Some Law and Economics of Historic Shipwrecks

This paper examines how US and proposed international law relate to the recovery of archaeological data from historic shipwrecks. It argues that US federal admiralty law of salvage gives far less protection to historic submerged sites than do US laws protecting archaeological sites on US federal and Indian lands. The paper offers a simple model in which the net present value of the salvage and archaeological investigation of an historic shipwreck is maximized. It is suggested that salvage law gives insufficient protection to archaeological data, but that UNESCO's Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage goes too far in the other direction. It is also suggested that a move towards maximizing the net present value of a wreck would be promoted if the US admiralty courts explicitly tied the size of salvage awards to the quality of the archaeology performed.

Patenting genes and gene sequences: Analysis of public health implications and the law

At issue is whether or not isolated DNA is patent eligible under the U.S. Patent Law and the implications of that determination on public health. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued patents on DNA since the 1980s, and scientists and researchers have proceeded under that milieu since that time. Today, genetic research and testing related to the human breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 is conducted within the framework of seven patents that were issued to Myriad Genetics and the University of Utah Research Foundation between 1997 and 2000. In 2009, suit was filed on behalf of multiple researchers, professional associations and others to invalidate fifteen of the claims underlying those patents. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears patent cases, has invalidated claims for analyzing and comparing isolated DNA but has upheld claims to isolated DNA. The specific issue of whether isolated DNA is patent eligible is now before the Supreme Court, which is expected to decide the case by year's end. In this work, a systematic review was performed to determine the effects of DNA patents on various stakeholders and, ultimately, on public health; and to provide a legal analysis of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA and the likely outcome of the Supreme Court's decision. ^ A literature review was conducted to: first, identify principle stakeholders with an interest in patent eligibility of the isolated DNA sequences BRCA1 and BRCA2; and second, determine the effect of the case on those stakeholders. Published reports that addressed gene patents, the Myriad litigation, and implications of gene patents on stakeholders were included. Next, an in-depth legal analysis of the patent eligibility of isolated DNA and methods for analyzing it was performed pursuant to accepted methods of legal research and analysis based on legal briefs, federal law and jurisprudence, scholarly works and standard practice legal analysis. ^ Biotechnology, biomedical and clinical research, access to health care, and personalized medicine were identified as the principle stakeholders and interests herein. Many experts believe that the patent eligibility of isolated DNA will not greatly affect the biotechnology industry insofar as genetic testing is concerned; unlike for therapeutics, genetic testing does not require tremendous resources or lead time. The actual impact on biomedical researchers is uncertain, with greater impact expected for researchers whose work is intended for commercial purposes (versus basic science). The impact on access to health care has been surprisingly difficult to assess; while invalidating gene patents might be expected to decrease the cost of genetic testing and improve access to more laboratories and physicians' offices that provide the test, a 2010 study on the actual impact was inconclusive. As for personalized medicine, many experts believe that the availability of personalized medicine is ultimately a public policy issue for Congress, not the courts. ^ Based on the legal analysis performed in this work, this writer believes the Supreme Court is likely to invalidate patents on isolated DNA whose sequences are found in nature, because these gene sequences are a basic tool of scientific and technologic work and patents on isolated DNA would unduly inhibit their future use. Patents on complementary DNA (cDNA) are expected to stand, however, based on the human intervention required to craft cDNA and the product's distinction from the DNA found in nature. ^ In the end, the solution as to how to address gene patents may lie not in jurisprudence but in a fundamental change in business practices to provide expanded licenses to better address the interests of the several stakeholders. ^

Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement

The use of solitary confinement in U.S. prisons and jails has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the past few months, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy all but invited constitutional challenges to the use of solitary confinement, while President Obama asked, “Do we really think it makes sense to lock so many people alone in tiny cells for 23 hours a day for months, sometime for years at a time?” Even some of the most notorious prisons and jails, including California’s Pelican Bay State Prison and New York’s Rikers Island, are reforming their use of solitary confinement because of successful litigation and public outcry. Rovner suggests that in light of these developments and “the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on human dignity as a substantive value underlying and animating constitutional rights,” there is a strong case to make that long-term solitary confinement violates the constitutional right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.

Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment

Recently the Supreme Court has placed new limits on both the substance of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary that serves as the principal remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. In this Article we briefly summarize these limitations and then argue that the curtailment of the exclusionary rule has the potential to ameliorate substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine. The limited reach of the modern exclusionary rule provides the Court with license to develop an expansive new substantive framework free of the specter of a correspondingly expansive remedial framework. One point on which nearly all jurists and commentators agree is that current Fourth Amendment doctrine is a mess. We argue that the Court’s exclusionary rule cases, while frustrating and ill-conceived if viewed in isolation, provide the Court with an opportunity to revisit problematic Fourth Amendment doctrine that was born under a very different remedial regime. Such an approach would allow the Court to adhere to its current view of the exclusionary rule as a remedy of last resort while creating a Fourth Amendment with teeth. The goal is a Fourth Amendment right that is more substantial and clearly defined, but a remedy that remains limited to egregious violations of clear substantive rules. The time is now to lift the Fourth Amendment fog.

Representing Clients in the Marijuana Industry: Navigating State and Federal Rules

As the number of states legalizing medicinal and recreational marijuana increases and marijuana emerges as a growing lawful industry, lawyers find themselves in an awkward position. In most states, lawyers who represent clients in the marijuana industry risk discipline for assisting clients in the commission of a (federal) crime. Even in jurisdictions like Colorado, where the rules of professional conduct have been amended to permit lawyers to assist clients who comply with marijuana state laws, lawyers who are admitted to practice in federal courts risk being disciplined by these tribunals for assisting clients in the commission of a crime pursuant to the courts’ local rules of conduct. This short article explores the thorny issue of navigating state and federal rules of professional conduct while representing clients in the marijuana industry.

Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World

On September 17, 2015, the Federal Circuit issued another decision in the epic Apple v. Samsung smartphone war. This was the fourth court decision in the ongoing saga to deal with injunctions. Apple IV explained the level of proof necessary to satisfy the "causal nexus" requirement. This requirement had emerged as a response to patent litigations involving products with thousands of features, the vast majority of which are unrelated to the asserted patent. To prove a causal nexus, patentees seeking an injunction have to do more than just show that the infringing product caused the patentee irreparable harm. The harm must be specifically attributable to the infringing feature. In Apple IV, the Federal Circuit noted that proving causation was "nearly impossible" in these multicomponent cases. So it decided to water down the causal nexus requirement saying that it was enough for Apple to show that the infringing features were "important"and customer sought these particular features. This lower standard is an ill-advised mistake that leaves multicomponent product manufacturers more susceptible to patent holdup. My critique takes two parts. First, I argue that a single infringing feature rarely, if ever, "causes" consumers to buy the infringer’s multicomponent products. The minor features at issue in Apple IV illustrate this point vividly. Thus, the new causal nexus standard does not accurately reflect how causation and harm operate in a multicomponent world. Second, I explain why the court was so willing to accept such little evidence of real injury. It improperly applied notions of traditional property law to patents. Specifically, the court viewed patent infringement as harmful regardless of any concrete consequences. This view may resonate for other forms of property where an owner's rights are paramount and a trespass is considered offensive in and of itself. But the same concepts do not apply to patent law where the Supreme Court has consistently said that private interests must take a back seat to the public good. Based on these principles, the courts should restore the "causal nexus" requirement and not presume causation.

Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents

Scholars understandably devote a great deal of effort to studying how well patent law works to incentive the most important inventions. After all, these inventions form the foundation of our new technological age. But very little time is spent focusing on the other end of the spectrum, inventions that are no better than what the public already has. At first blush, studying such “horizontal” innovation seems pointless. But this inquiry actually reveals much about how patents can be used in unintended, and arguably, anticompetitive ways. This issue has roots in one unintuitive aspect of patent law. Despite the law’s goal of promoting innovation, patents can be obtained on inventions that are no better than existing technology. Such patents might appear worthless, but companies regularly obtain these patents to cover interfaces. That is because interface patents actually derive value from two distinct characteristics. First, they can have “innovation value” that is based on how much better the patentedinterface is than existing technology. Second, interface patents can also have “compatibility value.” In other words, the patented technology is often essential to make products operate (i.e. compatible) with a particular interface. In practical terms, this means that an interface patent that covers little or no meaningful advance can give a company the ability to extract rents and foreclose competition. This undesirable result is a consequence of how patent law has structured its remedies. For years patent law has implicitly awarded both innovation and compatibility values. Recently, the courts have taken a sensible first step and excluded compatibility value from reasonable royalty recoveries for standard essential patents. This Article argues that the law needs to go further and do the same for all essential interface patents. Additionally, patent law should reform the way it awards injunctions and lost profits to also exclude compatibility value. This proposal has two benefits. It would eliminate the incentives for wasteful patents on horizontal technology. Second, and more importantly, the value of all interfacepatents would be better aligned with the goals of the patent system.

The Effect of the Farmer Assurance Provision of the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 on Biodiversity and Global Food Security

A rider to a US law, the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, known as the Farmer Assurance Provision, encourages the large-scale genetic modification and global distribution of agricultural crops, thereby undermining the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' determination that food security rests on biodiversity. The rider blocks the US Department of Agriculture's mandate to prohibit farmers from growing crops from biotechnological seeds where the courts have found that this farm practice may cause damage to human health and/or degrade the environment. Despite genetically modified organisms (GMOs) reducing unwanted traits in plants, the paper supports the UN's mission for biodiversity and that more long-term testing was (and is) needed for GMO products, developed from 1994 on, before a hasty piece of Congressional legislation as was made in this case.

Observations on the courts of law in Nova Scotia, Canada, 1775

Contains a discussion of the organization of the courts in Nova Scotia and recommends changes to allow for greater efficiency and logical administration of cases through the system of justice.

[ Minutes of the proceedings of a general courts-martial], 1776

Varick served as judge advocate during these court-martial proceedings.

Notes of cases before colonial New Jersey courts, 1735-1755

Contains notes of cases before several New Jersey courts especially the New Jersey Supreme Court. Possibly compiled by Coxe.

CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA: An Examination of Constitutional Positivism, Fundamental Law and Rights in Ghana and Nigeria

This work explores the idea of constitutional justice in Africa with a focus on constitutional interpretation in Ghana and Nigeria. The objective is to develop a theory of constitutional interpretation based upon a conception of law that allows the existing constitutions of Ghana and Nigeria to be construed by the courts as law in a manner that best serves the collective wellbeing of the people. The project involves an examination of both legal theory and substantive constitutional law. The theoretical argument will be applied to show how a proper understanding of the ideals of the rule of law and constitutionalism in Ghana and Nigeria necessitate the conclusion that socio-economic rights in those countries are constitutionally protected and judicially enforceable. The thesis argues that this conclusion follows from a general claim that constitutions should represent a ‘fundamental law’ and must be construed as an aspirational moral ideal for the common good of the people. The argument is essentially about the inherent character of ‘legality’ or the ‘rule of law.’ It weaves together ideas developed by Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and David Dyzenhaus, as well as the strand of common law constitutionalism associated with Sir Edward Coke, to develop a moral sense of ‘law’ that transcends the confines of positive or explicit law while remaining inherently ‘legal’ as opposed to purely moral or political. What emerges is an unwritten fundamental law of reason located between pure morality or natural law on the one hand and strict, explicit, or positive law on the other. It is argued that this fundamental law is, or should be, the basis of constitutional interpretation, especially in transitional democracies like Ghana and Nigeria, and that it grounds constitutional protection for socio-economic rights. Equipped with this theory of law, courts in developing African countries like Ghana and Nigeria will be in a better position to contribute towards developing a real sense of constitutional justice for Africa.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

L’Europa sociale e il diritto: il contributo del metodo comparato [Social Europe and the law: the contribution of the comparative method]. WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT - 94/2012

The essay explores the evolution of comparative law and the contribution of its more recent methodological results on the process of European social integration through law. The analysis of the comparative method in general glides on a discipline, such a as labour law, traditionally linked to the "nomos" of the nation state and looks at the process of its own supranationalization through the lens which is the comparative method; a method used mainly by the juridical format (national and supranational courts). The analysis focuses on the fixed term contract and on the vexing question of collective social fundamental rights vis a vis fundamental economic freedoms in the EU where national constitutional traditions and supranational principals risk collision due also to the comparative method.

Diritti sociali e crisi del costituzionalismo europeo [Social rights and the crisis of European constitutionalism]. WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 95/2012

In the face of what looks like a real impasse of the the line of European constitutionalism, partly due to an orientation of the Court of Justice which tends to favor the protection of economic freedoms over the protection of social rights, two opposing trends occurr. The first amounts to a new "constitutional patriotism"; the second entrusts the protection of fundamental social rights no longer to a single Chart or to a single court but to a multi-level system of protection. A dialogue between the European courts that truly valorizes fundamental rights, however, might be hindered by what someone has seen as a resurgence of the dualist theories, evident in an ECJ’s decision as Kadi.