783 resultados para Corporate governance - Brazil
Resumo:
In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.
Resumo:
Is it good or bad for senior executives to have strong interpersonal ties to the CEO? We argue that a strong relationship with the CEO raises the likelihood that a top manager stays in office or makes an upward career move when the CEO leaves office voluntarily. At the same time, such interpersonal ties also reinforce the negative spillover effects of a dismissal of the CEO on the career prospects of the manager concerned. Our empirical analysis lends support to both arguments. We contribute to managerial succession research by underlining the ambivalence of interpersonal ties within top management teams.
Resumo:
Die Studie im Auftrag des Staatssekretariats für Wirtschaft (SECO) nimmt eine Lagebeurteilung hinsichtlich der Positionierung sowie der rechtlichen Ausgestaltung von Organisationen der Standortförderung vor. Im Vordergrund stehen Schweiz Tourismus (ST), die Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Hotelkredit (SGH) sowie die Osec (Business Network Switzerland). Die Studie beurteilt ein mögliches Optimierungspotenzial vor dem Hintergrund der Public Corporate Governance Grundsätze des Bundes.
Resumo:
Bilanzskandale und Missmanagement haben in den vergangenen Jahren den Ruf nach besseren Kontrollmechanismen in der Unternehmensführung laut werden lassen. Audit Committees sind ein wichtiges Werkzeug um eine solche Kontrolle sicherzustellen und sind inzwischen weltweit zum integralen Bestandteil einer guten "Corporate Governance" geworden. Die Audit Committees haben sich in unterschiedlichen kulturellen und rechtlichen Umgebungen etabliert. Wie der Beitrag zeigt, hat die weltweite Zunahme der Bedeutung der "Corporate Governance" das Audit Committee zum Vorzeigebeispiel eines "legal transplant" gemacht.
Resumo:
Für die an der SWX kotierten Unternehmen besteht seit dem 1. Juli 2005 die Pflicht, Transaktionen in Bezug auf Beteiligungsrechte des Emittenten, welche Angehörige von dessen Management durchführen, der SWX anzuzeigen. In einem ersten Schritt wird die Bedeutung dieser spezifischen Offenlegungspflicht im Zusammenhang sonstiger Ad-hoc-Publizitätspflichten sowie im weiteren Kontext von Corporate Governance erörtert; anschliessend werden Geltungsgrund und normative Reichweite der schweizerischen Regelung vor dem Hintergrund vergleichbarer Regelungen im europäischen Ausland und in den USA analysiert. Abschliessend wird kritisch hinterfragt, ob sich die Verpflichtung zur Offenlegung von Director's Dealings tatsächlich durch die Signal- oder Indikatorfunktion rechtfertigen lässt.
Resumo:
Overcoming a crisis situation in which the socioemotional wealth (SEW) of a family is at risk can be threatened by a lack of formal crisis procedures, which can increase the probability of organizational decline. Thus, not being prepared for a crisis situation may be a critical factor in the long-term survival of family firms. From a corporate governance perspective, supervisory boards may achieve higher levels of crisis readiness. Applying the resourced-based view and SEW theory, we analyze the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures in 150 small and medium-sized German firms. Our results show that formalized crisis procedures decrease as family ownership increases. Including supervisory boards in our analysis, we find a significant moderating effect of supervisory boards on the relationship between family ownership and formalized crisis procedures. Specifically, our results suggest that family firms with supervisory boards show similar levels of formalized crisis procedures as non-family firms with supervisory boards. In contrast, family firms without supervisory boards exhibit lower levels of formalized crisis procedures compared with non-family firms without supervisory boards. We also discuss managerial implications, limitations, and future research.
Resumo:
This dissertation assesses the relationship between board composition and financial performance for the top 71 major nonprofit hospitals in the United States during the period 2004-2009. The underlying data were collected from copies of IRS Form 990 available at http://www.guidestar.org . The dissertation investigates five factors: board size, board independence (percentage of outsiders), number of MDs, CEO succession and CEO compensation. And it evaluates the results within a multi-theoretic framework drawing on agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory and social network theory. Corporate governance literature suggests that board composition has an important impact on firm financial performance. This dissertation examines whether the same may be true for nonprofit hospitals. The results should help hospital executives make better governance decisions during trying economic times.^
Resumo:
In the recent decade China witnessed an upsurge of privatization of small and medium state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In contrast to the consequent sharp reduction in the number of firms, however, the estimated share of broadly-defined SOEs that includes limited liabilities companies controlled by the State has shown virtually no sign of decline. We explain the backgrounds of this seemingly paradoxical persistence of state-ownership by looking into two distinctive types of large SOEs: traditional SOEs that remain dominant in oligopolistic industries and manager-controlled SOEs surviving in competitive industries. The two types exemplify several factors constraining further progress of SOE reform such as, financing the costs of restructuring, redefining the role of the State as the single dominant shareholder, and balancing the interests of the State and managers as entrepreneurs. Sorting these issues out will take time, which means that instabilities associated with state corporate ownership will remain in place in the foreseeable future in China.