931 resultados para currency crises
Resumo:
When facing a crisis, leaders' sensemaking can take a considerable amount of time due to the need to develop consensus in how to deal with it so that vision formation and sensegiving can take place. However, research into emerging cognitive consensus when leaders deal with a crisis over time is lacking. This is limiting a detailed understanding of how organizations respond to crises. The findings, based on a longitudinal analysis of cognitive maps within three management teams at a single organization, highlight considerable individual differences in cognitive content when starting to make sense of a crisis. Evidence for an emerging viable prescriptive mental model for the future was found, but not so much in the management as a whole. Instead, the findings highlight increasing cognitive consensus based on similarities in objectives and cause-effect beliefs within well-defined management teams over time.
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We examine how the most prevalent stochastic properties of key financial time series have been affected during the recent financial crises. In particular we focus on changes associated with the remarkable economic events of the last two decades in the volatility dynamics, including the underlying volatility persistence and volatility spillover structure. Using daily data from several key stock market indices, the results of our bivariate GARCH models show the existence of time varying correlations as well as time varying shock and volatility spillovers between the returns of FTSE and DAX, and those of NIKKEI and Hang Seng, which became more prominent during the recent financial crisis. Our theoretical considerations on the time varying model which provides the platform upon which we integrate our multifaceted empirical approaches are also of independent interest. In particular, we provide the general solution for time varying asymmetric GARCH specifications, which is a long standing research topic. This enables us to characterize these models by deriving, first, their multistep ahead predictors, second, the first two time varying unconditional moments, and third, their covariance structure.
Resumo:
Purpose—This article considers North Korea and the notion of crisis, by linking historical development over the Korean peninsula to the conflict resolution literature, and investigates why despite a large number of destabilizing events, a war involving Pyongyang has yet to erupt. Design/methodology—This article uses historical data and a framework developed by Aggarwal et al., in order to highlight patterns of interaction between states such as the United States, North Korea and South Korea, organizations such as the United Nations, as well as processes such as the Six- Party Talks and the Agreed Framework. The article then develops a crisis framework based on conflict resolution and negotiation literature, and applies it to three North Korean administrations. Findings—Findings suggest that an open- ended understanding of time (for all parties involved on the peninsula) leads to an impossibility to reach a threshold where full- scale war would be triggered, thus leaving parties in a stable state of crisis for which escalating moves and de- escalating techniques might become irrelevant. Practical implications—It is hoped that this article will help further endeavors linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. In the case of the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open-ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened hostilities that oscillates toward war, but that is controlled enough not to reach it. In-depth analysis of particular security sectors such as nuclear energy, food security, or missile testing would prove particularly useful in understanding the complexity of the Korean peninsula situation to a greater extent. It is hoped that this paper will help further endeavours linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. Originality/value—This research suggests that regarding the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open- ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened.
Resumo:
This article considers North Korea and the notion of crisis, by linking historical development over the Korean peninsula to the conflict resolution literature, and investigates why despite a large number of destabilising events, a war involving Pyongyang has yet to erupt. The paper considers historical data and uses a framework developed by Aggarwal et al. in order to highlight patterns of interaction between states such as the United States, North Korea and South Korea, organisations such as the United Nations, as well as processes such as the Six-Party Talk and the Agreed Framework. The paper then develops a crisis framework based on conflict resolution and negotiation literature, and applies it to three North Korean administrations. Findings suggests that an elastic understanding of time (for all parties involved on the peninsula) leads to an impossibility to reach a threshold where full-scale war would be triggered, thus leaving parties in a stable state of crisis for which escalating moves and de-escalating techniques might become irrelevant.
Resumo:
The ‘currency war’, as it has become known, has three aspects: 1) the inflexible pegs of undervalued currencies; 2) recent attempts by floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation; 3) quantitative easing. Europe should primarily be concerned about the first issue, which relates to the renewed debate about the international monetary system. The attempts of floating exchange-rate countries to resist currency appreciation are generally justified while China retains a peg. Quantitative easing cannot be deemed a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policy as long as the Fed’s policy is geared towards price stability. Current US inflationary expectations are at historically low levels. Central banks should come to an agreement about the definition of price stability at a time of deflationary pressures. The euro’s exchange rate has not been greatly impacted by the recent currency war; the euro continues to be overvalued, but less than before.
Resumo:
A 2007 óta kibontakozó válság újból divatba hozta a korai buborékok és válságok témáját. A jelenlegi válság nyomán újraéledtek a makroökónómiai viták, kétségessé vált a "nagy mérséklődés" és az újklasszikus szintézis érvényessége. Az 1634-1637 közötti holland tulipánmánia - mint az első buborék - sokféle értelmezése ismeretes: a tömeghisztéria kitörésétől a hatékony pénzügyi piacok korai példáján át a kulturális sokkig. Áttekintve ezeket, a cikk visszavezeti a tulipánmánia közismert anekdotikus leírásait az eredeti forrásokig, és megmutatja, milyen módon és céllal használták fel ezeket a közgazdászok és történészek saját elemzéseikben. / === / The accounts of early bubbles and crises are becoming fashionable again in economic discourse during the recent downturn. The article, having looked at the revival of macroeconomic debate provoked by the failure of current theory, sums up various interpretations of the Dutch tulip mania of 1634-7. These range from an outburst of popular madness, through an early example of an efficient financial market, to an instance of culture shock. Some well-known anecdotes about tulip mania are traced back to their original sources, and the article explores the various patterns and intentions in the use economists and historians have made of them.
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A cikk a tulipánmániával foglalkozó tanulmány folytatása (Madarász [2009]). A Déltengeri Társaság 1720-as fellendülése és kipukkadása mindmáig egyike a pénzügyi történelem leghíresebb és leggyakrabban emlegetett buborékainak. A közgazdaságtanban a buborék sokáig nem volt fontos téma, de az utóbbi időben ismét divatba jött. A tanulmány először a buborékmetafora néhány irodalmi példáját mutatja be, majd összefoglalja az angol államadósság kialakulását, a korai modern fiskális-militarista állam létrejöttét és a pénzügyi forradalom különböző interpretációit. A Déltengeri Társaság történetének, az adósság-részvény csere lebonyolításának és a korabeli vélemények spektrumának ismertetése után áttekintést ad arról, milyen módon és céllal használták fel az 1720-as eseményeket közgazdászok és történészek saját magyarázataikban. Ezek skálája a tudatos csalástól a befektetők irracionális mániáján át a racionális buborék kialakulásáig terjed. / === / The first part of the study (published here in 2009) was devoted to "tulipmania". This article continues the account of early bubbles and crises with the 1720 boom and bust of the South Sea Company, which is to this day one of the best known and most cited examples in history. For several decades, bubbles were not seen as an important issue in economic and financial theory, but recent events have focused attention on them again. The author introduces some historical examples of the bubble metaphor in literature, before giving an account of the emergence of British public debt and the fiscal-military state, and summarizing various interpretations of the financial revolution. An account of the South Sea Bubble, a detailed description of the debt-equity swap, and citations from some contemporary investors and observers are followed by an overview of the way the events of 1720 were used subsequently by various economists and historians in their own theorizing and explanations. The interpretations placed on it range from deliberate fraud, through irrational investment mania, to the emergence of a rational bubble.
Resumo:
A cikk a tulipánmániával foglalkozó tanulmány folytatása (Madarász [2009]). A Déltengeri Társaság 1720-as fellendülése és kipukkadása mindmáig egyike a pénzügyi történelem leghíresebb és leggyakrabban emlegetett buborékainak. A közgazdaságtanban a buborék sokáig nem volt fontos téma, de az utóbbi időben ismét divatba jött. A tanulmány először a buborékmetafora néhány irodalmi példáját mutatja be, majd összefoglalja az angol államadósság kialakulását, a korai modern fiskális-militarista állam létrejöttét és a pénzügyi forradalom különböző interpretációit. A Déltengeri Társaság történetének, az adósság-részvény csere lebonyolításának és a korabeli vélemények spektrumának ismertetése után áttekintést ad arról, milyen módon és céllal használták fel az 1720-as eseményeket közgazdászok és történészek saját magyarázataikban. Ezek skálája a tudatos csalástól a befektetők irracionális mániáján át a racionális buborék kialakulásáig terjed. / === / The first part of the study (published here in 2009) was devoted to "tulip-mania". This article continues the account of early bubbles and crises with the 1720 boom and bust of the South Sea Company, which remains to this day one of the best known and most cited examples in history. For several decades, bubbles were not seen as an important issue in economic and financial theory, but recent events have focused attention on them again. The author introduces some historical examples of the bubble metaphor in literature, before describing the emergence of British public debt and the fiscal/military state, and summarizing various interpretations of the financial revolution. An account of the South Sea Bubble, a detailed description of the debt-equity swap, and citations from some contemporary investors and observers are followed by an overview of how the events of 1720 were used subsequently by various economists and historians in their theorizing and explanations. Such interpretations range from deliberate fraud, through irrational investment mania, to the emergence of a rational bubble.
Resumo:
A hálózati megközelítés alapján a vállalatok nem izoláltan működő szervezetek. A kis- és középvállalkozások számára a hálózatok, a partnerkapcsolatok jelentős támogatást képesek biztosítani a növekedés, a tanulás és az innovációs tevékenység során. A szerző a hálózati, partneri kapcsolatok szerepét a válság idején vizsgálta, kvalitatív kutatás keretében. A tanulmány fontos megállapítása, hogy nem kizárólag a hálózatban rejlő lehetőségek, hanem a korábban biztos partneri kapcsolatok megszűnése is indukálhat innovációt a válság idején, valamint a biztonság, a tartalék-erőforrások megléte esetén lassabb a piaci reagálás, kevésbé kerül előtérbe a változás, s főként az innovációs tevékenység ______ Based on the network perspective companies are not isolated organizations. Networks and partnerships mean a significant support for SMEs in growth, learning and innovation. The author examines the role of networks and partnerships during the crisis, in a qualitative research. An important result of the paper is that not only the opportunities in networks but also the decomposition of prior secure relationships can induce innovation during the crisis. Moreover in case of safety and slack resources the reaction is slower, change and innovation come to the front less.
Resumo:
A cikk röviden összefoglalja az optimális valutaövezetek elméletének fejlődési állomásait, miközben felvet néhány kérdést a 2008-ban kezdődött válsággal kapcsolatban. Ezt követően áttekinti az elmélet és a válság által felvetett problémákra a gazdasági és monetáris unió által adott válaszokat. Végül az elmélet, az európai szabályozás aktuális állapota és a hazai tapasztalatok, lehetőségek tükrében megvizsgálja, hogy a jelenlegi helyzetben Magyarországnak milyen érdekei és ellenérdekei fűződhetnek az euró bevezetéséhez. Az írás kísérletet tesz arra, hogy kijelölje a hazai gazdaságpolitika kívánatos irányvonalát. _______ The article briefly summarizes the developments of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory, while states some questions regarding the crises starting in 2008. Secondly, it reviews the solutions given by the economic and monetary union to the problems raised by the OCA theory and the crisis. Thirdly, it evaluates the pros and cons for Hungary to introduce the euro as its own currency in the light of the OCA theory, the state of the European legislation and the Hungarian track record and possibilities. Finally, it shows the desired direction for the official Hungarian economic and financial policy.
Resumo:
Keynesian policy was quite successful in the post-war decades in Western Europe, but by the late 1960s lost its efficiency due to changes in conditions rather than its mistaken logic. The lesson from the first global crisis erupting in early 1970s and also from the subsequent several crises since then is that the increasing crisis propensity of the world economy is rooted in its inherent disequilibria stemming from deep inequalities, asymmetrical interdependencies and disintegrated socio-economic structures. In view of the failure of the prevailing methods of crisis management, particularly those undifferentiated, antisocial austerity measures corresponding to a neo-liberal monetarist concept which neglects this lesson, many economists prefer the Keynesian recipe. However, since global crises need global solution, and the spread of conspicuous consumption modify the demand constraint, its application must be adjusted to reality, and requires some global governance which may pave the way for a global oeco-social market economy.
Resumo:
Számos publikáció bizonyította, hogy az elemzők a tőzsdei vállalatokra készült egy részvényre jutó nyereség- (EPS-earnings per share) előrejelzéseikben szisztematikusabban kedvezőbb tervértéket adnak meg, mint a tényérték. A cikkben az EPS-előrejelzéseket vizsgálta meg a szerző a válság első másfél évében, melyek ezen időszakban is optimistának bizonyultak a vizsgált adatbázison. Az elmúlt húsz évben számos magyarázat látott napvilágot a pénzügyi előrejelzésekben tapasztalható „túltervezésre”. A viselkedéstani magyarázatok jelentős része az elemzők túlzott önbizalmát, jövőbe vetett túlzott optimizmusát jelölték meg okként. Jelen cikk – az empirikus kutatáson túl – nagy hangsúlyt fektet a két fogalom részletes bemutatására, mivel a válság éveit is optimista EPS-előrejelzések jellemezték. _____ There are numerous evidences from the 1980s that analysts give systematically more favorable forecasts for the earnings per share of listed companies than the fact, i.e. they are generally optimistic. In the current article the author investigated the EPS forecasting error in the first two and a half years of the crisis (2008-2010), which was also proved to be an era of the optimistic forecasting error. During the last 20 years reasons of so called “overplanning” have been explained in several ways. Many of these cognitive thinking patterns explanations relied on the phenomenon of overconfidence, and overoptimism without giving detailed description of these concepts. Beside the empirical part of the research current article puts more emphasis on the analysis of these theoretical concepts.
Resumo:
The study reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of tight monetary conditions, crisis on corporate capital structure, further creates a framework for analyzing their relation, as well as sheds light on the lessons learned and open research areas. The results highlight that the supply side of capital has an effect on corporate capital structure, though the analysis of this relation is scarce. However, the impact of tight monetary conditions on capital structure is analyzed by several studies, there is limited evidence on the financial policy and the development of financing mix during a crisis period. The impact of the 2007/08 crisis on the corporate capital structure and especially in case of firms with impaired access to external financing is scarce. The study also highlights our lack in understanding of the relation of crisis and capital structure in case of the CEE region.
Resumo:
This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades.^ First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers.^ Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other.^ Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments' inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies.^ We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones.^ We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process.^ Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions. ^
Resumo:
This dissertation discusses the relationship between inflation, currency substitution and dollarization that has taken place in Argentina for the past several decades. First, it is shown that when consumers are able to hold only domestic monetary balances (without capital mobility) an increase in the rate of inflation will produce a balance of payments deficit. We then look at the same issue but with heterogeneous consumers, this heterogeneity being generated by non-proportional lump-sum transfers. Second, we discussed some necessary assumptions related to currency substitution models and concluded that there was no a-priori conclusion on whether currencies should be assumed to be "cooperant" or "non-cooperant" in utility. That is to say, whether individuals held different currencies together or one instead of the other. Third, we went into discussing the issue of currency substitution as being a constraint on governments inflationary objectives rather than a choice of those governments to avoid hyperinflations. We showed that imperfect substitutability between currencies does not "reduce the scope for rational (hyper)inflationary processes" as it had been previously argued. It will ultimately depend on the parametrization used and not on the intrinsic characteristics of imperfect substitutability between currencies. We further showed that in Argentina, individuals have been able to endogenize the money supply by holding foreign monetary balances. We argued that the decision to hold foreign monetary balances by individuals is always a second best due to the trade-off between holding foreign monetary balances and consumption. For some levels of income, consumption, and foreign inflation, individuals would prefer to hold domestic monetary balances rather than foreign ones. We then modeled the distinction between dollarization and currency substitution. We concluded that although dollarization is necessary for currency substitution to take place, the decision to use foreign monetary balances for transactions purposes is largely independent from the dollarization process. Finally, we concluded that Argentina should not fully dollarize its economy because dollarization is always a second best to using a domestic currency. Further, we argued that a fixed exchange system would be better than a flexible exchange rate or a "crawling-peg" system because of the characteristics of the political system and the possibilities of "mass praetorianism" to develop, which is intricately linked to "populist" solutions.