Iowa Civil Rights Commission Preformance Plan, FY 2007

Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Division of Criminal and Juvenile Justice Planning, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Department of Human Rights - Deaf Services Commission of Iowa, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Iowa Department of Human Rights - Latino Affairs, Agency Performance Plan, 2007

Annual Report, Agency Performance Plan

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Human Rights for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Department of Human Rights for the year ended June 30, 2006

Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction, June 2007

This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

When to carry eccentric products? Optimal retail assortment under consumer returns

To understand whether retailers should consider consumer returns when merchandising, we study howthe optimal assortment of a price-taking retailer is influenced by its return policy. The retailer selects itsassortment from an exogenous set of horizontally differentiated products. Consumers make purchase andkeep/return decisions in nested multinomial logit fashion. Our main finding is that the optimal assortmenthas a counterintuitive structure for relatively strict return policies: It is optimal to offer a mix of the mostpopular and most eccentric products when the refund amount is sufficiently low, which can be viewed asa form of risk sharing between the retailer and consumers. In contrast, if the refund is sufficiently high, orwhen returns are disallowed, optimal assortment is composed of only the most popular products (a commonfinding in the literature). We provide preliminary empirical evidence for one of the key drivers of our results:more eccentric products have higher probability of return conditional on purchase. In light of our analyticalfindings and managerial insights, we conclude that retailers should take their return policies into accountwhen merchandising.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Health Privacy Act Takes Effect April 14, April 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Health Privacy Act Takes Effect April 14

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Tips for Buying a Used Car, June 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tips for Buying a Used Car

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Rapid Tax-Refund Loans A very costly way to gain just a few days on tax refunds, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Rapid Tax-Refund Loans A very costly way to gain just a few days on tax refunds.