Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.

Bertrand, Cournot and monopolistically competitive equilibria

Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. These equilibria can be shown to exist and be uni que if we impose a sim pie and natural restriction on the elasticities of the demand functions for the differentiated products. Our characterizations of these equilibria make it possible to compare them and to determine how they are affected by the size of the market and the number of firms. We are also able to prove the existence of Cournot free-entry equilibria in which the number of firms is determined endogenously. In addition, we are able to prove that, in a large market, the Cournot free-entry equilibria approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive equilibria. The free-entry equilibrium concept we study is an analog of the one studied by Novshek for the case of firms selling products that are perfect substitutes. Our results are extensions of Novshek's. While we were unable to establish a general existence result for Bertrand free-entry equilibria, we were able to prove that, when these equilibria exist, they are unique and that in large markets they also approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibria.

A Bilevel Approach to Transmission Expansion Planning Within a Market Environment

We present a bilevel model for transmission expansion planning within a market environment, where producers and consumers trade freely electric energy through a pool. The target of the transmission planner, modeled through the upper-level problem, is to minimize network investment cost while facilitating energy trading. This upper-level problem is constrained by a collection of lower-level market clearing problems representing pool trading, and whose individual objective functions correspond to social welfare. Using the duality theory the proposed bilevel model is recast as a mixed-integer linear programming problem, which is solvable using branch-and-cut solvers. Detailed results from an illustrative example and a case study are presented and discussed. Finally, some relevant conclusions are drawn.

Sonho e poesia em Gaspard de la Nuit, de Aloysius Bertrand

Considerado o criador do poema em prosa na literatura francesa, Aloysius Bertrand incorporou em seus textos diversos elementos da cultura popular da Idade Média, entre eles, o sonho e o pesadelo. Neste artigo pretende-se mostrar que, em certos poemas do Gaspard de la Nuit, o sonho funciona não só como um motivo literário, mas também como componente da construção textual.