Biogeeniset amiinit : [osa] II. : Suomessa raportoidut amiinimyrkytykset vuosina 1975-1994

Summary: [Biogenic amines] : [part] II. : foodborne intoxications caused by biogenic amines in Finland during 1975-1994

Paratuberkuloosi : yleiskatsaus ja tilanne Suomessa

Summary: Paratuberculosis : a review and survey in Finland

Kunnostusojitustarpeen arviointi Pohjois-Suomessa

Summary: Evaluation of the need for ditch network maintenance in northern Finland

Un modelo de riesgo de crédito basado en opciones compuestas con barrera. Aplicación al mercado continuo español

In this work the valuation methodology of compound option written on a downand-out call option, developed by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), has been applied to deduce a credit risk model. It is supposed that the firm has a debt structure with two maturity dates and that the credit event takes place when the assets firm value falls under a determined level called barrier. An empirical application of the model for 105 firms of Spanish continuous market is carried out. For each one of them its value in the date of analysis, the volatility and the critical value are obtained and from these, the default probability to short and long-term and the implicit probability in the two previous probabilities are deduced. The results are compared with the ones obtained from the Geskemodel (1977).

New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks

This paper tests for real interest parity (RIRP) among the nineteen major OECD countries over the period 1978:Q2-1998:Q4. The econometric methods applied consist of combining the use of several unit root or stationarity tests designed for panels valid under cross-section dependence and presence of multiple structural breaks. Our results strongly support the fulfilment of the weak version of the RIRP for the studied period once dependence and structural breaks are accounted for.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.