Two decades on from the break-up of Czechoslovakia: Departures, diversions and destinations. CEPS Commentary, 7 March 2013

Twenty years after the split of Czechoslovakia, expert analysts from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the UK shed light on the political geography of this part of Central Europe in an extended three-part Commentary. The end points in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the successor states may be similar, argue the authors, but the journeys have been very different. Recent experience would suggest that in terms of EU politics, the Slovaks will be rather passive whilst the Czechs might be a little more troublesome. On the domestic front, the political discourse and competition in both states will largely revolve around the question of competence and corruption.

The Visegrad group and Germany: towards a new paradigm. CEPS Commentary, 28 November 2013

In surveying the strategic realignment now underway in Central Europe among the four members of the Visegrad Group, Michal Simecka observes in a new CEPS Commentary that it is hard to think of another point in modern history that permitted a scenario of Germany and its eastern neighbours working together to constructively shape Europe.

First steps towards into the unknown. The possibilities prospects of unconventional gas extraction in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 106, 2013-04-24

Ukraine’s deposits of unconventional gas (shale gas, tight gas trapped in non-porous sandstone formations, and coal bed methane) may form a significant part of Europe’s gas reserves. Initial exploration and test drilling will be carried out in two major deposits: Yuzivska (Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts) and Oleska (Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts), to confirm the volume of the reserves. Shell and Chevron, respectively, won the tenders for the development of these fields in mid 2012. Gas extraction on an industrial scale is expected to commence in late 2018/ early 2019 at the earliest. According to estimates presented in the draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine 2030, annual gas production levels may range between 30 billion m3 and 47 billion m3 towards the end of the next decade. According to optimistic forecasts from IHS CERA, total gas production (from both conventional and unconventional reserves) could reach as much as 73 billion m3. However, this will require multi-billion dollar investments, a significant improvement in the investment climate, and political stability. It is clear at the present initial stage of the unconventional gas extraction project that the private interests of the Ukrainian government elite have played a positive role in initiating unconventional gas extraction projects. Ukraine has had to wait nearly four decades for this opportunity to regain its status of a major gas producer. Gas from unconventional sources may lead not only to Ukraine becoming self-sufficient in terms of energy supplies, but may also result in it beginning to export gas. Furthermore, shale gas deposits in Poland and Ukraine, including on the Black Sea shelf (both traditional natural gas and gas hydrates) form a specific ‘European methane belt’, which could bring about a cardinal change in the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eastern and Central Europe over the next thirty years.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

Economic Implications of Enlargement. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 1/2002

The Eastern enlargement is about to be decided by the European Council. As expected, the “end game “ of the negotiations and assessments is heavily biased by a narrow perspective on net transfers, on income compensations to Central European farmers and on the psychological politics of a single “big bang “. None of these three so-called key items of the end game are of much relevance to appreciate the significance of enlargement. Net transfers have little to do with the costs and benefits of club membership for countries which pay, and can lead to addiction and lethargy rather than extra growth if market integration, macro-economic stability and domestic reforms are not taken serious (as the case of Greece before 1997 has demonstrated). Income compensations for Eastern farmers are crucial for this pressure group, and symbolically of some importance in domestic politics because of the perversity that rich farmers get more, but their absence is likely to serve the public interest in candidate countries far better. And being part of the big bang, as against getting in one or three years later, has assumed a dramatic meaning during this end game, far beyond its true proportions. This hectic European theatre tends to obscure what enlargement is mainly about, now that the stability and values have been secured for the peoples from Central Europe. In a guaranteed setting of peace, freedom and security, enlargement is about greater prosperity.

EU Enlargement: external economic implications. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 4/2003

Unlike some previous EU enlargements (e.g. with the UK and with Spain/Portugal) the present EU enlargement to Central Europe has not prompted much, let alone a fierce, debate about the external dimension. This BEEP briefing discusses the main economic aspects of the external dimension, in particular whether there is a threat of (how much) trade diversion. Attention is paid to the three main topics of interest for third countries: industrial trade effects, impact on FDI and agricultural trade effects. Agriculture is arguably the most sensitive of the three, given the very high CAP border protection, and although large-scale trade diversion may eventually occur under certain scenarios (such as an unreformed CAP), these fears are greatly exaggerated in the short to medium term (5-7 years): the time frame considered is therefore all-important. This conclusion becomes less surprising if one takes a closer look at the current sorry state of agriculture in the CEECs. Separate sections treat the somewhat sensitive subject of U.S.-CEEC Bilateral Investment Treaties, as well as the longterm development perspective, which addresses the prospects for catch-up growth by the accession countries. In the end, non-European stakeholders in the accession process will greatly benefit from sustained catch-up growth by the CEECs, which are locking-in deep reforms due to EU accession.

The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy. OSW Commentary No. 161, February 10 2015

Introduction. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping presented the concept of the New Silk Road – a collection of land and maritime routes – in autumn 2013. Initially, it envisaged the creation of a network of infrastructural connections, mainly transport corridors, between China and its most important economic partner – Europe. The concept grew in importance throughout 2014 to become the key instrument of China’s foreign policy, especially in the areas of public diplomacy and soft power. Towards the end of 2014, the Chinese government announced it would establish a Silk Road Fund worth US$40 billion. The New Silk Road idea is a flexible formula used by China in its dialogue with many other countries. Its inclusive nature helps contribute to diluting the negative impression caused by China’s rapid economic expansion and assertiveness in foreign policy, especially with regard to its neighbours. The process of implementing the New Silk Road concept will allow China to expand its influence within its neighbourhood: in Central and South-Eastern Asia. The New Silk Road will be an alternative point of reference to the US dominance and Russian integration projects in these regions. The concept will legitimise and facilitate the growth of China’s influence in the transit countries on the route to Western Europe, i.e. in the Middle East (Arab countries, Israel and Turkey, the Horn of Africa and Central Europe (the Balkans and the Visegrad Group countries). This concept is also essential for China’s domestic policy. It has become one of Xi Jinping’s main political projects. It will boost the development of China’s central and western provinces. The fact that the concept is open and not fully defined means that it will be a success regardless of the extent to which it will be implemented in practice. Its flexible nature allows China to continue investments already initiated bilaterally and to present them as components of the New Silk Road concept.

The Weakness of Post-Communist Civil Society Reassessed. CES Papers - Open Forum #11, 2012

During the last two decades, scholars from a variety of disciplines have argued that civil society is structurally deficient in post-communist countries. Yet why have the seemingly strong, active and mobilized civic movements of the transition period become so weak after democracy was established? And why have there been diverging political trajectories across the post-communist space if civil society structures were universally weak? This paper uses a wide range of data from various available sources to show that civil societies in Central and Eastern European countries are not as feeble as is commonly assumed. Some post-communist countries possess vigorous public spheres, and active civil society organizations strongly connected to transnational civic networks able to shape domestic policies. Following the calls by Anheier (2004) and Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) we adopt a multidimensional approach to the measurement of civil society. In a series of cross-section timeseries models, we show that our broader measures of civic and social institutions are able to predict the diverging transition paths among post-communist regimes, and in particular the growing gap between democratic East Central Europe and the increasingly authoritarian post-Soviet space.

International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. COMECON, No. 549, September 1964

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance is the least known of all the regional organizations. This is attributable partly to the fact that it was largely dormant from its inception in 1949 until the late 1950s and partly to the scattered and fragmentary nature of information on its activities. The present article is an attempt to bring available knowledge into focus for a coherent pioture of the organization that "will probably play an increasing role in the economic development of East Central Europe." COMECON is of interest not only because of its importance as one of the regional bodies shaping a network of relations among European countries. Its interest lies also in the light it throws on the particular problems faced by centrally planned economies when they try to integrate and in its demonstration that international organizations have a life of their own.

Enriching plant diversity in grasslands by large-scale experimental sward disturbance and seed addition along gradients of land-use intensity

Aims The relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning is among the most active areas of ecological research. Furthermore, enhancing the diversity of degraded ecosystems is a major goal in applied restoration ecology. In grasslands, many species may be locally absent due to dispersal or microsite limitation and may therefore profit from mechanical disturbance of the resident vegetation. We established a seed addition and disturbance experiment across several grassland sites of different land use to test whether plant diversity can be increased in these grasslands. Additionally, the experiment will allow us testing the consequences of increased plant diversity for ecosystem processes and for the diversity of other taxa in real-world ecosystems. Here we present details of the experimental design and report results from the first vegetation survey one year after disturbance and seed addition. Moreover, we tested whether the effects of seed addition and disturbance varied among grassland depending on their land use or pre-disturbance plant diversity. Methods A full-factorial experiment was installed in 73 grasslands in three regions across Germany. Grasslands were under regular agricultural use, but varied in the type and the intensity of management, thereby representing the range of management typical for large parts of Central Europe. The disturbance treatment consisted of disturbing the top 10 cm of the sward using a rotavator or rotary harrow. Seed addition consisted of sowing a high-diversity seed mixture of regional plant species. These species were all regionally present, but often locally absent, depending on the resident vegetation composition and richness of each grassland. Important findings One year after sward disturbance it had significantly increased cover of bare soil, seedling species richness and numbers of seedlings. Seed addition had increased plant species richness, but only in combination with sward disturbance. The increase in species richness, when both seed addition and disturbance was applied, was higher at high land-use intensity and low resident diversity. Thus, we show that at least the early recruitment of many species is possible also at high land-use intensity, indicating the potential to restore and enhance biodiversity of species-poor agricultural grasslands. Our newly established experiment provides a unique platform for broad-scale research on the land-use dependence of future trajectories of vegetation diversity and composition and their effects on ecosystem functioning.

Gnathostome microremains from the lower Devonian Jawf Formation, Saudi Arabia

Calcareotis horizons in the Qasr and Hammamiyat members (Lower Devonian, ?Pragian and lower Emsian) of file Jawf Formation, northwestern Saudi Arabia, yielded a rich assemblage of microremains from acanthodian, placoderm. chondrichthyan, and sarcopterygian vertebrates. The most abundant elements are scales from acanthodians Nostolepis spp., Milesacanthus ancestralis n. sp., Canadatepis? sp., and Gomphonchus? fromensis. scales and dermal bone fragments from acanthothoracid and ?rhenanid placoderms, and teeth from onychodontids. Rarer occurrences include ?chondrichthyan scales of several different morphotypes, and petalichthid and ?ptyctodontid placoderm elements. The Qasr Member assemblage shows a close resemblance to slightly older faunas front the Lochkovian of Brittany and Spain. The Hammamiyat Member microvertebrate fauna shows closest affinity with that of the stratigraphically lower Qasr Member, with similarities also to coeval faunas from southeastern Australia, late Emsian/Eifelian faunas from west-central Europe, and the Givetian Aztec Siltstone fauna from Antarctica.