoff puzzle). However, the recent literature has identified a series of fundamentals/methodologies that claim to have resolved the puzzle. This article providesa critical review of the recent literature on exchange rate forecasting and illustratesthe new methodologies and fundamentals that have been recently proposed in an up-to-date, thorough empirical analysis. Overall, our analysis of the literature and thedata suggests that the answer to the question: "Are exchange rates predictable?" is,"It depends" -on the choice of predictor, forecast horizon, sample period, model, andforecast evaluation method. Predictability is most apparent when one or more of thefollowing hold: the predictors are Taylor rule or net foreign assets, the model is linear, and a small number of parameters are estimated. The toughest benchmark is therandom walk without drift.