Regulating State Aid: Inter-jurisdictional competition, public choice, and corporate governance

Depending on the regulatory regime they are subject to, governments may or may not be allowed to hand out state aid to private firms. The economic justification for state aid can address several issues present in the competition for capital and the competition for transfers from the state. First, there are principal-agent problems involved at several stages. Self-interested politicians might enter state aid deals that are the result of extensive rent-seeking activities of organized interest groups. Thus the institutional design of political systems will have an effect on the propensity of a jurisdiction to award state aid. Secondly, fierce competition for firm locations can lead to over-spending. This effect is stronger if the politicians do not take into account the entirety of the costs created by their participation in the firm location race. Thirdly, state aid deals can be incomplete and not in the interest of the citizens. This applies if there are no sanctions if firms do not meet their obligations from receiving aid, such as creating a certain number of jobs or not relocating again for a certain amount of time. The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to principal-agent problems on the side of the aid recipient as well. Managers might receive personal benefits from subsidies, the use of which is sometimes less monitored than private finance. This can eventually be to the detriment of the shareholders. Overall, it can be concluded that state aid control should also serve the purpose of regulating the contracting between governments and firms. An extended mandate for supervision by the European Commission could include requirements to disincentive the misuse of state aid. The Commission should also focus on the corporate governance regime in place in the jurisdiction that awards the aid as well as in the recipient firm.

The Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Cost of Going Public

This paper examines the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), a legal framework intended to increase transparency and accountability of listed companies, on the cost of going public in the US. We expect SOX to increase the direct cost of going public, but decrease the underpricing because of reduced asymmetric information. Our main results corroborate these hypotheses. First, we find an increase in the cost of going public of 90 bp of gross proceeds. Second, we record a reduction in underpricing of 6 pp, which is related to a reduced offer price adjustment. This supports our hypothesis that SOX represents a mechanism to reduce asymmetric information.

Open Finance Apps: Chancen und Voraussetzungen bei der Visualisierung von Finanzdaten

Die Open Government Bewegung soll der Verwaltungsführung mehr Transparenz und Verständnis entgegenbringen. Durch Open Finance Apps werden Finanzangaben und dazugehörige Informationen verständlich zugänglich gemacht und Grössenverhältnisse veranschaulicht.

Mehr Transparenz und Mitwirkung bei oeffentlichen Finanzen: Open Finance Apps in der Schweiz und im Ausland

Die Finanzfluesse in oeffentlichen Haushalten sind heute hochkomplexe Gebilde. Mit interaktiven Visualisierungen können oeffentliche Finanzen transparenter und verstaendlicher werden. Diese sogenannten Open Finance Apps helfen mit, dass sich Bevoelkerung und Politik rasch ein objektives Bild der relevanten Finanzen verschaffen und vertiefte Informationen abrufen koennen. Immer haeufiger werden Open Finance Apps auch für partizipative und kollaborative Projekte eingesetzt.

A model of factors determining levels of public support for health care policy in the United States

Public preferences for policy are formed in a little-understood process that is not adequately described by traditional economic theory of choice. In this paper I suggest that U.S. aggregate support for health reform can be modeled as tradeoffs among a small number of behavioral values and the stage of policy development. The theory underlying the model is based on Samuelson, et al.'s (1986) work and Wilke's (1991) elaboration of it as the Greed/Efficiency/Fairness (GEF) hypothesis of motivation in the management of resource dilemmas, and behavioral economics informed by Kahneman and Thaler's prospect theory. ^ The model developed in this paper employs ordered probit econometric techniques applied to data derived from U.S. polls taken from 1990 to mid-2003 that measured support for health reform proposals. Outcome data are four-tiered Likert counts; independent variables are dummies representing the presence or absence of operationalizations of each behavioral variable, along with an integer representing policy process stage. Marginal effects of each independent variable predict how support levels change on triggering that variable. Model estimation results indicate a vanishingly small likelihood that all coefficients are zero and all variables have signs expected from model theory. ^ Three hypotheses were tested: support will drain from health reform policy as it becomes increasingly well-articulated and approaches enactment; reforms appealing to fairness through universal health coverage will enjoy a higher degree of support than those targeted more narrowly; health reforms calling for government operation of the health finance system will achieve lower support than those that do not. Model results support the first and last hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, universal health care proposals did not provide incremental support beyond those targeted to “deserving” populations—children, elderly, working families. In addition, loss of autonomy (e.g. restrictions on choice of care giver) is found to be the “third rail” of health reform with significantly-reduced support. When applied to a hypothetical health reform in which an employer-mandated Medical Savings Account policy is the centerpiece, the model predicts support that may be insufficient to enactment. These results indicate that the method developed in the paper may prove valuable to health policy designers. ^

California's School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism

The 1971 ruling of the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v. Priest initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local financing of public schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how much to spend on their schools to a centralized one in which the state legislature determines the expenditures of every school district. This paper begins by describing California's school finance system before Serrano and the transformation from local to state finance. It then delineates some consequences of that transformation and draws lessons from California's experience with school finance reform.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

A study of four listed micro finance institutions

Compared to the size of the microfinance market, the number of Microfinance Institutions that are professionally ran like commercial banks is still scarce, and even more scarce are the MFI listed in public stock exchanges. This document focuses on four listed MFIs and reviews its business model and funding sources. The document also analyses the market price evolution of the listed shares and investigates whether investors are assigning a premium to the MFIs compared with its respective market indices. Keywords: Microfinance institutions, Micro-credits, Financial Institutions, Equity; Stock Exchange.

Supporting Access to Finance by SMEs: Mapping the initiatives in five EU countries. ECMI Research Report No. 9, April 2014

This paper maps the initiatives to support access to finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that were available at national level in 2012 in the five biggest European economies (Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain). This mapping distinguishes initiatives promoted and financed primarily through public resources from those developed independently by the market. A second breakdown is proposed for those sources of finance with different targets, i.e. whether the target is debt financing (typically bank loans at favourable conditions, public guarantees on loans, etc.) or equity financing (typically venture capital funds, tax incentives on equity investments, etc.). A broad set of initiatives has been implemented to close the funding gap of SMEs in these five countries. The total amount of public spending for SMEs, however, has remained well below 1% of GDP. Public subsidisation of bank loans has been by far the most diffused type of intervention. Despite the fact that this strategy might prove to be effective in the short term, it fails to address long-term sustainability issues via a more diversified set of financing tools.

The finance-welfare state nexus. ACES Cases No. 2013.1

At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals. Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states ‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity. Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and life insurance markets for four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.

European climate finance: securing the best return. Bruegel Policy Brief ISSUE 2015/03, 11 September 2015

Combating climate change is perhaps the most formidable public policy challenge of our times. Unmitigated climate change will be irreversible. It will place significant costs on future generations, and expose them to unexplored risks. To mitigate climate change, global coordination is indispensable. European Union citizens consider climate change a central problem. The EU and its member states have therefore put in place signficant and costly climate mitigation policies.

Ecuador industrial development finance /

"June 1985."

The Impact of increased United States-Mexico trade on southwest border development : report to the Senate Committee on Finance on investigation no. 332-223, under section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930.

"November 1986."

The law relating to the duties on land values and mineral rights and to the valuation of the same , being part I of the Finance (1909-1910) act, 1910, with the incorporated enactments, full explanatory notes and a practical introduction

Half-title: Konstam's law of land values.