795 resultados para Individual Rationality
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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UANL
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We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.
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We provide an axiomatization of Yitzhaki’s index of individual deprivation. Our result differs from an earlier characterization due to Ebert and Moyes in the way the reference group of an individual is represented in the model. Ebert and Moyes require the index to be defined for all logically possible reference groups, whereas we employ the standard definition of the reference group as the set of all agents in a society. As a consequence of this modification, some of the axioms used by Ebert and Moyes can no longer be applied and we provide alternative formulations.
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UANL
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We introduce and axiomatize a one-parameter class of individual deprivation measures. Motivated by a suggestion of Runciman, we modify Yitzhaki’s index by multiplying it by a function that is interpreted as measuring the part of deprivation generated by an agent’s observation that others in its reference group move on to a higher level of income than itself. The parameter reflects the relative weight given to these dynamic considerations, and the standard Yitzhaki index is obtained as a special case. In addition, we characterize more general classes of measures that pay attention to this important dynamic aspect of deprivation.
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Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).
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Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)
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Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.
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Tesis (Doctor en Ingeniería con Especialidad en Ingeniería de Sistemas) UANL, 1997.
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Tesis (Doctor en Filosofía con Orientación en Trabajo Social y Políticas Comparadas de Bienestar Social) UANL, 2011.
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Tesis (Doctorado en Filosofía con Orientación en Trabajo Social y Políticas Comparadas de Bienestar Social) UANL, 2013.