For the Good of the Game(?): The Legacy of the Football Trust, the Football Pools & the Dangerous Seduction of Political Promise

During the late twentieth century, the United Kingdom’s football infrastructure and spectatorship underwent transformation as successive stadia disasters heightened political and public scrutiny of the game and prompted industry change. Central to this process was the government’s formation of an independent charitable organization to oversee subsequent policy implementation and grant-aid provision to clubs for safety, crowd, and spectator requirements. This entity, which began in 1975 focusing on ground improvement, developed into the Football Trust. The Trust was funded directly by the football pools companies who ran popular low-stakes football betting enterprises. Working in association with the Pools Promoters Association (PPA), and demonstrating their social responsibility towards the game’s constituents, the pools resourced a wide array of Trust activities. Yet irrespective of government mandate, the PPA and Trust were continually confronted by political and economic obstacles that threatened the effectiveness of their arrangements. In this paper the history of the Football Trust is investigated, along with its partnership with the PPA, and its relationship with the government within the context of broader political shifts, stadia catastrophes, official inquiries, and commercial threats. It is contended that while the Trust/PPA partnership had a respectable legacy, their history afforded little protection against adverse contemporary conditions.

Transmission cost allocation using cooperative game theory: a comparative study

In this paper is presented a Game Theory based methodology to allocate transmission costs, considering cooperation and competition between producers. As original contribution, it finds the degree of participation on the additional costs according to the demand behavior. A comparative study was carried out between the obtained results using Nucleolus balance and Shapley Value, with other techniques such as Averages Allocation method and the Generalized Generation Distribution Factors method (GGDF). As example, a six nodes network was used for the simulations. The results demonstrate the ability to find adequate solutions on open access environment to the networks.

A mobile robot platform for open learning based on serious games and remote laboratories

Within the pedagogical community, Serious Games have arisen as a viable alternative to traditional course-based learning materials. Until now, they have been based strictly on software solutions. Meanwhile, research into Remote Laboratories has shown that they are a viable, low-cost solution for experimentation in an engineering context, providing uninterrupted access, low-maintenance requirements, and a heightened sense of reality when compared to simulations. This paper will propose a solution where both approaches are combined to deliver a Remote Laboratory-based Serious Game for use in engineering and school education. The platform for this system is the WebLab-Deusto Framework, already well-tested within the remote laboratory context, and based on open standards. The laboratory allows users to control a mobile robot in a labyrinth environment and take part in an interactive game where they must locate and correctly answer several questions, the subject of which can be adapted to educators' needs. It also integrates the Google Blockly graphical programming language, allowing students to learn basic programming and logic principles without needing to understand complex syntax.

Strategic Bidding in Electricity Markets: An agent-based simulator with game theory for scenario analysis

Electricity markets are complex environments, involving a large number of different entities, with specific characteristics and objectives, making their decisions and interacting in a dynamic scene. Game-theory has been widely used to support decisions in competitive environments; therefore its application in electricity markets can prove to be a high potential tool. This paper proposes a new scenario analysis algorithm, which includes the application of game-theory, to evaluate and preview different scenarios and provide players with the ability to strategically react in order to exhibit the behavior that better fits their objectives. This model includes forecasts of competitor players’ actions, to build models of their behavior, in order to define the most probable expected scenarios. Once the scenarios are defined, game theory is applied to support the choice of the action to be performed. Our use of game theory is intended for supporting one specific agent and not for achieving the equilibrium in the market. MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for Competitive Electricity Markets) is a multi-agent electricity market simulator that models market players and simulates their operation in the market. The scenario analysis algorithm has been tested within MASCEM and our experimental findings with a case study based on real data from the Iberian Electricity Market are presented and discussed.

A framework for real time MMO game content generation

Com o aumento de plataformas móveis disponíveis no mercado e com o constante incremento na sua capacidade computacional, a possibilidade de executar aplicações e em especial jogos com elevados requisitos de desempenho aumentou consideravelmente. O mercado dos videojogos tem assim um cada vez maior número de potenciais clientes. Em especial, o mercado de jogos massive multiplayer online (MMO) tem-se tornado muito atractivo para as empresas de desenvolvimento de jogos. Estes jogos suportam uma elevada quantidade de jogadores em simultâneo que podem estar a executar o jogo em diferentes plataformas e distribuídos por um "mundo" de jogo extenso. Para incentivar a exploração desse "mundo", distribuem-se de forma inteligente pontos de interesse que podem ser explorados pelo jogador. Esta abordagem leva a um esforço substancial no planeamento e construção desses mundos, gastando tempo e recursos durante a fase de desenvolvimento. Isto representa um problema para as empresas de desenvolvimento de jogos, e em alguns casos, e impraticável suportar tais custos para equipas indie. Nesta tese e apresentada uma abordagem para a criação de mundos para jogos MMO. Estudam-se vários jogos MMO que são casos de sucesso de modo a identificar propriedades comuns nos seus mundos. O objectivo e criar uma framework flexível capaz de gerar mundos com estruturas que respeitam conjuntos de regras definidas por game designers. Para que seja possível usar a abordagem aqui apresentada em v arias aplicações diferentes, foram desenvolvidos dois módulos principais. O primeiro, chamado rule-based-map-generator, contem a lógica e operações necessárias para a criação de mundos. O segundo, chamado blocker, e um wrapper à volta do módulo rule-based-map-generator que gere as comunicações entre servidor e clientes. De uma forma resumida, o objectivo geral e disponibilizar uma framework para facilitar a geração de mundos para jogos MMO, o que normalmente e um processo bastante demorado e aumenta significativamente o custo de produção, através de uma abordagem semi-automática combinando os benefícios de procedural content generation (PCG) com conteúdo gráfico gerado manualmente.

Spiteful Strategies. The ontogeny and the practice of spite in human interaction: an experimental game theory approach and empirical applications

As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

Evolution of reputation in networks: A mean field game approach

This work models the competitive behaviour of individuals who maximize their own utility managing their network of connections with other individuals. Utility is taken as a synonym of reputation in this model. Each agent has to decide between two variables: the quality of connections and the number of connections. Hence, the reputation of an individual is a function of the number and the quality of connections within the network. On the other hand, individuals incur in a cost when they improve their network of contacts. The initial value of the quality and number of connections of each individual is distributed according to an initial (given) distribution. The competition occurs over continuous time and among a continuum of agents. A mean field game approach is adopted to solve the model, leading to an optimal trajectory for the number and quality of connections for each individual.

Almirante: Evaluating the board game: Board game, startup, discounted cash flow, venture capital method, real options

This thesis evaluates a start-up company (Jogos Almirante Lda) whose single asset is a board game named Almirante. It aims to conclude whether it makes sense to create a company or just earn copyrights. The thesis analyzes the board game’s market, as part of the general toy’s market, from which some data exists: European countries as well as the USA. In this work it is analyzed the several ways to finance a start-up company and then present an overview of the valuation of the Jogos Almirante based on three different methods: Discounted Cash Flow, Venture Capital Method and Real Options.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

How aspiring filmmakers cope with unexpected events on set

Making the transition between plans and unexpected occurrences is something organizations are used to doing every day. However, not much is known about how actors cope with unanticipated events and how they accommodate them within predefined schedules. In this study, we draw on an inductive analysis of aspiring filmmakers’ film sets to elaborate on how they plan their shooting activities every day, only to adjust them when unforeseen complications arise. We discover that film crews anchor their expectations for the day based on a planned shooting schedule, yet they incorporate a built-in assumption that it will inevitably be disrupted. We argue that they resort to triage processes and “troubleshooting protocols” that help decipher incoming problems. Familiar problems are solved by making use of experience obtained from past situations, whereas unprecedented problems are solved through a tacit protocol used as a tool to quickly devise an appropriate game plan. This study contributes to the literature on sense-making and provides valuable information about the unexplored world of filmmaking.

Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.

Effect of Emotion and Personality on Deviation from Purely Rational Decision-Making

Human decision-making has consistently demonstrated deviation from "pure" rationality. Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and the current study investigates how perceived emotions and personality traits may affect decision-making during the Ultimatum Game (UG). We manipulated emotions by showing images with emotional connotation while participants decided how to split money with a second player. Event-related potentials (ERPs) from scalp electrodes were recorded during the whole decision-making process. We observed significant differences in the activity of central and frontal areas when participants offered money with respect to when they accepted or rejected an offer. We found that participants were more likely to offer a higher amount of money when making their decision in association with negative emotions. Furthermore, participants were more likely to accept offers when making their decision in association with positive emotions. Honest, conscientious, and introverted participants were more likely to accept offers. Our results suggest that factors others than a rational strategy may predict economic decision-making in the UG.

On the Offesive

A game from the 79/80 or 80/81 season.

Salivary testosterone and cortisol : role of athletic setting, game outcome, and game location /

Many studies investigating the relationship between hormones and competition have focused on athletic competition. The athletic setting enables r researchers to investigate the hormone-behaviour relationship in a relatively controlled environment. However, research to date has been based on observations made from single status contests and/or weekend tournaments and as such, does not provide a clear picture of an individual's average hormonal responses to both victory and defeat. In appreciation of this limitation, the current study tracked elite hockey players throughout a hockey season, measuring pre- and post-game salivary testosterone and Cortisol as well as psychological measures. I was interested in determining whether status outcome (win vs. loss) would influence an individual's testosterone and Cortisol responses to competition. Furthermore, I was also interested in assessing whether testosterone and Cortisol responses were specific to the competitive environment or whether similar hormonal responses would occur during non-competitive practice sessions. Last, I was interested in whether there were any differences in pre-game hormonal and psychological states depending on where the status contest was held: home versus away. The results indicated that game outcome moderated the testosterone responses to competition. That is, testosterone increased significantly more after a victory compared to a defeat. Furthermore, a loss of status produced significantly hreports, the players did not show an anticipatory rise in either Cortisol or testosterone prior to competition. In addition to the effects of status outcome on hormonal levels, it was also found that these hormonal responses were specific to competition. The athletes in the current study did not demonstrate any hormonal responses to the practice sessions. Last, there were significant differences in pre-game testosterone as well as in selfconfidence, cognitive, and somatic anxiety levels depending on the location at which the status contest took place. Pre-game testosterone and self-confidence levels were significantly higher prior to games played in the home venue. In contrast, pre-game somatic and cognitive anxiety levels were significantly higher prior to games played in the away venue. The current findings add to the developing literature on the relationship between hormones and competition. This was the first study to detect a moderating effect of status outcome on testosterone responses in a team sport. Furthermore, this was also the first study in humans to demonstrate that post-contest Cortisol levels were significantly higher after a loss of status. Last, the current study also adds to the sport psychology literature by demonstrating that pre-game psychological variables differ depending on where the status contest is being held: higher self-confidence at home and higher somatic and cognitive anxiety away. Taken together, the results from the current thesis may have important practical relevance to coaches, trainers and sport psychologists who are always trying to find ways to maximize performance. post-game Cortisol levels than did an increase in status. In contrast to previous

The wars of the gulls; : an historical romance in three chapters; chap. I, Shewing how and why and with whom the gulls went to war: chap. II, Shewing how the gulls make the deep to boil like a pot: chap. III, Shewing how a certain doughty general of the gulls goes forth to play the game of hull-gull in Upper Canada.

Transcribed on front paste-down: W.G. Phelps Oct. 29 1890.