Comparative cost-effectiveness of policy instruments for reducing the global burden of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drug use

Alcohol, tobacco and illicit drug use together pose a formidable challenge to international public health. Building on earlier estimates of the demonstrated burden of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drug use at the global level, this review aims to consider the comparative cost-effectiveness of evidence-based interventions for reducing the global burden of disease from these three risk factors. Although the number of published cost-effectiveness studies in the addictions field is now extensive ( reviewed briefly here) there are a series of practical problems in using them for sector-wide decision making, including methodological heterogeneity, differences in analytical reference point and the specificity of findings to a particular context. In response to these limitations, a more generalised form of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is proposed, which enables like-with-like comparisons of the relative efficiency of preventive or individual-based strategies to be made, not only within but also across diseases or their risk factors. The application of generalised CEA to a range of personal and non-personal interventions for reducing the burden of addictive substances is described. While such a development avoids many of the obstacles that have plagued earlier attempts and in so doing opens up new opportunities to address important policy questions, there remain a number of caveats to population-level analysis of this kind, particularly when conducted at the global level. These issues are the subject of the final section of this review.

The release of nicotine from chewing gum formulations

The first clinically proven nicotine replacement product to obtain regulatory approval was Nicorette® gum. It provides a convenient way of delivering nicotine directly to the buccal cavity, thus, circumventing 'first-pass' elimination following gastrointestinal absorption. Since launch, Nicorette® gum has been investigated in numerous studies (clinical) which are often difficult to compare due to large variations in study design and degree of sophistication. In order to standardise testing, in 2000 the European Pharmacopoeia introduced an apparatus to investigate the in vitro release of drug substances from medical chewing gum. With use of the chewing machine, the main aims of this project were to determine factors that could affect release from Nicorette® gum, to develop an in vitro in vivo correlation and to investigate formulation variables on release of nicotine from gums. A standard in vitro test method was developed. The gum was placed in the chewing chamber with 40 mL of artificial saliva at 37'C and chewed at 60 chews per minute. The chew rate, the type of dissolution medium used, pH, volume, temperature and the ionic strength of the dissolution medium were altered to investigate the effects on release in vitro. It was found that increasing the temperature of the dissolution media and the rate at which the gums were chewed resulted in a greater release of nicotine, whilst increasing the ionic strength of the dissolution medium to 80 mM resulted in a lower release. The addition of 0.1 % sodium Jauryl sulphate to the artificial saliva was found to double the release of nicotine compared to the use of artificial saliva and water alone. Although altering the dissolution volume and the starting pH did not affect the release. The increase in pH may be insufficient to provide optimal conditions for nicotine absorption (since the rate at which nicotine is transported through the buccal membrane was found to be higher at pH values greater than 8.6 where nicotine is predominately unionised). Using a time mapping function, it was also possible to establish a level A in vitro in vivo correlation. 4 mg Nicorette® gum was chewed at various chew rates in vitro and correlated to an in vivo chew-out study. All chew rates used in vitro could be successfully used for IVIVC purposes, however statistically, chew rates of 10 and 20 chews per minute performed better than all other chew rates. Finally a series of nicotine gums was made to investigate the effect of formulation variables on release of nicotine from the gum. Using a directly compressible gum base, in comparison to Nicorette® the gums crumbled when chewed in vitro, resulting in a faster release of nicotine. To investigate the effect of altering the gum base, the concentration of sodium salts, sugar syrup, the form of the active drug, the addition sequence and the incorporation of surfactant into the gum, the traditional manufacturing method was used to make a series of gum formulations. Results showed that the time of addition of the active drug, the incorporation of surfactants and using different gum base all increased the release of nicotine from the gum. In contrast, reducing the concentration of sodium carbonate resulted in a lower release. Using a stronger nicotine ion-exchange resin delayed the release of nicotine from the gum, whilst altering the concentration of sugar syrup had little effect on the release but altered the texture of the gum.

Corporate coalitions and policy making in the European Union:how and why British American tobacco promoted "better regulation"

Over the past fifteen years, an interconnected set of regulatory reforms, knownas Better Regulation, has been adopted across Europe, marking a significant shift in theway that European Union policies are developed. There has been little exploration of the origins of these reforms, which include mandatory ex ante impact assessment. Drawing on documentary and interview data, this article discusses how and why large corporations, notably British American Tobacco (BAT), worked to influence and promote these reforms. Our analysis highlights (1) howpolicy entrepreneurs with sufficient resources (such as large corporations) can shape the membership and direction of advocacy coalitions; (2) the extent to which "think tanks" may be prepared to lobby on behalf of commercial clients; and (3) why regulated industries (including tobacco) may favor the use of "evidence tools," such as impact assessments, in policy making. We argue that a key aspect of BAT's ability to shape regulatory reform involved the deliberate construction of a vaguely defined idea that could be strategically adapted to appeal to diverse constituencies.We discuss the theoretical implications of this finding for the Advocacy Coalition Framework, as well as the practical implications of the findings for efforts to promote transparency and public health in the European Union.

Smoke rings:towards a comprehensive tobacco free policy for the Olympic Games

Background The tobacco industry has long sought affiliation with major sporting events, including the Olympic Games, for marketing, advertising and promotion purposes. Since 1988, each Olympic Games has adopted a tobacco-free policy. Limited study of the effectiveness of the smoke-free policy has been undertaken to date, with none examining the tobacco industry's involvement with the Olympics or use of the Olympic brand. Methods and Findings A comparison of the contents of Olympic tobacco-free policies from 1988 to 2014 was carried out by searching the websites of the IOC and host NOCs. The specific tobacco control measures adopted for each Games were compiled and compared with measures recommended by the WHO Tobacco Free Sports Initiative and Article 13 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). This was supported by semi-structured interviews of key informants involved with the adoption of tobacco-free policies for selected games. To understand the industry's interests in the Olympics, the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) was systematically searched between June 2013 and August 2014. Company websites, secondary sources and media reports were also searched to triangulate the above data sources. This paper finds that, while most direct associations between tobacco and the Olympics have been prohibited since 1988, a variety of indirect associations undermine the Olympic tobacco-free policy. This is due to variation in the scope of tobacco-free policies, limited jurisdiction and continued efforts by the industry to be associated with Olympic ideals. Conclusions The paper concludes that, compatible with the IOC's commitment to promoting healthy lifestyles, a comprehensive tobacco-free policy with standardized and binding measures should be adopted by the International Olympic Committee and all national Olympic committees.

The devil is in the detail:tobacco industry political influence in the Dutch implementation of the 2001 EU Tobacco Products Directive

Introduction - The Dutch implementation of the black border provision in the 2001 European Union Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) is studied to examine the implications of tobacco industry involvement in the implementation phase of the policy process. Methods - A qualitative analysis was conducted of Dutch government documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, triangulated with in-depth interviews with key informants and secondary data sources (publicly available government documents, scientific literature, and news articles). Results - Tobacco manufacturers’ associations were given the opportunity to set implementation specifications via a fast-track deal with the government. The offer of early implementation of the labelling section of the TPD was used as political leverage by the industry, and underpinned by threats of litigation and arguments highlighting the risks of additional public costs and the benefits to the government of expediency and speed. Ultimately, the government agreed to the industry's interpretation, against the advice of the European Commission. Conclusions - The findings highlight the policy risks associated with corporate actors’ ability to use interactions over technical product specifications to influence the implementation of health policy and illustrate the difficulties in limiting industry interference in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The implementation phase is particularly vulnerable to industry influence, where negotiation with industry actors may be unavoidable and the practical implications of relatively technical considerations are not always apparent to policymakers. During the implementation of the new TPD 2014/40/EU, government officials are advised to take a proactive role in stipulating technical specifications.

Exposing and addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income countries

The tobacco industry's future depends on increasing tobacco use in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), which face a growing burden of tobacco-related disease, yet have potential to prevent full-scale escalation of this epidemic. To drive up sales the industry markets its products heavily, deliberately targeting non-smokers and keeps prices low until smoking and local economies are sufficiently established to drive prices and profits up. The industry systematically flaunts existing tobacco control legislation and works aggressively to prevent future policies using its resource advantage to present highly misleading economic arguments, rebrand political activities as corporate social responsibility, and establish and use third parties to make its arguments more palatable. Increasingly it is using domestic litigation and international arbitration to bully LMICs from implementing effective policies and hijacking the problem of tobacco smuggling for policy gain, attempting to put itself in control of an illegal trade in which there is overwhelming historical evidence of its complicity. Progress will not be realised until tobacco industry interference is actively addressed as outlined in Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. Exemplar LMICs show this action can be achieved and indicate that exposing tobacco industry misconduct is an essential first step.

How does the tobacco industry attempt to influence marketing regulations? A systematic review

BACKGROUND: The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control makes a number of recommendations aimed at restricting the marketing of tobacco products. Tobacco industry political activity has been identified as an obstacle to Parties' development and implementation of these provisions. This study systematically reviews the existing literature on tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations and develops taxonomies of 1) industry strategies and tactics and 2) industry frames and arguments. METHODS: Searches were conducted between April-July 2011, and updated in March 2013. Articles were included if they made reference to tobacco industry efforts to influence marketing regulations; supported claims with verifiable evidence; were written in English; and concerned the period 1990-2013. 48 articles met the review criteria. Narrative synthesis was used to combine the evidence. RESULTS: 56% of articles focused on activity in North America, Europe or Australasia, the rest focusing on Asia (17%), South America, Africa or transnational activity. Six main political strategies and four main frames were identified. The tobacco industry frequently claims that the proposed policy will have negative unintended consequences, that there are legal barriers to regulation, and that the regulation is unnecessary because, for example, industry does not market to youth or adheres to a voluntary code. The industry primarily conveys these arguments through direct and indirect lobbying, the promotion of voluntary codes and alternative policies, and the formation of alliances with other industrial sectors. The majority of tactics and arguments were used in multiple jurisdictions. CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco industry political activity is far more diverse than suggested by existing taxonomies of corporate political activity. Tactics and arguments are repeated across jurisdictions, suggesting that the taxonomies of industry tactics and arguments developed in this paper are generalisable to multiple jurisdictions and can be used to predict industry activity.

Representation and misrepresentation of scientific evidence in contemporary tobacco regulation:a review of tobacco industry submissions to the UK Government consultation on standardised packaging

BACKGROUND: Standardised packaging (SP) of tobacco products is an innovative tobacco control measure opposed by transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) whose responses to the UK government's public consultation on SP argued that evidence was inadequate to support implementing the measure. The government's initial decision, announced 11 months after the consultation closed, was to wait for 'more evidence', but four months later a second 'independent review' was launched. In view of the centrality of evidence to debates over SP and TTCs' history of denying harms and manufacturing uncertainty about scientific evidence, we analysed their submissions to examine how they used evidence to oppose SP. METHODS AND FINDINGS: We purposively selected and analysed two TTC submissions using a verification-oriented cross-documentary method to ascertain how published studies were used and interpretive analysis with a constructivist grounded theory approach to examine the conceptual significance of TTC critiques. The companies' overall argument was that the SP evidence base was seriously flawed and did not warrant the introduction of SP. However, this argument was underpinned by three complementary techniques that misrepresented the evidence base. First, published studies were repeatedly misquoted, distorting the main messages. Second, 'mimicked scientific critique' was used to undermine evidence; this form of critique insisted on methodological perfection, rejected methodological pluralism, adopted a litigation (not scientific) model, and was not rigorous. Third, TTCs engaged in 'evidential landscaping', promoting a parallel evidence base to deflect attention from SP and excluding company-held evidence relevant to SP. The study's sample was limited to sub-sections of two out of four submissions, but leaked industry documents suggest at least one other company used a similar approach. CONCLUSIONS: The TTCs' claim that SP will not lead to public health benefits is largely without foundation. The tools of Better Regulation, particularly stakeholder consultation, provide an opportunity for highly resourced corporations to slow, weaken, or prevent public health policies.