Investment, duration, and exit strategies for corporate and independent venture capital-backed start-ups

We propose a model of investment, duration, and exit strategies for start-ups backed by venture capital (VC) funds that accounts for the high level of uncertainty, the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders, and the discount rate. Our analysis predicts that start-ups backed by corporate VC funds remain for a longer period of time before exiting and receive larger investment amounts than those financed by independent VC funds. Although a longer duration leads to a higher likelihood of an exit through an acquisition, a larger investment increases the probability of an IPO exit. These predictions find strong empirical support.

Sharing competences in strategic alliances: a case study of the Cosan and Shell biofuel venture

In a competitive world, the way a firm establishes its organizational arrangements may determine the enhancement of its core competences and the possibility of reaching new markets. Firms that find their skills to be applicable in just one type of market encounter constraints in expanding their markets, and through alliances may find a competitive form of value capture. Hybrid forms of organization appear primarily as an alternative to capturing value and managing joint assets when the market and hierarchy modes do not present any yields for the firm's competitiveness. As a result, this form may present other challenging issues, such as the allocation of rights and principal-agent problems. The biofuel market has presented a strong pattern of changes over the last 10 years. New intra-firm arrangements have appeared as a path to participate or survive among global competition. Given the need for capital to achieve better results, there has been a consistent movement of mergers and acquisitions in the Biofuel sector, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. In 2011 there were five major groups in Brazil with a grinding capacity of more than 15 million tons per year: Raízen (joint venture formed by Cosan and Shell), Louis Dreyfus, Tereos Petrobras, ETH, and Bunge. Major oil companies have implemented the strategy of diversification as a hedge against the rising cost of oil. Using the alliance of Cosan and Shell in the Brazilian biofuel market as a case study, this paper analyses the governance mode and challenging issues raised by strategic alliances when firms aim to reach new markets through the sharing of core competences with local firms. The article is based on documentary research and interviews with Cosan's Investor Relations staff, and examines the main questions involving hybrid forms through the lens of the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Agency Theory, Resource Based View (RBV), and dynamic capabilities theoretical approaches. One focal point is knowledge "appropriability" and the specific assets originated by the joint venture. Once the alliance is formed, it is expected that competences will be shared and new capabilities will expand the limits of the firm. In the case studied, Cosan and Shell shared a number of strategic assets related to their competences. Raízen was formed with economizing incentives, as well to continue marshalling internal resources to enhance the company's presence in the world energy sector. Therefore, some challenges might be related to the control and monitoring agents' behavior, considering the two-part organism formed by distinctive organizational culture, tacit knowledge, and long-term incentives. The case study analyzed illustrates the hybrid arrangement as a middle form for organizing the transaction: neither in the market nor in the hierarchy mode, but rather a more flexible commitment agreement with a strategic central authority. The corporate governance devices are also a challenge, since the alignment between the parent companies in the joint ventures is far more complex. These characteristics have led to an organism with bilateral dependence, offering favorable conditions for developing dynamic capabilities. However, these conditions might rely on the partners' long-term interest in the joint venture.

Technological convergence: a strategic perspective

The information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors are in a process of technological convergence. Determinant factors in this process are the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets and technological change. Many firms are engaged in a process of mergers and alliances to position themselves in this new framework. Technological and demand uncertainties are very important. Our objective in this paper is to study the economic determinants of the strategies of the firms. With this aim, we review some key technological and demand aspects. We shed some light on the strategic motivations of the firms by establishing a parallel with the evolution of the retailing sector

Iowa Department of Corrections Strategic Plan and Plan, Performance 2003

Annual Report, Strategic Plan and Performance Plan

Behavioral aspects of investment fund's markets: are good managers lucky or skilled?

It is generally accepted that financial markets are efficient in the long run a lthough there may be some deviations in the short run. It is also accepted that a good portfolio manager is the one who beats the market persistently along time, this type of manager could not exist if markets were perfectly efficient According to this in a pure efficient market we should find that managers know that they can not beat the market so they would undertake only pure passive management strategies. Assuming a certain degree of inefficiency in the short run, a market may show some managers who tr y to beat the market by undertaking active strategies. From Fama’s efficient markets theory we can state that these active managers may beat the market occasionally although they will not be able to enhance significantly their performance in the long run. On the other hand, in an inefficient market it would be expected to find a higher level of activity related with the higher probability of beating the market. In this paper we follow two objectives: first, we set a basis to analyse the level of efficiency in an asset invest- ment funds market by measuring performance, strategies activity and it’s persistence for a certain group of funds during the period of study. Second, we analyse individual performance persistence in order to determine the existence of skilled managers. The CAPM model is taken as theoretical background and the use of the Sharpe’s ratio as a suitable performance measure in a limited information environment leads to a group performance measurement proposal. The empiri- cal study takes quarterly data from 1999-2007 period, for the whole population of the Spanish asset investment funds market, provided by the CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores). This period of study has been chosen to ensure a wide enough range of efficient market observation so it would allow us to set a proper basis to compare with the following period. As a result we develop a model that allows us to measure efficiency in a given asset mutual funds market, based on the level of strategy’s activity undertaken by managers. We also observe persistence in individual performance for a certain group of funds

Economics of public governance with strategic production of information: four essays

SUMMARY This paper analyses the outcomes of the EEA and bilateral agreements vote at the level of the 3025 communities of the Swiss Confederation by simultaneously modelling the vote and the participation decisions. Regressions include economic and political factors. The economic variables are the aggregated shares of people employed in the losing, Winning and neutral sectors, according to BRUNETTI, JAGGI and WEDER (1998) classification, Which follows a Ricardo-Viner logic, and the average education levels, which follows a Heckscher-Ohlin approach. The political factors are those used in the recent literature. The results are extremely precise and consistent. Most of the variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the l % level. More than 80 % of the communities' vote variance is explained by the model, substantially reducing the residuals when compared to former studies. The political variables do have the expected signs and are significant as Well. Our results underline the importance of the interaction between electoral choice and participation decisions as well as the importance of simultaneously dealing with those issues. Eventually they reveal the electorate's high level of information and rationality. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Unser Beitrag analysiert in einem Model, welches gleichzeitig die Stimm- ("ja" oder "nein") und Partizipationsentscheidung einbezieht, den Ausgang der Abstimmungen über den Beitritt zum EWR und über die bilateralen Verträge für die 3025 Gemeinden der Schweiz. Die Regressionsgleichungen beinhalten ökonomische und politische Variabeln. Die ökonomischen Variabeln beinhalten die Anteile an sektoriellen Arbeitsplatzen, die, wie in BRUNETTI, JAGGIl.1I1d WEDER (1998), in Gewinner, Verlierer und Neutrale aufgeteilt Wurden, gemäß dem Model von Ricardo-Viner, und das durchschnittliche Ausbildungsniveau, gemäß dem Model von Heckscher-Ohlin. Die politischen Variabeln sind die in der gegenwärtigen Literatur üblichen. Unsere Resultate sind bemerkenswert präzise und kohärent. Die meisten Variabeln haben das von der Theorie vorausgesagte Vorzeichen und sind hoch signifikant (l%). Mehr als 80% der Varianz der Stimmabgabe in den Gemeinden wird durch das Modell erklärt, was, im Vergleich mit früheren Arbeiten, die unerklärten Residuen Wesentlich verkleinert. Die politischen Variabeln haben auch die erwarteten Vorzeichen und sind signifikant. Unsere Resultate unterstreichen die Bedeutung der Interaktion zwischen der Stimm- und der Partizipationsentscheidung, und die Bedeutung diese gleichzeitig zu behandeln. Letztendlich, belegen sie den hohen lnformationsgrad und die hohe Rationalität der Stimmbürger. RESUME Le présent article analyse les résultats des votations sur l'EEE et sur les accords bilatéraux au niveau des 3025 communes de la Confédération en modélisant simultanément les décisions de vote ("oui" ou "non") et de participation. Les régressions incluent des déterminants économiques et politiques. Les déterminants économiques sont les parts d'emploi sectoriels agrégées en perdants, gagnants et neutres selon la classification de BRUNETTI, JAGGI ET WEDER (1998), suivant la logique du modèle Ricardo-Viner, et les niveaux de diplômes moyens, suivant celle du modèle Heckscher-Ohlin. Les déterminants politiques suivent de près ceux utilisés dans la littérature récente. Les résultats sont remarquablement précis et cohérents. La plupart des variables ont les signes prédits par les modèles et sont significatives a 1%. Plus de 80% de la variance du vote par commune sont expliqués par le modèle, faisant substantiellement reculer la part résiduelle par rapport aux travaux précédents. Les variables politiques ont aussi les signes attendus et sont aussi significatives. Nos résultats soulignent l'importance de l'interaction entre choix électoraux et décisions de participation et l'importance de les traiter simultanément. Enfin, ils mettent en lumière les niveaux élevés d'information et de rationalité de l'électorat.

Program, Highlights & Budget Summaries, 2004

Budget in Brief from the Governor's Office

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, December 2003

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

Budget Report Fiscal Year 2005

Budget from the Governor's Office

Annual Report and Budget Summary, 2003-2004

Annual report for the Department of Public Health

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, January 2004

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, February 2004

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

A-1 Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, March 2004

Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program