Is monetary policy in new members states asymmetric?

Estimated Taylor rules became popular as a description of monetary policy conduct. There are numerous reasons why real monetary policy can be asymmetric and estimated Taylor rule nonlinear. This paper tests whether monetary policy can be described as asymmetric in three new European Union (EU) members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), which apply an inflation targeting regime. Two different empirical frameworks are

Monetary policy rules and financial stress: does financial instability matter for monetary

We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy

Macroeconomic shocks and the business cycle: evidence from a structural factor model

We use a dynamic factor model to provide a semi-structural representation for 101 quarterly US macroeconomic series. We find that (i) the US economy is well described by a number of structural shocks between two and six. Focusing on the four-shock specification, we identify, using sign restrictions, two non-policy shocks, demand and supply, and two policy shocks, monetary and fiscal. We obtain the following results. (ii) Both supply and demand shocks are important sources of fluctuations; supply prevails for GDP, while demand prevails for employment and inflation. (ii) Policy matters, Both monetary and fiscal policy shocks have sizeable effects on output and prices, with little evidence of crowding out; both monetary and fiscal authorities implement important systematic countercyclical policies reacting to demand shocks. (iii) Negative demand shocks have a large long-run positive effect on productivity, consistently with the Schumpeterian "cleansing" view of recessions.

Les Polítiques Econòmiques en la UEM, un Poder de Decisió Dividit

Aquest treball de recerca pretén analitzar les conseqüències de tenir el poder de decisió separat entre la política fiscal i la política monetària en la UEM. Alguns autors han anomenat aquest fet com el pecat original de l’eurozona, considerant que aquesta àrea monetària ha patit un error de disseny des d’un bon principi1. El creixement econòmic d’alguns EM, ha amagat aquesta dialèctica constant, retardant la decisió entre les Institucions Europees i els EM eternament, fins a tal punt que la recessió econòmica actual ha evidenciat la necessitat de coordinació entre aquestes dues polítiques econòmiques i s’ha començat a instrumentalitzar nous mecanismes per millorar l’estructura actual

Gobernanza económica y Constitución Europea

En l'àmbit de la política econòmica en la Constitució es produeixen canvis que poden ser importants en el futur, referits al reforçament de la capacitat de gestió de l'eurozona, a més de convertir el BCE com una institució sense disminuir la seva independència. Essencialment els camgios en el mecanisme de govern pivoten al voltant de la governança de la política monetària i l'euro, i s'estenen als aspectes de les decisions sobre el procediment de dèficit públic excessiu. És a dir, s'avança en els mecanismes de presa de decisions que pertanyen ja al camp competencial de les polítiques de la Unió. Per contra, s'avança poc en la coordinació de les polítiques econòmiques, les competències pertanyen als estats membres.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Priors about observables in vector autoregressions

Standard practice in Bayesian VARs is to formulate priors on the autoregressive parameters, but economists and policy makers actually have priors about the behavior of observable variables. We show how this kind of prior can be used in a VAR under strict probability theory principles. We state the inverse problem to be solved and we propose a numerical algorithm that works well in practical situations with a very large number of parameters. We prove various convergence theorems for the algorithm. As an application, we first show that the results in Christiano et al. (1999) are very sensitive to the introduction of various priors that are widely used. These priors turn out to be associated with undesirable priors on observables. But an empirical prior on observables helps clarify the relevance of these estimates: we find much higher persistence of output responses to monetary policy shocks than the one reported in Christiano et al. (1999) and a significantly larger total effect.

A fractionally integrated approach to monetary policy and inflation dynamics

This paper relaxes the standard I(0) and I(1) assumptions typically stated in the monetary VAR literature by considering a richer framework that encompasses the previous two processes as well as other fractionally integrated possibilities. First, a timevarying multivariate spectrum is estimated for post WWII US data. Then, a structural fractionally integrated VAR (VARFIMA) is fitted to each of the resulting time dependent spectra. In this way, both the coefficients of the VAR and the innovation variances are allowed to evolve freely. The model is employed to analyze inflation persistence and to evaluate the stance of US monetary policy. Our findings indicate a strong decline in the innovation variances during the great disinflation, consistent with the view that the good performance of the economy during the 80’s and 90’s is in part a tale of good luck. However, we also find evidence of a decline in inflation persistence together with a stronger monetary response to inflation during the same period. This last result suggests that the Fed may still play a role in accounting for the observed differences in the US inflation history. Finally, we conclude that previous evidence against drifting coefficients could be an artifact of parameter restriction towards the stationary region. Keywords: monetary policy, inflation persistence, fractional integration, timevarying coefficients, VARFIMA. JEL Classification: E52, C32

Rational Partisan Theory with fiscal policy and an independent central bank

The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

De la mano de Keynes: "A tract on monetary reform"

En Tract on Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes propuso utilizar la base monetaria y el coeficiente de reserva bancaria como variables instrumentales d¿una política monetaria que había sido considerada hasta entonces innecesaria. En este trabajo se intenta desvelar las primeras contribuciones de Keynes al progreso del análisis económico

De la mano de Keynes: "A tract on monetary reform"

En Tract on Monetary Reform, John Maynard Keynes propuso utilizar la base monetaria y el coeficiente de reserva bancaria como variables instrumentales d¿una política monetaria que había sido considerada hasta entonces innecesaria. En este trabajo se intenta desvelar las primeras contribuciones de Keynes al progreso del análisis económico

Independent Central Banks: Low inflation at no cost?: A model with fiscal policy

In this article we extend the rational partisan model of Alesina and Gatti (1995) to include a second policy, fiscal policy, besides monetary policy. It is shown that, with this extension, the politically induced variance of output is not always eliminated nor reduced by delegating monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank. Further, in flation and output stabilisation will be affected by the degree of conservativeness of the central bank and by the probability of the less in flation averse party gaining power. Keywords: rational partisan theory; fiscal policy; independent central bank JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.

The Conservativeness of the Central Bank when Institutional Quality is Poor

We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.

Emergence and development of a financial cluster: the evolution of Andorra’s banking deposits in the long-term, 1931-2007

This paper explores the origins of Andorra’s financial cluster. It shows that the free movement of currency, the protection of infant industry, and geographical concentration lie at the foundation of the cluster’s competitive advantage. Drawing on a new set of data, the paper also provides for the first time an estimate of the total deposits held by Andorra’s banks between 1931 and 2007. Based on this new information, the paper reaches the conclusion that the development of the cluster went through four distinct phases in which large companies, acting as leaders, played an important role in enhancing the cluster’s business capabilities.