Memorial to the Harvard Board of Overseers, 1823 November 3

Five drafts of a letter.

Draft of a memorial to an unidentified board (fragment), [1829] March 5-9

Fragment of a draft of a petition.

Draft of a petition to an unidentified board, [1829] November 6

One draft of a letter.

Manifest of the cargo on board the Brig William, 1791 October

Handwritten manifest listing ship cargo for a voyage of Brig William.

Note to Harvard board, undated

Brief undated note by Croswell requesting an opportunity to prepare remarks regarding his delay in completing the Library catalogue.

Minutes of the Proceedings of the Board of Overseers of Harvard College, 1775-1776

This is a small, paper-bound "waste book" containing minutes taken by the Secretary pro tempore, Samuel Cooke, at meetings held on the following dates: July 31, 1775; August 8, 1775; August 22, 1775; September 5, 1775; October 3, 1775; October 23, 1775 (fragmentary); November 5, 1775; April 16, 1776; and April 23, 1776. Because these meetings took place during the American Revolutionary War, they were held in the "Council chamber at Watertown."

No. 14 Actual amount of chamber rent & board, [1799]

One folio-sized leaf containing a handwritten table with information about student boarders in Cambridge residences listing the names of the heads of families, student names, the annual rent of chambers, the board per week, and a total amount.

[Notes from the minutes of the Board of Overseers, ca. 1799]

Small notebook containing handwritten entries of actions for the years 1718-1799 recorded in Volumes I-IV of the Harvard Board of Overseers formal meeting minutes. The entries note the appointment of Committees of inquiry and votes related to salary increases and allowances.

Complaint of Harvard President and Tutors against Nathan Prince, submitted to Governor William Shirley and the Board of Overseers on Jan. 29, 1741

President Edward Holyoke and Tutors Henry Flynt, Joseph Mayhew, and Thomas Marsh accused Prince of "sundry crimes & misdemeanors" and "sundry evil actions," including weakening and undermining the College government, showing contempt towards his fellow Tutors and towards Hollis Professor John Winthrop (who he claimed "knew no more of Philosophy than a Brute"), and making insulting remarks on numerous occasions. Prince was accused of calling others "Fool, Rogue, Rascal, Puppy &c." and of calling Col. Brattle "a Devilish Lyar." He was also accused of "appearing often times, to be what is commonly stil'd the worse for Drink" and of neglecting his duties towards his students.

Letter from Samuel Checkley to Nathan Prince, Dec. 14, 1741 with copy of Board of Overseers' meeting minutes from Nov. 27, 1741 on verso

The minutes contain votes of the Overseers relative to Prince's case. Checkley appears to have served as the Overseers' Clerk pro hac vice on several occasions.

Copy of Board of Overseers meeting minutes, Dec. 24, 1741

The minutes contain votes of the Overseers relative to Prince's case.

Receipts for room and board, 1796-1798

Eight receipts from Abiel Holmes for room and board dated October 19, 1796; January 3, 1797; February 20, 1797; April 19, 1797; July 14, 1797; October 10, 1797; April 17, 1798; and July 12, 1798.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.