Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

Understanding Political Knowledge and Its Influence on Voting Preferences in the 2007 Federal Election

In this article we propose a model to explain how voters' perceptions of their ideological proximity to a party affect their propensity to vote for that party. We argue that political knowledge plays a crucial moderating role in the relationship between party proximity and voting propensity. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between institutional knowledge (information about the political system) and party knowledge (information about the parties' left-right positions). An analysis of survey data from the 2007 Swiss federal elections supports our main hypothesis that party knowledge enhances the link between party proximity and voting propensity. Institutional knowledge may have additional influence, but clear evidence for this effect was obtained only for propensities to vote for the Swiss People's Party (SVP). Overall, the impact of political knowledge was found to be substantial, even after controlling for the outstanding influence of party identification and other predictors of voting propensities

Iowa Voters Judicial Directory, August 2012

Voter Information: • Answers to Questions about Judicial Retention Elections • Biographies of Judges on the 2012 Iowa Ballot

Leadership at the upper echelons : three essays

"IT'S THE ECONOMY STUPID", BUT CHARISMA MATTERS TOO: A DUAL PROCESS MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTCOMES. ABSTRACT Because charisma is assumed to be an important determinant of effective leadership, the extent to which a presidential nominee is more charismatic than his opponent should be an important determinant of voter choices. We computed a composite measure of the rhetorical richness of acceptances speeches given by U.S. presidential candidates at their national party convention. We added this marker of charisma to Ray C. Fair's presidential vote-share equation (1978; 2009). We theorized that voters decide using psychological attribution (i.e., due to macroeconomics and incumbency) as well as inferential processes (i.e., due to leader charismatic behavior) when voting. Controlling for the macro-level variables and incumbency in the Fair model, our results indicated that difference between nominees' charisma is a significant determinant of electoral success, particularly in close elections. This extended model significantly improves the precision of the Fair model and correctly predicts 23 out of the last 24 U.S. presidential elections. Paper 2: IT CEO LEADERSHIP, CORPORATE SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE. ABSTRACT We investigated whether CEO leadership predicted corporate financial performance (CFP) and corporate social performance (CSP). Using longitudinal data on 258 CEOs from 117 firms across 19 countries and 10 industry sectors, we found that determinants of CEO leadership (i.e., implicit motives) significantly predicted both CFP and CSP. As expected, the most consistent positive predictor was Responsibility Disposition when interacting with n (need for) Power. n Achievement and n Affiliation were generally negatively related or unrelated to outcomes. CSP was positively related to accounting measures of CFP. Our findings suggest that executive leader characteristics have important consequences for corporate level outcomes. Paper 3. PUNISHING THE POWERFUL: ATTRIBUTIONS OF BLAME AND LEADERSHIP ABSTRACT We propose that individuals are more lenient in attributing blame to leaders than to nonleaders. We advance a motivational explanation building on the perspective of punishment and on system justification theory. We conducted two scenario experiments which supported our proposition. In study 1, wrongdoer leader status was negatively related to blame and the perceived seriousness of the wrongdoing. In study 2, controlling for the Big-Five personality factor and individual differences in moral evaluation (i.e., moral foundations), wrongdoer leader status was negatively related with desired severity of punishment, and fair punishments were perceived as more just for non-leaders than for leaders.

Valsystem i lilleputtar: pluralitet och diffusion

Abstract: Elections in lilliputs: plurality and diffusion

The views of rich Europeans are more likely to be reflected by political parties than those of poorer citizens

How does income inequality affect political representation? Jan Rosset, Nathalie Giger and Julian Bernauer examine whether politicians represent the views of poorer and richer citizens equally. They find that in 43 out of the 49 elections included in their analysis, the preferences of low-income citizens are located further away from the policy positions of the closest political party than those with mid-range incomes. This suggests that income inequality may spill-over into political inequalities, although it is less clear whether this effect is likely to get better or worse as a result of the Eurozone crisis.

The Limits of Issue Ownership Dynamics : The Constraining Effect of Party Preference

Issue ownership theory argues that when a voter considers a party to be the most competent amongst others to deal with an issue (that is, the party "owns" the issue), chances are the voter will vote for that party. Recent work has shown that perceptions of issue ownership are dynamic: they are affected by the media coverage of party messages. However, based on the broad literature on partisan bias, we predict that parties' efforts to change issue ownership perceptions will have a difficult time breaching the perceptual screen created by a voter's party preference. Using two separate experiments with a similar design we show that the effect of partisan issue messages on issue competence is moderated by party preference. The effect of issue messages is reinforced when people already like a party, and blocked when people dislike a party.

DCI Voter Fraud Investigations Report, May 8, 2014.

In March of 2012, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office compared Iowa’s voter registration records with the driver’s license record s of individuals that identified themselves as non-citizens with the Iowa Department of Transportation. After comparing those records, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office found that more than 3,000 individuals registered to vote that had previously identified themselves as non-citizens. More than 1,000 of these individuals had also cast a ballot. The Iowa Secretary of State’s office was not given timely access to the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE)database, and therefore was unable to determine if any of these individuals had become citizens before they registered to vote or cast a ballot. On June 21, 2012, the Iowa Secretary of State’s office entered into an agreement with the Iowa Department of Public Safety’s Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) to review potential election misconduct crimes and improve the administration of federal elections. Over the last two years,DCI agents have reviewed thousands of instances of possible election misconduct. DCI’s review included cases referred by the Iowa Secretary of State’s office as well as by other state and local government agencies.

Miten äänestäjät valitsevat puolueen?

Abstract: How electors choose thier party in general elections

Uncertainty, electoral incentives and political myopia

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build aframework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectlyobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies withfuture returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability.Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, undersome conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewardscan be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limitto governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised factsand with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better fiscal discipline in a panel of 20 OECDcountries.

Puolueiden vaalikampanjat vuoden 2004 europarlamenttivaaleissa

Abstract: Parties' campaigns in European elections of 2004