Globalization, Agency, and Institutional Innovation: The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships in Global Governance

Public and private actors increasingly cooperate in global governance, a realm previously reserved for states and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). This trend raises fascinating theoretical questions. What explains the rise in public-private institutions and their role in international politics? Who leads such institutional innovation and why? To address the questions, this paper develops a theory of the political demand and supply of public-private institutions and specifies the conditions under which IOs and non-state actors would cooperate, and states would support this public-private cooperation. The observable implications of the theoretical argument are evaluated against the broad trends in public-private cooperation and in a statistical analysis of the significance of demand and supply-side incentives in public-private cooperation for sustainable development. The study shows that public-private institutions do not simply fill governance gaps opened by globalization, but cluster in narrower areas of cooperation, where the strategic interests of IOs, states, and transnational actors intersect.

University System Governance and Organization

University systems rely on organizational and governance structures to balance the interest, missions, and needs of constituent campuses. This report examines organizational and governance structures of four public university systems. It explores the organizational structures of governing boards and administrative offices, as well as the role of system offices in coordinating across constituent campuses and protecting mission differentiation.

Anti-money laundering and governance in Latin America

This paper is designed to provide a first approach to some questions raised by the Global administrative Law Project concerning the anti money laundering system, as a global governance project, and how it works in Latin America. We address some interactions between actors at the global, regional and local level. So we have organized our presentation according to those three spaces: 1) global standards, 2) regional efforts and 3) national experiences, where we present the contrast between Brazil and Argentina.

Contingent Edis: a new contractual framework for minimizing the risk of incentive failures

Granting economic development incentives (or “EDIs”) has become commonplace throughout the United States, but the efficiency of these mechanisms is generally unwarranted. Both the politicians granting, and the companies seeking, EDIs have incentives to overestimate the EDIs benefits. For politicians, ribbon–cutting ceremonies can be the highly desirable opportunity to please political allies and financiers, and the same time that they demonstrate to the population that they are successful in promoting economic growth – even when the population would be better off otherwise. In turn, businesses are naturally prone to seek governmental aid. This explains in part why EDIs often “fail” (i.e. don’t pay–off). To increase transparency and mitigate the risk of EDI failure, local and state governments across the country have created a number of accountability mechanisms. The general trait of these accountability mechanisms is that they apply controls to some of the sub–risks that underlie the risk of EDI failure. These sub–risks include the companies receiving EDIs not generating the expected number of jobs, not investing enough in their local facilities, not attracting the expected additional businesses investments to the jurisdiction, etc. The problem with such schemes is that they tackle the problem of EDI failure very loosely. They are too narrow and leave multiplier effects uncontrolled. I propose novel contractual framework for implementing accountability mechanisms. My suggestion is to establish controls on the risk of EDI failure itself, leaving its underlying sub–risks uncontrolled. I call this mechanism “Contingent EDIs”, because the EDIs are made contingent on the government achieving a preset target that benchmarks the risk of EDI failure. If the target is met, the EDIs will ex post kick in; if not, then the EDIs never kick in.

Governance empreendedora : um projeto sócio-ambiental para o desenvolvimento econômico : Santos, 1989-1992

O presente trabalho trata da questão da governance e do empreendedorismo, ou seja, da governance empreendedora, enquanto instrumentos para que um governo local promova o desenvolvimento econômico e social e alcance a sustentabilidade política e econômica, frente ao paradoxo da globalização. Averigüando a possibilidade do exercrcio da governance empreendedora, traz como estudo de caso, o governo santista de 1989 a 1992, conduzido por Teima de Souza. Aborda as políticas públicas formuladas e adotadas no período, referentes às questões ambientais e de saúde, levadas a termo pelo governo local, bem como, problemas pertinentes à questão portuária e de participação popular, procurando identificar na lide governamental os princípios da governance e do empreendedorismo.

Do private equity and venture capital backed firms have better corporate governance after going public?

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Evolution of corporate governance of privately controlled brazilian companies

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Cooperação e multi-level governance: o caso do Grande Recife Consórcio de Transporte Metropolitano

As primeiras regiões metropolitanas brasileiras foram instituídas de maneira vertical e autoritária como parte da estratégia de desenvolvimento nacional promovida pelo governo militar. Percebidas como instituições não-democráticas e rejeitadas como possível quarto ente federativo, as regiões metropolitanas, desde a Constituição de 1988, foram gradualmente esvaziadas dos seus propósitos originais. Em sua orfandade, os problemas socioeconômicos proliferaram e foram acentuados, e passaram a predominar relações intergovernamentais competitivas em vez de cooperativas. Um dos principais desafios enfrentados pelo modelo federalista brasileiro, em especial quando se trata destas regiões, está relacionado à necessidade de estabelecer maior cooperação e coordenação, tidas como imprescindíveis para garantir um relacionamento mais equilibrado entre os entes federativos, assim como para a efetiva implementação de políticas de enfrentamento das desigualdades e exclusão social nas aglomerações urbanas. Este trabalho analisa o Grande Recife Consórcio Metropolitano de Transportes (CMT), empresa pública multifederativa estabelecida em 2008 entre os governos municipais e estadual da Região Metropolitana de Recife (RMR). Responsável pelo planejamento, gestão e implementação compartilhada da política de transporte público coletivo na RMR, o Grande Recife se tornou realidade com a aprovação e regulamentação da Lei Federal nº 11.107 de 2005, conhecida como a Lei de Consórcios Públicos. O Grande Recife é uma experiência pioneira e inovadora, demonstrando que é possível encontrar uma maneira de superar conflitos e desafios comuns e, ao mesmo tempo, garantir a preservação da autonomia de cada ente, bem como os direitos cidadãos. Neste trabalho consideramos essa experiência de cooperação intergovernamental como um exemplo de multi-level governance (MLG), uma vez que é ilustrativa de um novo arranjo institucional democrático entre distintas esferas governamentais para a gestão compartilhada de um serviço público.

Contractual solutions to the holdup problem: a survey

In this survey, we presented the general idea and main results from what we understand that are the most important contributions to contractual solutions to the holdup problem literature. The aim of this paper is to push the previous analysis, uniform the notation and provide a snapshot on the most recent literature, as well as bring topics for future inquires on this issue.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Global governance, currency and trade: implications of one on the other, common problems and how to address cooperation through law at the international level

How to deal with the impacts of the exchange rate on the trade balance of Brazil? There is not a single answer to such question. In order to find out some legal approaches for this matter, this paper aims to describe and analyze the role of the IMF, WTO and the governments of Brazil and the United States on the currency misalignments, especially the extraterritorial effects of such misalignment on the Brazil’s bilateral trade with the United States. The article concludes that the Currency Swap Agreements and other bilateral solutions may minimize the distortions that the Brazilian balance of payment against the USA is carrying, due to the lack of legal solutions for the problem of the exchange rate misalignments that Brazil is facing.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

Análise dos aspectos envolvidos na condução de contratos de terceirização de tecnologia da informação

Terceirização de Serviços de Tecnologia da Informação (TI) é uma prática crescente entre organizações de diversos portes e setores, onde uma relação entre contratante e contratado usualmente regida por contratos. Contratos são dispositivos destinados a regular obrigações e direitos entre as partes. Em função da impossibilidade das partes preverem todas as contingências futuras e também devido à imprecisão da linguagem escrita, contratos são usualmente reconhecidos em Economia como sendo fundamentalmente incompletos. Disso se origina a possibilidade de classificar contratos como predominantemente formais, aqueles cuja estrutura escrita apresenta mecanismos de completude suficiente para conduzir o relacionamento entre as partes, e predominantemente relacionais, aqueles cuja estrutura formal é insuficiente para coordenar o relacionamento, e que demandam mecanismos adicionais de comunicação e interação para que o relacionamento entre as partes ocorra de adequadamente em torno do objeto contratado. Dentre os mecanismos usados em contratos formais para sinalizar às partes os comportamentos desejados, inclui-se a estrutura de incentivos. Pouco se estudou sobre o efeito que a combinação de estruturas de incentivos e mecanismos relacionais tem sobre o andamento dos contratos. Este estudo analisa os efeitos de mecanismos formais de estruturas de incentivos e os mecanismos relacionais sobre o andamento do contrato, usando como contexto o cenário de contratações de serviços de terceirização de Tecnologia da Informação (TI). Como resultados dos três capítulos principais deste estudo, configurados no formato de artigos acadêmicos, são apresentados altos poderes explicativos das interações entre estruturas de incentivos, governança relacional, comportamento do contratado e expectativa de sucesso dos contratos. Da mesma forma, antecedentes e resultantes são analisados e discutidos. Do ponto de vista da contribuição para a prática gerencial, o trabalho como um todo contribui para melhorar decisões de contratação de serviços de TI, formulação de contratos mais efetivos, e apoio na escolha dos mecanismos de contratação mais adequados ao contexto do contratante.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.