909 resultados para European contract Law
Resumo:
The present research aims to study the special rights other than shares in Spanish Law and the protection of their holders in cross-border mergers of limited liability companies within the European Union frame. Special rights other than shares are recognised as an independent legal category within legal systems of some EU Member States, such as Germany or Spain, through the implementation of the Third Directive 78/855/CEE concerning mergers of public limited liability companies. The above-cited Directive contains a special regime of protection for the holders of securities, other than shares, to which special rights are attached, consisting of being given rights in the acquiring company, at least equivalent to those they possessed in the company being acquired. This safeguard is to highlight the intimate connection between this type of rights and the company whose extinction determines the existence of those. Pursuant to the Directive 2005/56/CE on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, each company taking part in these operations shall comply with the safeguards of members and third parties provided in their respective national law to which is subject. In this regard, the protection for holders of special rights other than shares shall be ruled by the domestic M&A regime. As far as Spanish Law are concerned, holders of these special rights are recognized a right of merger information, in the same terms as shareholders, as well as equal rights in the company resulting from the cross-border merger. However, these measures are not enough guarantee for a suitable protection, thus considering those holders of special rights as special creditors, sometimes it will be necessary to go to the general protection regime for creditors. In Spanish Law, it would involve the recognition of right to the merger opposition, whose exercise would prevent the operation was completed until ensuring equal rights.
Resumo:
This dissertation has studied how legal and non-legal mechanisms affect the levels of trust and trustworthiness in an economy, and whether and when subtle psychological factors are crucial for establishing trust and even for recovering trust from a breach of contract. The first Chapter has addressed the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. We find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally undermine trust except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment in which repeated commercial relationships take place becomes highly uncertain. The second Chapter has examined whether the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment institution can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. The experimental results show that the endogenous introduction of collective punishment by means of a majority-voting rule does not significantly improve coordination on the efficient equilibrium. Not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior induced by the introduction of the mechanism, and a majority of them vote against it. The third Chapter has explored whether high-trustors adapt their behavior in response to others’ trustworthiness or untrustworthiness more quickly, which in turn supports them to maintain higher default expectations of others’ trustworthiness relative to low-trustors. Our experimental results reveal that high-trustors are better than low-trustors at predicting others’ trustworthiness because they are less susceptible to the anticipated aversive emotions aroused by the potential betrayal and thereby have a higher willingness to acquire the valuable information about their partner’s actions.
Resumo:
The present article is an abridged version of a chapter to the book EC Electronic Communications and Competition Law (London: Cameron May, 2007). It provides an introduction to the rules at the European Community level governing the electronic communications sector (previously and more traditionally referred to as telecommunications). Such an introduction encompasses essentially an enquiry into the relevant competition law rules, of which here particular attention is paid to abuse of dominant position and the essential facilities doctrine, as well as an analysis of the EC sector specific regulatory framework, which has substantially evolved since the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector back in the beginning of the 1990s. It is the objective of the article to explore to what extent both regulatory tools could deal with the specificities of communications markets, and where they may fail to do so.