997 resultados para Marketing competition
Resumo:
Segundo a Organização Mundial do Turismo (OMT), o turismo é a maior indústria do séc. XXI gerando anualmente milhares de milhões de dólares em divisas para a economia de inúmeros países. Por apresentar um conjunto de características muito específicas, o sucesso desta actividade é fortemente condicionado pela imagem que os turistas e potenciais turistas apresentam relativamente a um determinado destino. Apesar de existirem muitos factores que interferem na formação desta imagem, a comunicação de marketing é apontada, pelos investigadores, como um dos elementos que desempenha um papel crucial neste âmbito. O objecto do presente trabalho de investigação é a comunicação de marketing na formação da imagem dos destinos turísticos particularizando o arquipélago de Cabo Verde. O principal objectivo da pesquisa, é analisar a eficácia da comunicação de marketing de três organizações (Cabo Verde – Investimentos, União Nacional dos Operadores Turísticos e operador Soltropico), na promoção do arquipélago de Cabo Verde, enquanto destino turístico, no mercado português. Para a realização deste estudo empírico, foram definidas três hipóteses. Essas hipóteses foram testadas através do cruzamento da informação proveniente de uma entrevista realizada aos directores de marketing de cada uma das três organizações, com os dados obtidos a partir da análise de conteúdo dos instrumentos de comunicação que têm vindo a ser utilizados pelas respectivas entidades para promover o destino e com as respostas de um conjunto de 115 turistas portugueses, a um questionário cujo assunto se encontra relacionado com os principais atributos de Cabo Verde enquanto destino de férias. A investigação realizada permitiu verificar que, de uma forma geral, existe uma sintonia entre os atributos de Cabo Verde que as organizações têm intenção de divulgar, os atributos deste destino que são transmitidos pelos seus instrumentos comunicação e os principais atributos do arquipélago indicados pelos turistas portugueses. Contudo, os resultados do estudo revelam também a necessidade de se introduzir algumas correcções a nível de conteúdos e imagens que se encontram presentes nos instrumentos de comunicação de algumas das organizações, visando a criação de uma imagem mais atractiva deste destino.
Resumo:
At the request of the Government Oversight Committee, the Ombudsman gathered information regarding competition by county Soil and Water Conservation Districts (SWCD) with small business through the sale of products and services. The goal of the Ombudsman’s review was to assist the Government Oversight Committee (Committee) in gaining an objective understanding of the issues so the Committee can ascertain whether there is a problem that requires legislation this legislative session. The Ombudsman focused on gathering specific information from four SWCD offices in central Iowa; Dallas, Greene, Guthrie and Jasper. These offices were specifically identified in documentation presented to the Government Oversight Committee by affected small business owners (contractors), Jon Judson of Diversity Farms and Dan Brouse of Iowa Restorations. However, with 100 SWCDs in Iowa,1 each with their own elected commissioners and each with different practices, priorities and fundraising activities, what the Ombudsman learned about these four counties may not be applicable to all the SWCDs in Iowa. The Ombudsman assigned the case to the Assistant Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman for Small Business, Kristie Hirschman. For reference purposes in this report, actions taken by Ms. Hirschman will be ascribed to the Ombudsman.
Resumo:
This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.
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Audit report on the Iowa Turkey Marketing Council for the years ended December 31, 2006 and 2005
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In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellerswhen each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limitedslots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous pricing.First, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that under simultaneous individual pricing, equilibriumoften does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. By contrast,equilibrium always exists under sequential individual pricing and we characterize it inthis paper. We find that each seller faces a trade-off between the number of slots heoccupies and surplus extraction per product, and there is no particular reason thatthis leads to an efficient allocation of slots.Second, Jeon-Menicucci (2009) find that when bundling is allowed, there alwaysexists an efficient equilibrium but inefficient equilibria can also exist due to purebundling (for physical products) or slotting contracts. Under sequential pricing,we find that all equilibria are efficient regardless of whether firms can use slottingcontracts, and both for digital goods and for physical goods. Therefore, sequentialpricing presents an even stronger case for laissez-faire in the matter of bundling thansimultaneous pricing.
Resumo:
We study a decentralized matching model in a large exchange economy,in which trade takes place through non--cooperative bargaining in coalitionsof finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with theWalrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof exploits equivalenceresults between the core and Walrasian equilibria. Our model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences thereby covering the caseof indivisible goods.
Resumo:
We study how gender differences in performance under competition areaffected by the provision of information regarding rival s gender and/ordifferences in relative ability. In a laboratory experiment, we use two tasks thatdiffer regarding perceptions about which gender outperforms the other. Weobserve women s underperformance only under two conditions: 1) tasks areperceived as favoring men and 2) rivals gender is explicitly mentioned. Thisresult can be explained by stereotype-threat being reinforced when explicitlymentioning gender in tasks in which women already consider they are inferior.Omitting information about gender is a safe alternative to avoid women sunderperformance in competition.
Resumo:
We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.
Resumo:
We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as theset of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizesthe core. The results are extended to production economies by extending thedefinition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agentsto recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed onfirms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy thefollowing conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle isa maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. Therecontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers tohis equilibrium bundle.
Resumo:
Actualmente as empresas precisam adoptar as melhores praticas de gestão para se sobreviverem neste mercado competitivo e com tendencias em aumentar a competitividade cada vez mais, uma vez que estamos num mercado globalizado. Devido a esses acontecimentos é que o presente trabalho teve como objectivo maior conhecer a importância do marketing no sector bancário. A metodologia utilizada para a concretização desta pesquisa, no que se refere aos objectivos traçados foi a metodologia exploratóoria, onde consegui–se retratar os aspectos teóricos sobre o marketing, o marketing bancário, fazer um breve apanhado do sector e também realizou – se um estudo de caso na Caixa Económica de Cabo Verde - CECV. A fim de responder o problema da pesquisa optou – se pela utilização de duas técnicas de recolha de dados, nomeadamente, realização de uma entrevista com o coordenador de marketing da empresa em estudo e análise documental da mesma e conseguentemente foram analisados e interpretados as informações obtidas. Ficou provado que a empresa utiliza uma filosofia de marketing interno, assim como também se provou que realmente investir em marketing reflete de uma forma positiva evolução da quota do mercado da empresa. De uma forma geral o resultado obtido foi favorável (o que se esperava), constatando que na verdade o marketing é de grande importância na gestão da empresa estudada, pois contribui para o alcance dos seus objectivos.
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Intraspecific genetic variation for morphological traits is observed in many organisms. In Arabidopsis thaliana, alleles responsible for intraspecific morphological variation are increasingly being identified. However, the fitness consequences remain unclear in most cases. Here, the fitness effects of alleles of the BRX gene are investigated. A brx loss-of-function allele, which was found in a natural accession, results in a highly branched but poorly elongated root system. Comparison between the control accession Sav-0 and an introgression of brx into this background (brxS) indicated that, surprisingly, brx loss of function did not negatively affect fitness in pure stands. However, in mixed, well-watered stands brxS performance and reproductive output decreased significantly, as the proportion of Sav-0 neighbors increased. Additional comparisons between brxS and a brxS line that was complemented by a BRX transgene confirmed a direct effect of the loss-of-function allele on plant performance, as indicated by restored competitive ability of the transgenic genotype. Further, because plant height was very similar across genotypes and because the experimental setup largely excluded shading effects, the impaired competitiveness of the brx loss-of-function genotype likely reflects below-ground competition. In summary, these data reveal conditional fitness effects of a single gene polymorphism in response to intraspecific competition in Arabidopsis.
Resumo:
This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.