Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Patient-based Literature Retrieval and Integration: A Use Case for Diabetes and arterial Hypertension

Specialized search engines such as PubMed, MedScape or Cochrane have increased dramatically the visibility of biomedical scientific results. These web-based tools allow physicians to access scientific papers instantly. However, this decisive improvement had not a proportional impact in clinical practice due to the lack of advanced search methods. Even queries highly specified for a concrete pathology frequently retrieve too many information, with publications related to patients treated by the physician beyond the scope of the results examined. In this work we present a new method to improve scientific article search using patient information. Two pathologies have been used within the project to retrieve relevant literature to patient data and to be integrated with other sources. Promising results suggest the suitability of the approach, highlighting publications dealing with patient features and facilitating literature search to physicians.

Monitoring ocular hypertension, how much and how often? : A cost-effectiveness perspective

Peer reviewed

Down-regulation of the expression of endothelial NO synthase is likely to contribute to glucocorticoid-mediated hypertension

Hypertension is a side effect of systemically administered glucocorticoids, but the underlying molecular mechanism remains poorly understood. Ingestion of dexamethasone by rats telemetrically instrumented increased blood pressure progressively over 7 days. Plasma concentrations of Na+ and K+ and urinary Na+ and K+ excretion remained constant, excluding a mineralocorticoid-mediated mechanism. Plasma NO2−/NO3− (the oxidation products of NO) decreased to 40%, and the expression of endothelial NO synthase (NOS III) was found down-regulated in the aorta and several other tissues of glucocorticoid-treated rats. The vasodilator response of resistance arterioles was tested by intravital microscopy in the mouse dorsal skinfold chamber model. Dexamethasone treatment significantly attenuated the relaxation to the endothelium-dependent vasodilator acetylcholine, but not to the endothelium-independent vasodilator S-nitroso-N-acetyl-d,l-penicillamine. Incubation of human umbilical vein endothelial cells, EA.hy 926 cells, or bovine aortic endothelial cells with several glucocorticoids reduced NOS III mRNA and protein expression to 60–70% of control, an effect that was prevented by the glucocorticoid receptor antagonist mifepristone. Glucocorticoids decreased NOS III mRNA stability and reduced the activity of the human NOS III promoter (3.5 kilobases) to ≈70% by decreasing the binding activity of the essential transcription factor GATA. The expressional down-regulation of endothelial NOS III may contribute to the hypertension caused by glucocorticoids.

Hypertension, cardiac hypertrophy, and sudden death in mice lacking natriuretic peptide receptor A

Natriuretic peptides, produced in the heart, bind to the natriuretic peptide receptor A (NPRA) and cause vasodilation and natriuresis important in the regulation of blood pressure. We here report that mice lacking a functional Npr1 gene coding for NPRA have elevated blood pressures and hearts exhibiting marked hypertrophy with interstitial fibrosis resembling that seen in human hypertensive heart disease. Echocardiographic evaluation of the mice demonstrated a compensated state of systemic hypertension in which cardiac hypertrophy and dilatation are evident but with no reduction in ventricular performance. Nevertheless, sudden death, with morphologic evidence indicative in some animals of congestive heart failure and in others of aortic dissection, occurred in all 15 male mice lacking Npr1 before 6 months of age, and in one of 16 females in our study. Thus complete absence of NPRA causes hypertension in mice and leads to cardiac hypertrophy and, particularly in males, lethal vascular events similar to those seen in untreated human hypertensive patients.

Genetically determined chloride-sensitive hypertension and stroke

The stroke-prone spontaneously hypertensive rat (SHRSP) is a genetically determined model of “salt-sensitive” stroke and hypertension whose full phenotypic expression is said to require a diet high in Na+ and low in K+. We tested the hypothesis that dietary Cl− determines the phenotypic expression of the SHRSP. In the SHRSP fed a normal NaCl diet, supplementing dietary K+ with KCl exacerbated hypertension, whereas supplementing either KHCO3 or potassium citrate (KB/C) attenuated hypertension, when blood pressure (BP) was measured radiotelemetrically, directly and continually. Supplemental KCl, but not KB/C, induced strokes, which occurred in all and only those rats in the highest quartiles of both BP and plasma renin activity (PRA). PRA was higher with KCl than with KB/C. These observations demonstrate that with respect to both severity of hypertension and frequency of stroke the phenotypic expression of the SHRSP is (i) either increased or decreased, depending on whether the anionic component of the potassium salt supplemented is, or is not, Cl−; (ii) increased by supplementing Cl− without supplementing Na+, and despite supplementing K+; and hence (iii) both selectively Cl−-sensitive and Cl−-determined. The observations suggest that in the SHRSP selectively supplemented with Cl− the likelihood of stroke depends on the extent to which both BP and PRA increase.

Nonlinear indicial response of complex nonstationary oscillations as pulmonary hypertension responding to step hypoxia

This paper is devoted to the quantization of the degree of nonlinearity of the relationship between two biological variables when one of the variables is a complex nonstationary oscillatory signal. An example of the situation is the indicial responses of pulmonary blood pressure (P) to step changes of oxygen tension (ΔpO2) in the breathing gas. For a step change of ΔpO2 beginning at time t1, the pulmonary blood pressure is a nonlinear function of time and ΔpO2, which can be written as P(t-t1 | ΔpO2). An effective method does not exist to examine the nonlinear function P(t-t1 | ΔpO2). A systematic approach is proposed here. The definitions of mean trends and oscillations about the means are the keys. With these keys a practical method of calculation is devised. We fit the mean trends of blood pressure with analytic functions of time, whose nonlinearity with respect to the oxygen level is clarified here. The associated oscillations about the mean can be transformed into Hilbert spectrum. An integration of the square of the Hilbert spectrum over frequency yields a measure of oscillatory energy, which is also a function of time, whose mean trends can be expressed by analytic functions. The degree of nonlinearity of the oscillatory energy with respect to the oxygen level also is clarified here. Theoretical extension of the experimental nonlinear indicial functions to arbitrary history of hypoxia is proposed. Application of the results to tissue remodeling and tissue engineering of blood vessels is discussed.

Survival in treated hypertension: follow up study after two decades

Objective: To compare survival and cause specific mortality in hypertensive men with non-hypertensive men derived from the same random population, and to study mortality and morbidity from cardiovascular diseases in the hypertensive men in relation to effects on cardiovascular risk factors during 22-23 years of follow up.