Human Rights in Northern Ireland in 2011

This chapter surveys and comments on the developments in the legal protection of human rights in Northern Ireland during the year 2011.

What is an absolute right? Deciphering absoluteness in the context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

The answer to the question of what it means to say that a right is absolute is often taken for granted, yet still sparks doubt and scepticism. This article investigates absoluteness further, bringing rights theory and the judicial approach on an absolute right together. A theoretical framework is set up that addresses two distinct but potentially related parameters of investigation: the first is what I have labelled the ‘applicability’ criterion, which looks at whether and when the applicability of the standard referred to as absolute can be displaced, in other words whether other considerations can justify its infringement; the second parameter, which I have labelled the ‘specification’ criterion, explores the degree to which and bases on which the content of the standard characterised as absolute is specified. This theoretical framework is then used to assess key principles and issues that arise in the Strasbourg Court’s approach to Article 3. It is suggested that this analysis allows us to explore both the distinction and the interplay between the two parameters in the judicial interpretation of the right and that appreciating the significance of this is fundamental to the understanding of and discourse on the concept of an absolute right.

The Human Rights Act 1998 – Future Prospects

It is now over fifteen years since the Human Rights Act was enacted in November 1998. Although in legal terms it is difficult to argue with the proposition that the Act is working in an effective manner, in political terms the Act remains one of the most highly debated pieces of legislation on the UK statute books. In recent years there have been numerous calls for the repeal of the Act, and for its replacement with a ‘UK Bill of Rights’. Such calls led to the establishment of a Commission on a Bill of Rights, which issued its final report in December 2012. Little progress has since been made on the issue. One notable occurrence however was the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, a Private Member’s Bill which was eventually withdrawn in March 2013. This article seeks to assess the current situation regarding the bill of rights debate, and ultimately the question of the future prospects of the Human Rights Act, an issue of immense legal significance. Overall, it will be questioned whether the enactment of a UK Bill of Rights would constitute an improvement on the current position under the Human Rights Act.

The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 – Ten Years On

The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 has now been in force in Ireland for ten years. This article analyses the Act itself and the impact which it has had on the Irish courts during the first decade of its operation. The use of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Irish courts prior to the enactment of the legislation is discussed, as are the reasons for the passing of the Act. The relationship between the Act and the Irish Constitution is examined, as is the jurisprudence of the Irish courts towards the interpretative obligation found in section 2(1), and the duty placed upon organs of the State by section 3(1). The article ends with a number of observations regarding the impact which the Act has had on the Irish courts at a more general level. Comparisons will be drawn with the UK’s Human Rights Act 1998 throughout the discussion.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights has begun to refer to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to support its reasoning for interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in a particular way. But the EU Charter does not yet have any special status in that regard, being treated by the Court as on a par with numerous other documents of international law. The Court’s use of the Charter began in connection with arts 8 and 12 of the Convention (the right to a family life and the right to marry) but in subsequent years it has been extended to many other Articles of the Convention. It is in relation to art.6 (the right to a fair trial) that the Charter’s influence has been most noticeable so far, the Court having changed its position on two important aspects of Article 6 partly because of the wording of the EU Charter. But the influence on art.3 (in relation to the rights of asylum seekers), art.7 (in relation to retroactive penal laws), art.9 (in relation to the right to conscientious objection) and art.11 (in relation to rights of trades unions) has also been significant. The potential for the Charter to have greater influence on the Court’s jurisprudence in years to come remains considerable.

Human Rights in Northern Ireland 2009-10

This report surveys the legislative and judicial developments in human rights law within Northern Ireland in the years 2009 and 2010, highlighting the respects in which the law was or was not in compliance with international human rights standards, in particular those laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights.

Human Rights Histories

This review article considers Samuel Moyn’s book The Last Utopia:Human Rights in History in the context of recent trends in the writing of human rights history. A central debate among historians of human rights, in seekingto account for the genesis and spread of human rights, is how far current humanrights practice demonstrates continuity or radical discontinuity with previousattempts to secure rights. Moyn’s discontinuity thesis and the controversysurrounding it exemplify this debate. Whether Moyn is correct is importantbeyond the confines of human rights historiography, with implications for theirmeaning in law, as well as their political legitimacy. This review argues that Moyn’s book ultimately fails to convince, for two broad reasons. First, a more balanced judgment would conclude that the history of human rights is both one of continuity and discontinuity. Second, and more importantly, Moyn fails to offer a convincing account of the normativity of human rights. Undertaking a history of human rights requires a deeper engagement with debates on the nature and validity of human rights than Moyn seems prepared to contemplate.

Why do national court judges refer to human rights treaties?: A comparative international law analysis of CEDAW

An analysis was conducted of 325 national judicial decisions across 55 jurisdictions, in which CEDAW was referred to in the reported decision. Despite predictions to the contrary based on previous scholarship, significant variations between courts in their interpretation of CEDAW occurred relatively infrequently, courts referred relatively seldom to interpretations of CEDAW by other national courts, and there was little evidence of transnational dialogic approaches to judging. An analysis of these results suggests that domestic judges invoking CEDAW act primarily as domestic actors who use international law in order to advance domestic goals, rather than acting primarily as agents of the international community in applying CEDAW domestically, or contributing to the transnational shaping of international law to suit national interests. The Article suggests an understanding of the domestic implementation of a human rights treaty as not only law, but a unique kind of law that performs a particular function, in light of its quality as something akin to hard and soft law simultaneously.

Operationalizing the Comparative International Human Rights Law Method: A Case Study of CEDAW in National Courts

In this chapter, I focus on how the example of CEDAW illustrates the methodological and conceptual difficulties that future work in comparative international human is likely to encounter. Despite the challenges, I suggest that the worked example of CEDAW has raised interesting lines for empirical analysis, and additional perspectives which may enrich normative inquiry, sufficient to justify comparative international human rights law being regarded as likely to give rise to insights that might not otherwise have emerged, and therefore to be as an approach worth pursuing in the future.

Comparative International Human Rights Law

This chapter locates of international human rights in current discussion of comparative international law, and distinguishes comparative international human rights law from both the 'fragmentation' literature, and from comparative constitutional rights discourse.

The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication

This chapter considers judicial reasoning in ‘human rights’ cases. Are there techniques that courts share, or are different techniques adopted, to decide how human rights, in this broader sense, are protected? The chapter aims to adopt a comparative approach to the examination of this reasoning, through a detailed examination of similar human rights issues in a range of jurisdictions. The aim of the chapter is to examine the similarities and divergences in the reasoning developed by courts when addressing comparable human rights questions. The chapter shows that human rights reasoning involves distinctive and particular forms of legal reasoning, but that its form and content differ significantly
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and over time within jurisdictions. Building upon these findings, the chapter explores what these similarities and differences tell us about the nature, and the direction of travel, of human rights law which comprises notionally universal norms.