What if TTIP Changed the Regulation of Public Services ?Lessons for Europe from Developing Countries

This paper argues that the TTIP negotiators may be underestimating some of the risks associated with the treatment of public services. De facto opening the door to supranational regulation of key public services may be well intended to protect investors. But when the bargaining power of these investors operating in non-competitive markets (which is the case for most public services) becomes excessive as a result, the experience of developing countries in interactions with many of the same large players points to risks. It is likely that outcomes in terms of the usual policy criteria (efficiency, equity and fiscal viability) will not be as positive as promised in an environment in which regulation ends up weaker (because it is captured or less specialized). Ignoring these lessons and failing to internalize them in the design of negotiation is likely to cost Europe.

El principio de oportunidad : análisis de Derecho comparado

La conformidad procesal es una de las manifestaciones más importantes del principio de oportunidad. Éste, en relación constante con el principio de legalidad, tiende a la agilización y el recorte de los trámites procesales, sin perjuicio de las garantías esenciales del procedimiento penal. Debido a sus ventajas se ha instalado tanto en el modelo norteamericano, a través del «plea bargaining», como en el modelo continental europeo.

Market work and household production in Brazil

This thesis is composed of three papers in which the research questions are related to the double burden that accrues to Brazilian women. The first and second papers address this issue by looking at expenditure decisions about home production. The first paper examines whether the expenditure decisions about production goods, such as white appliances, relative to entertainment goods, such as TVs, are the outcome of a bargaining process between husbands and wives. The second paper looks at the demand for maid services and for production durable goods, examining the extent to which other household members substitute for maid services and durable goods in home production. The third paper addresses the effects of Brazilian women's double burden on their labor market participation by examining whether the occupational choice of Brazilian women is affected by their gender roles and whether entry into other occupations that are not identified as female occupations has become easier since the introduction of anti-discrimination laws in the labor market. The first paper combines two Brazilian data sets: a Brazilian household expenditure survey, Pesquisa de Orçamento Familiares (POF), and a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). The results of the first paper indicate that the decision about durable goods ownership is the outcome of a bargaining process between husband and wife. The test on the coefficients of the marriage market variable and the indicators of households in which only the wife and households in which only the husband makes expenditure decisions corroborate the expectations about wives' preferences for production goods. The same data sets as the first paper are used in the second paper. The finding of the second paper indicates that if the marriage market is favorable to women, that is if the ratio of women to men goes from 1.07 to 0.96, the increment in the household probability of owning at least one maid's substitute durable goods is equivalent to 24% the impact of moving a household up one income quintile. Moreover, the results indicate that daughters' time substitutes for wives' time and maid services in home production. Parents may want daughters trained in home production to be able to perform their future role as wives. However, this training comes at a cost to daughters' investment in formal education, narrowing their future career options. The data used in the third paper come from a Brazilian household survey, Pesquisa Nacional Por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). Gender roles are responsible for women to choose female-dominated occupations, married women are 1.14 times more likely to work in female-dominated occupations and having a child six years and older increases on average by 12% the probability that women work in female-dominated occupations instead of genderintegrated occupations in 2001. However, it becomes easier for all types of women to enter into male-dominated and gender-integrated occupations in 2001 compared to 1981.

Lobbying in a transatlantic comparison: opportunity structures and lobbying content in the US and the EU

Despite vast literatures on interest representation in the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), few studies have tried to compare lobbying across the two cases. Those who do are interested primarily in the existence of different lobbying styles and distinguish between an aggressive pressure group approach in the US and a more consensus oriented informational lobbying in the EU. However, the origins of these differences have received little attention and references most often point to different political “cultures” and lobbying traditions. This paper takes issue with this cultural explanation and links the observed lobbying styles with differences in the design of the political institutions that private actors have to interact with. It argues that divided policy authority in the US allows for interest group bargaining while shared policy competencies in the EU constrain not only policy-makers but also lobbyists to adopt a more consensus-oriented approach. The effect of political institutions on the form of lobbying, in turn, can have important implications for the comparison of different policy areas across countries, because the policy stances of private actors cannot always be assumed to be exogenous to the policy process in which they are active.

The Sparta and the Athens Of Our Age At Daggers Drawn: Polities, Perceptions, and Peace

While historically notions of democracy have varied widely, democratic peace theory has generally defined it in procedural terms. This article takes a close look at the Anglo-French confrontation of 1840. I show that while leaders on both sides were prepared to risk war to gain bargaining advantages, only the French left really wanted to fight. Why? By today's criteria, Britain was incontestably more democratic, with its monarch's powers far more restricted and its suffrage several times as large. Nevertheless, both sides considered France more democratic, with French republicans despising Britain as an aristocratic oligarchy. While Spencer Weart is right to argue that democratic republics may be hostile to oligarchic ones, they will not necessarily define each other according to modern procedural criteria. Instead, they may judge regimes by the broader social structures that shape power relationships and by outcomes, possibly explaining wars or near misses between democracies.

The Scottish Parliament in the 15th and 16th centuries

Earlier histories of the Scottish parliament have been somewhat constitutional in emphasis and have been exceedingly critical of what was understood to be parliament's subservience to the crown. Estimates by constitutional historians of the extreme weakness of parliament rested on an assessment of the constitutional system. The argument was that many of its features were not consistent with a reasonably strong parliament. Because the 'constitution' is apparently fragmented, with active roles played by bodies such as the lords of articles, the general council and the convention of estates, each apparently suggesting that parliament was inadequate, historians have sometimes failed to appreciate the positive role played by the estates in the conduct of national affairs. The thesis begins with a discussion of the reliability of the printed text of APS and proceeds to an examination of selected aspects of the work of parliament in a period from c 1424-c 1625. The belief of constitutional historians such as Rait that conditions In Scotland proved unfavourable to the interests and. effectiveness of parliament in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is also examined. Chapter 1 concludes that APS is a less than reliable text, particularly for the reign of James I. Numerous statutes were excluded from the printed text and they are offered below for the first time. These statutes have been a useful addition to our understanding of the reign of James I. Chapter 2 analyses the motives behind the schemes for shire representation and concludes that neither constitutional theory nor political opportunism explains the support which James I and James VI gave to these measures. Both these monarchs were motivated by the realisation that their particular ambitions were dependent on winning the support of the estates whose ranks should include representatives from the shires. Chapter 3 examines the method of electing the lords of articles, the composition of this committee, and some aspects of its operation. The conclusion is that in the main the estates were the deciding force in the choice of the lords of articles. The committee's composition was more a reflection of a desire for a balance between representatives from north and south of the Forth and for the most important burghs and clergy to be selected than an attempt at electing government favourites. The articles did exercise a significant control over the items which came before parliament but this control was not absolute and applied to government as well as private legislation. Chapter 4 questions the traditional view that the general council and convention of estates were the same body. It is argued that they were two different institutions with different powers, but that they nevertheless worked within certain limits and were careful not to usurp the authority of parliament. Chapter 5 concedes that taxation was sometimes decided outside parliament; that the irregularity of taxation certainly weakened the bargaining power of the estates and that the latter did not appear to capitalise on these occasions when taxation was an issue. But the tendency was to ensure that, whether in or out of parliament, the decision to impose taxation was taken by a large number of each estate. The infrequency of taxation was a direct consequence of an unwillingness among the estates to agree to a regular taxation and their preference to ensure for the crown an alternative source of income. Moreover taxation was one issue, which more than any other, would be subject to contentious opposition by the estates, and could lead to the crown's defeat. Chapter 6 is concerned with ecclesiastical representation after the Reformation and the church's attitudes to the possibility of ministerial representation. Some ministers had doctrinal misgivings but the majority came to believe that the church's absence from parliament bad severely reduced. the influence of the church. That no agreement was forthcoming on a system of ministerial representation, particularly after 1597, is attributable to the estates' unwillingness to compromise and, not to the strength of opposition in the church. Chapter 7 examines the institutions which are sometime seen as 'rivals' of parliament and concludes that institutions such as the privy council were generally very careful in matters which needed the approval of parliament, and seemed aware of the greater authority of parliament. Chapter 8 which illustrates how parliament had the right to be consulted in all important matters of state, brings together the main points of the earlier chapters and offers further illustrations of the essential role which parliament played in the conduct of national affairs. Whether or not the system can be regarded as constitutionally sound, the estates in Scotland could observe parliament's day-to-day operation with some satisfaction. All in all, there is little convincing evidence that parliament was as weak as some historians would have us believe.

Report on its study of municipal public employees labor relations law /

Mode of access: Internet.

Paths to peace: conflict management trajectories in militarized interstate disputes

When multiple third-parties (states, coalitions, and international organizations) intervene in the same conflict, do their efforts inform one another? Anecdotal evidence suggests such a possibility, but research to date has not attempted to model this interdependence directly. The current project breaks with that tradition. In particular, it proposes three competing explanations of how previous intervention efforts affect current intervention decisions: a cost model (and a variant on it, a limited commitments model), a learning model, and a random model. After using a series of Markov transition (regime-switching) models to evaluate conflict management behavior within militarized interstate disputes in the 1946-2001 period, this study concludes that third-party intervention efforts inform one another. More specifically, third-parties examine previous efforts and balance their desire to manage conflict with their need to minimize intervention costs (the cost and limited commitments models). As a result, third-parties intervene regularly using verbal pleas and mediation, but rely significantly less frequently on legal, administrative, or peace operations strategies. This empirical threshold to the intervention costs that third-parties are willing to bear has strong theoretical foundations and holds across different time periods and third-party actors. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that the first third-party to intervene in a conflict is most likely to use a strategy designed to help the disputants work toward a resolution of their dispute. After this initial intervention, the level of third-party involvement declines and often devolves into a series of verbal pleas for peace. Such findings cumulatively suggest that disputants hold the key to effective conflict management. If the disputants adopt and maintain an extreme bargaining position or fail to encourage third-parties to accept greater intervention costs, their dispute will receive little more than verbal pleas for negotiations and peace.

HOLDING HANDS WHILE PARTING WAYS: EXAMINING ALLIANCE TREATY RENEGOTIATION

This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies thus increases, but the alliance endures. I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s demonstrates successful use of a strategy of delay that appeases a dissatisfied member.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).

Essays on optimal fiscal and monetary policies

Cette thèse se compose de trois articles sur les politiques budgétaires et monétaires optimales. Dans le premier article, J'étudie la détermination conjointe de la politique budgétaire et monétaire optimale dans un cadre néo-keynésien avec les marchés du travail frictionnels, de la monnaie et avec distortion des taux d'imposition du revenu du travail. Dans le premier article, je trouve que lorsque le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs est faible, la politique Ramsey-optimale appelle à un taux optimal d'inflation annuel significativement plus élevé, au-delà de 9.5%, qui est aussi très volatile, au-delà de 7.4%. Le gouvernement Ramsey utilise l'inflation pour induire des fluctuations efficaces dans les marchés du travail, malgré le fait que l'évolution des prix est coûteuse et malgré la présence de la fiscalité du travail variant dans le temps. Les résultats quantitatifs montrent clairement que le planificateur s'appuie plus fortement sur l'inflation, pas sur l'impôts, pour lisser les distorsions dans l'économie au cours du cycle économique. En effet, il ya un compromis tout à fait clair entre le taux optimal de l'inflation et sa volatilité et le taux d'impôt sur le revenu optimal et sa variabilité. Le plus faible est le degré de rigidité des prix, le plus élevé sont le taux d'inflation optimal et la volatilité de l'inflation et le plus faible sont le taux d'impôt optimal sur le revenu et la volatilité de l'impôt sur le revenu. Pour dix fois plus petit degré de rigidité des prix, le taux d'inflation optimal et sa volatilité augmentent remarquablement, plus de 58% et 10%, respectivement, et le taux d'impôt optimal sur le revenu et sa volatilité déclinent de façon spectaculaire. Ces résultats sont d'une grande importance étant donné que dans les modèles frictionnels du marché du travail sans politique budgétaire et monnaie, ou dans les Nouveaux cadres keynésien même avec un riche éventail de rigidités réelles et nominales et un minuscule degré de rigidité des prix, la stabilité des prix semble être l'objectif central de la politique monétaire optimale. En l'absence de politique budgétaire et la demande de monnaie, le taux d'inflation optimal tombe très proche de zéro, avec une volatilité environ 97 pour cent moins, compatible avec la littérature. Dans le deuxième article, je montre comment les résultats quantitatifs impliquent que le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs et les coûts de l'aide sociale de règles monétaires sont liées négativement. Autrement dit, le plus faible est le pouvoir de négociation des travailleurs, le plus grand sont les coûts sociaux des règles de politique monétaire. Toutefois, dans un contraste saisissant par rapport à la littérature, les règles qui régissent à la production et à l'étroitesse du marché du travail entraînent des coûts de bien-être considérablement plus faible que la règle de ciblage de l'inflation. C'est en particulier le cas pour la règle qui répond à l'étroitesse du marché du travail. Les coûts de l'aide sociale aussi baisse remarquablement en augmentant la taille du coefficient de production dans les règles monétaires. Mes résultats indiquent qu'en augmentant le pouvoir de négociation du travailleur au niveau Hosios ou plus, les coûts de l'aide sociale des trois règles monétaires diminuent significativement et la réponse à la production ou à la étroitesse du marché du travail n'entraîne plus une baisse des coûts de bien-être moindre que la règle de ciblage de l'inflation, qui est en ligne avec la littérature existante. Dans le troisième article, je montre d'abord que la règle Friedman dans un modèle monétaire avec une contrainte de type cash-in-advance pour les entreprises n’est pas optimale lorsque le gouvernement pour financer ses dépenses a accès à des taxes à distorsion sur la consommation. Je soutiens donc que, la règle Friedman en présence de ces taxes à distorsion est optimale si nous supposons un modèle avec travaie raw-efficace où seule le travaie raw est soumis à la contrainte de type cash-in-advance et la fonction d'utilité est homothétique dans deux types de main-d'oeuvre et séparable dans la consommation. Lorsque la fonction de production présente des rendements constants à l'échelle, contrairement au modèle des produits de trésorerie de crédit que les prix de ces deux produits sont les mêmes, la règle Friedman est optimal même lorsque les taux de salaire sont différents. Si la fonction de production des rendements d'échelle croissant ou decroissant, pour avoir l'optimalité de la règle Friedman, les taux de salaire doivent être égales.

Derechos colectivos de las y los servidores públicos al amparo de las Enmiendas Constitucionales de 2015

La Constitución de la República del Ecuador vigente desde el año 2008, reconoce y garantiza derechos para los ciudadanos domiciliados en el país, entre ellos trabajadores/as y servidoras y servidores públicos. En diciembre de 2015, la Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, mediante el procedimiento de Enmienda Constitucional unificó el régimen laboral de las personas que prestan sus servicios laborales en las instituciones y organismos estatales, debiendo adecuarse la normativa legal y secundaria a esta modificación de la Carta Magna hasta junio de 2016. En el presente trabajo abordaremos en su primer capítulo antecedentes históricos del derecho al trabajo en general y la legislación histórica que ha regido en nuestro país. En el segundo capítulo nos centraremos en distinguir cuales son las características del régimen laboral público y del privado en Ecuador y realizaremos recomendaciones en relación a derechos individuales de los servidores públicos. En el tercer capítulo haremos referencia a los Convenios Internacionales de la OIT ratificados y no ratificados por nuestro país. En el cuarto capítulo estableceremos similitudes y diferencias entre las legislaciones regionales en razón del reconocimiento de derechos colectivos para servidores públicos. En el capítulo cinco detallaremos criterios doctrinarios sobre los derechos de ejercicio colectivo, es decir: huelga, convenio colectivo y sindicalización en el sector público para finalmente en el sexto y último capítulo dar recomendaciones para la inminente reforma a la Ley Orgánica de Servicio Público, LOSEP.

Le conflit de travail à l’usine d’Alma de Rio Tinto Alcan en 2012 : un déséquilibre du rapport de force entre un syndicat local et une entreprise multinationale?

Ce mémoire analyse la mobilisation multiniveaux de la section locale 9490 d'Alma du syndicat des Métallos lors de son conflit de travail avec Rio Tinto Alcan à l'hiver 2012. Lors de la négociation pour le renouvellement de la convention collective, le syndicat, affilié à la FTQ, est mis en lock-out par Rio Tinto Alcan, une entreprise multinationale anglo-australienne. Rio Tinto achète Alcan, une entreprise multinationale canadienne, au milieu des années 2000 et souhaite rentabiliser son investissement. Le Syndicat tient à maintenir ses acquis et les emplois de qualité dans la région et à ne pas céder devant ce nouvel employeur. Le syndicat des Métallos est affilié au syndicat international United SteelWorkers. Ensemble, ils mettront sur pied une campagne stratégique internationale afin de faire contrepoids aux énormes ressources de l'employeur. Cette étude analyse le déploiement d'un syndicat international lors d'un conflit de travail au niveau local avec une entreprise multinationale et identifie les impacts de la campagne sur les relations de travail.

Le conflit de travail à l’usine d’Alma de Rio Tinto Alcan en 2012 : un déséquilibre du rapport de force entre un syndicat local et une entreprise multinationale?

Ce mémoire analyse la mobilisation multiniveaux de la section locale 9490 d'Alma du syndicat des Métallos lors de son conflit de travail avec Rio Tinto Alcan à l'hiver 2012. Lors de la négociation pour le renouvellement de la convention collective, le syndicat, affilié à la FTQ, est mis en lock-out par Rio Tinto Alcan, une entreprise multinationale anglo-australienne. Rio Tinto achète Alcan, une entreprise multinationale canadienne, au milieu des années 2000 et souhaite rentabiliser son investissement. Le Syndicat tient à maintenir ses acquis et les emplois de qualité dans la région et à ne pas céder devant ce nouvel employeur. Le syndicat des Métallos est affilié au syndicat international United SteelWorkers. Ensemble, ils mettront sur pied une campagne stratégique internationale afin de faire contrepoids aux énormes ressources de l'employeur. Cette étude analyse le déploiement d'un syndicat international lors d'un conflit de travail au niveau local avec une entreprise multinationale et identifie les impacts de la campagne sur les relations de travail.

Music copyright in the digital age: creators, commerce and copyright - an empirical study of the UK music copyright industries

Copyright markets, it is said, are ‘winner takes all’ markets favouring the interests of corporate investors over the interests of primary creators. However, little is known about popular music creators’ ‘lived experience’ of copyright. This thesis interrogates key aspects of copyright transactions between creators and investors operating in the UK music industries using analysis of various copyright related documents and semi-structured interviews with creators and investors. The research found considerable variety in the types of ‘deal’ creators enter into and considerable divergence in the potential rewards. It was observed that new-entrant creators have little comprehension of the basic tenets of copyright, but with experience they become more ‘copyright aware’. Documentary and interview evidence reveals creators routinely assign copyright to third party investors for the full term of copyright in sound recordings: the justification for this is questionable. An almost inevitable consequence of this asymmetry of understanding of copyright and asymmetry of bargaining power is that creators become alienated from their copyright works. The empirical evidence presented here supports historic and contemporary calls for a statutory mechanism limiting the maximum copyright assignment period to ten-years.