Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

The daily market for funds in Europe: Mathematical appendix

This paper includes the derivations of the main expressions in the paper ``The Daily Market for Funds in Europe: Has Something Changed With the EMU?'' by G. Pérez Quirós and H. Rodríguez Mendizábal.

Locação: Critérios de decisão e de reconhecimento

Uma empresa pode alcançar bons resultados, se os gestores da mesma optarem pela melhor fonte de financiamento. Na qualidade de alternativa de financiamento, a locação financeira tem vindo a apresentar níveis de crescimentos bastante expressivas, tendo já sido adoptado por grande parte do tecido empresarial internacional, como meio privilegiado de financiamento de médio e longo prazo. Desta forma, o presente trabalho desenvolve o tema: “ Locação: Critérios de Decisão e de Reconhecimento”, focalizando na locação financeira enquanto alternativa de financiamento. Tendo como objectivo, demonstrar a utilização ou não da locação financeira como meio de financiamento e de apresentar os critérios para fundamentar tal decisão, foi feito um inquérito a algumas empresas no mercado em São Vicente. A apreciação das respostas obtidas e análise do inquérito levou à conclusão de que a locação financeira é uma actividade relativamente recente, sendo pouca explorada pelo tecido empresarial. O trabalho explora ainda uma dimensão contabilística das locações, relacionada com os processos de mensuração e reconhecimento no balanço e nas demonstrações de resultados. Para além disso, este trabalho vai mais adiante com um estudo de caso, utilizando como instrumento um contrato de locação financeira, para averiguar na prática qual o tratamento contabilístico atribuído a este tipo de contrato pelos intervenientes no contrato. O estudo de caso foi feito com base em documentos facultados por uma das empresas inquiridas no mercado em São Vicente, da qual por exigência da mesma garantimos a confidencialidade, utilizando assim um nome fictício “Alfa, S.A.”. Esperamos que este estudo exploratório seja útil e que contribua para o aumento do conhecimento teórico e prático sobre as locações, a todos os interessados nesta matéria. A company can get good results, if their managers, opt for the best financing source. In the quality of financing alternative, the financial lease has been demonstrating, growth levels quite expressive, having already been adopted for great part of the international business fabric, as a privilege way of financing of medium and long period. On this way, the present work develops the theme: “Lease: Criteria of decision and of the recognition” focusing in the financial lease while financing alternative. The goal is to demonstrate the use of the financial lease as a way of financing and of presenting the criteria to base such decision, it was made an inquiry to some companies in São Vicente market. The appreciation of the obtained answers and the analyzes of such inquiry took the conclusion that the financial lease is an activity relatively recent, being little explored by the business fabric. This work explores also a accountant dimension of the related leases with the mensuration processes and of recognition of the swinging and in the demonstration of results. Besides, this work is going further on with a case study, using as instrument a contract of financial lease to inquire in practice which is the accounting treatment attributed to this type of contract by the intervening in the contact. The study case was done with base in documents allowed by one of the companies inquired in São Vicente, of which we guaranteed the confidentiality for demand of the same, using as a fictitious the name “Alfa, S.A.” We hoped that this exploratory study is useful and that it contributes to the increase of the theoretical knowledge and practice on the leases, to all the interested in this matter.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

On the impact of fundamentals, liquidity and coordination on market stability

We develop a coordination game to model interactions betweenfundamentals and liquidity during unstable periods in financial markets.We then propose a flexible econometric framework for estimationof the model and analysis of its quantitative implications. The specificempirical application is carry trades in the yen dollar market, includingthe turmoil of 1998. We find a generally very deep market, withlow information disparities amongst agents. We observe occasionallyepisodes of market fragility, or turmoil with up by the escalator, downby the elevator patterns in prices. The key role of strategic behaviorin the econometric model is also confirmed.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".