The future of the national laboratories

The end of the Cold War has called into question the activities of the national laboratories and, more generally, the level of support now given to federal intramural research in the United States. This paper seeks to analyze the potential role of the laboratories, with particular attention to the possibility, on the one hand, of integrating private technology development into the laboratory’s menu of activities and, on the other hand, of outsourcing traditional mission activities. We review the economic efficiency arguments for intramural research and the political conditions that are likely to constrain the activities of the laboratories, and analyze the early history of programs intended to promote new technology via cooperative agreements between the laboratories and private industry. Our analysis suggests that the laboratories are likely to shrink considerably in size, and that the federal government faces a significant problem in deciding how to organize a downsizing of the federal research establishment.

Long-term change in the organization of inventive activity

Relying on a quantitative analysis of the patenting and assignment behavior of inventors, we highlight the evolution of institutions that encouraged trade in technology and a growing division of labor between those who invented new technologies and those who exploited them commercially over the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. At the heart of this change in the organization of inventive activity was a set of familiar developments which had significant consequences for the supply and demand of inventions. On the supply side, the growing complexity and capital intensity of technology raised the amount of human and physical capital required for effective invention, making it increasingly desirable for individuals involved in this activity to specialize. On the demand side, the growing competitiveness of product markets induced firms to purchase or otherwise obtain the rights to technologies developed by others. These increasing incentives to differentiate the task of invention from that of commercializing new technologies depended for their realization upon the development of markets and other types of organizational supports for trade in technology. The evidence suggests that the necessary institutions evolved first in those regions of the country where early patenting activity had already been concentrated. A self-reinforcing process whereby high rates of inventive activity encouraged the evolution of a market for technology, which in turn encouraged greater specialization and productivity at invention as individuals found it increasingly feasible to sell and license their discoveries, appears to have been operating. This market trade in technological information was an important contributor to the achievement of a high level of specialization at invention well before the rise of large-scale research laboratories in the twentieth century.

National policies for technical change: Where are the increasing returns to economic research?

Improvements over the past 30 years in statistical data, analysis, and related theory have strengthened the basis for science and technology policy by confirming the importance of technical change in national economic performance. But two important features of scientific and technological activities in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries are still not addressed adequately in mainstream economics: (i) the justification of public funding for basic research and (ii) persistent international differences in investment in research and development and related activities. In addition, one major gap is now emerging in our systems of empirical measurement—the development of software technology, especially in the service sector. There are therefore dangers of diminishing returns to the usefulness of economic research, which continues to rely completely on established theory and established statistical sources. Alternative propositions that deserve serious consideration are: (i) the economic usefulness of basic research is in the provision of (mainly tacit) skills rather than codified and applicable information; (ii) in developing and exploiting technological opportunities, institutional competencies are just as important as the incentive structures that they face; and (iii) software technology developed in traditional service sectors may now be a more important locus of technical change than software technology developed in “high-tech” manufacturing.

Are the returns to technological change in health care declining?

Whether the U.S. health care system supports too much technological change—so that new technologies of low value are adopted, or worthwhile technologies become overused—is a controversial question. This paper analyzes the marginal value of technological change for elderly heart attack patients in 1984–1990. It estimates the additional benefits and costs of treatment by hospitals that are likely to adopt new technologies first or use them most intensively. If the overall value of the additional treatments is declining, then the benefits of treatment by such intensive hospitals relative to other hospitals should decline, and the additional costs of treatment by such hospitals should rise. To account for unmeasured changes in patient mix across hospitals that might bias the results, instrumental–variables methods are used to estimate the incremental mortality benefits and costs. The results do not support the view that the returns to technological change are declining. However, the incremental value of treatment by intensive hospitals is low throughout the study period, supporting the view that new technologies are overused.

Star scientists and institutional transformation: Patterns of invention and innovation in the formation of the biotechnology industry

The most productive (“star”) bioscientists had intellectual human capital of extraordinary scientific and pecuniary value for some 10–15 years after Cohen and Boyer’s 1973 founding discovery for biotechnology [Cohen, S., Chang, A., Boyer, H. & Helling, R. (1973) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 70, 3240–3244]. This extraordinary value was due to the union of still scarce knowledge of the new research techniques and genius and vision to apply them in novel, valuable ways. As in other sciences, star bioscientists were very protective of their techniques, ideas, and discoveries in the early years of the revolution, tending to collaborate more within their own institution, which slowed diffusion to other scientists. Close, bench-level working ties between stars and firm scientists were needed to accomplish commercialization of the breakthroughs. Where and when star scientists were actively producing publications is a key predictor of where and when commercial firms began to use biotechnology. The extent of collaboration by a firm’s scientists with stars is a powerful predictor of its success: for an average firm, 5 articles coauthored by an academic star and the firm’s scientists result in about 5 more products in development, 3.5 more products on the market, and 860 more employees. Articles by stars collaborating with or employed by firms have significantly higher rates of citation than other articles by the same or other stars. The U.S. scientific and economic infrastructure has been particularly effective in fostering and commercializing the bioscientific revolution. These results let us see the process by which scientific breakthroughs become economic growth and consider implications for policy.

Evaluating the federal role in financing health-related research

This paper considers the appropriate role for government in the support of scientific and technological progress in health care; the information the federal government needs to make well-informed decisions about its role; and the ways that federal policy toward research and development should respond to scientific advances, technology trends, and changes in the political and social environment. The principal justification for government support of research rests upon economic characteristics that lead private markets to provide inappropriate levels of research support or to supply inappropriate quantities of the products that result from research. The federal government has two basic tools for dealing with these problems: direct subsidies for research and strengthened property rights that can increase the revenues that companies receive for the products that result from research. In the coming years, the delivery system for health care will continue to undergo dramatic changes, new research opportunities will emerge at a rapid pace, and the pressure to limit discretionary federal spending will intensify. These forces make it increasingly important to improve the measurement of the costs and benefits of research and to recognize the tradeoffs among alternative policies for promoting innovation in health care.

Public–private interaction in pharmaceutical research

We empirically examine interaction between the public and private sectors in pharmaceutical research using qualitative data on the drug discovery process and quantitative data on the incidence of coauthorship between public and private institutions. We find evidence of significant reciprocal interaction, and reject a simple “linear” dichotomous model in which the public sector performs basic research and the private sector exploits it. Linkages to the public sector differ across firms, reflecting variation in internal incentives and policy choices, and the nature of these linkages correlates with their research performance.

Environmental change and hedonic cost functions for automobiles

This paper focuses on how changes in the economic and regulatory environment have affected production costs and product characteristics in the automobile industry. We estimate “hedonic cost functions” that relate product-level costs to their characteristics. Then we examine how this cost surface has changed over time and how these changes relate to changes in gas prices and in emission standard regulations. We also briefly consider the related questions of how changes in automobile characteristics, and in the rate of patenting, are related to regulations and gas prices.

Sematech: Purpose and Performance

In previous research, we have found a steep learning curve in the production of semiconductors. We estimated that most production knowledge remains internal to the firm, but that a significant fraction “spills over” to other firms. The existence of such spillovers may justify government actions to stimulate research on semiconductor manufacturing technology. The fact that not all production knowledge spills over, meanwhile, creates opportunities for firms to form joint ventures and slide down their learning curves more efficiently. With these considerations in mind, in 1987 14 leading U.S. semiconductor producers, with the assistance of the U.S. government in the form of $100 million in annual subsidies, formed a research and development (R&D) consortium called Sematech. In previous research, we estimated that Sematech has induced its member firms to lower their R&D spending. This may reflect more sharing and less duplication of research, i.e., more research being done with each R&D dollar. If this is the case, then Sematech members may wish to replace any funding withdrawn by the U.S. government. This in turn would imply that the U.S. government’s contributions to Sematech do not induce more semiconductor research than would otherwise occur.

The challenge of contracting for technological information

Contracting to provide technological information (TI) is a significant challenge. TI is an unusual commodity in five ways. (i) TI is difficult to count and value; conventional indicators, such as patents and citations, hardly indicate value. TI is often sold at different prices to different parties. (ii) To value TI, it may be necessary to “give away the secret.” This danger, despite nondisclosure agreements, inhibits efforts to market TI. (iii) To prove its value, TI is often bundled into complete products, such as a computer chip or pharmaceutical product. Efficient exchange, by contrast, would involve merely the raw information. (iv) Sellers’ superior knowledge about TI’s value make buyers wary of overpaying. (v) Inefficient contracts are often designed to secure rents from TI. For example, licensing agreements charge more than marginal cost. These contracting difficulties affect the way TI is produced, encouraging self-reliance. This should be an advantage to large firms. However, small research and development firms spend more per employee than large firms, and nonprofit universities are major producers. Networks of organizational relationships, particularly between universities and industry, are critical in transmitting TI. Implicit barter—money for guidance—is common. Property rights for TI are hard to establish. Patents, quite suitable for better mousetraps, are inadequate for an era when we design better mice. Much TI is not patented, and what is patented sets fuzzy demarcations. New organizational forms are a promising approach to contracting difficulties for TI. Webs of relationships, formal and informal, involving universities, start-up firms, corporate giants, and venture capitalists play a major role in facilitating the production and spread of TI.

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Mapping the universe in three dimensions

The determination of the three-dimensional layout of galaxies is critical to our understanding of the evolution of galaxies and the structures in which they lie, to our determination of the fundamental parameters of cosmology, and to our understanding of both the past and future histories of the universe at large. The mapping of the large scale structure in the universe via the determination of galaxy red shifts (Doppler shifts) is a rapidly growing industry thanks to technological developments in detectors and spectrometers at radio and optical wavelengths. First-order application of the red shift-distance relation (Hubble’s law) allows the analysis of the large-scale distribution of galaxies on scales of hundreds of megaparsecs. Locally, the large-scale structure is very complex but the overall topology is not yet clear. Comparison of the observed red shifts with ones expected on the basis of other distance estimates allows mapping of the gravitational field and the underlying total density distribution. The next decade holds great promise for our understanding of the character of large-scale structure and its origin.

Convex polytopes and quantization of symplectic manifolds

Quantum mechanics associate to some symplectic manifolds M a quantum model Q(M), which is a Hilbert space. The space Q(M) is the quantum mechanical analogue of the classical phase space M. We discuss here relations between the volume of M and the dimension of the vector space Q(M). Analogues for convex polyhedra are considered.

Parametrizations of elliptic curves by Shimura curves and by classical modular curves

Fix an isogeny class

Electrostatic steering and ionic tethering in enzyme–ligand binding: Insights from simulations

To bind at an enzyme’s active site, a ligand must diffuse or be transported to the enzyme’s surface, and, if the binding site is buried, the ligand must diffuse through the protein to reach it. Although the driving force for ligand binding is often ascribed to the hydrophobic effect, electrostatic interactions also influence the binding process of both charged and nonpolar ligands. First, electrostatic steering of charged substrates into enzyme active sites is discussed. This is of particular relevance for diffusion-influenced enzymes. By comparing the results of Brownian dynamics simulations and electrostatic potential similarity analysis for triose-phosphate isomerases, superoxide dismutases, and β-lactamases from different species, we identify the conserved features responsible for the electrostatic substrate-steering fields. The conserved potentials are localized at the active sites and are the primary determinants of the bimolecular association rates. Then we focus on a more subtle effect, which we will refer to as “ionic tethering.” We explore, by means of molecular and Brownian dynamics simulations and electrostatic continuum calculations, how salt links can act as tethers between structural elements of an enzyme that undergo conformational change upon substrate binding, and thereby regulate or modulate substrate binding. This is illustrated for the lipase and cytochrome P450 enzymes. Ionic tethering can provide a control mechanism for substrate binding that is sensitive to the electrostatic properties of the enzyme’s surroundings even when the substrate is nonpolar.