940 resultados para Computer games
Resumo:
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.
Resumo:
Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la thorie des jeux rside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles diffrents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des dcisions qui influenceront toutes le rsultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont t invents afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrs dans d'importantes situations socio-conomiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'tres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expriences ont montr que les individus ont parfois tendance cooprer dans des situations pour lesquelles la thorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mcanismes ont t invoqus pour tenter d'expliquer l'mergence de ce comportement coopratif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la rptition des interactions, la rputation ou encore l'appartenance des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent t mentionns. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montr que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopration mme si le jeu est jou de manire anonyme et sans rptitions. L'tude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, taient bass sur des structures rgulires telles que des grilles deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montr qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation gographique stricte, la coopration peut malgr tout merger, pour autant que les schmas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de rseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux prcurseurs de sociologues des annes soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernires annes qu'une grande partie des rseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et mme quelques rseaux technologiques, possdent des proprits particulires, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes rguliers ou alatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en gnral une distribution du degr relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossirement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un rseau o tout individu se trouve relativement prs de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une proprit galement prsente dans les graphes alatoires mais absente des grilles rgulires. Par contre, les rseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes alatoires, une certaine structure de localit, mesure par exemple par une quantit appele le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le mme esprit, plusieurs situations relles de conflit en conomie et sociologie ne sont pas bien dcrites ni par des positions gographiquement fixes des individus en grilles rgulires, ni par des graphes alatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure mme d'un rseau peut passablement influencer des phnomnes dynamiques tels que la manire qu'a une maladie de se rpandre travers une population, ou encore la faon dont des ides ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernire dcennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement dplace des graphes alatoires et rguliers vers de meilleurs modles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de dcouvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais rseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'tres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopration suprieurs ce qui est prescrit par la thorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par tudier un vritable rseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en vidence la manire dont il diffre de rseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je dcris sa structure de communauts en tenant compte de l'intensit d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'volution temporelle du rseau depuis son origine jusqu' son tat en 2006, date laquelle l'tude a t effectue, en suggrant galement une vue effective du rseau par opposition une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la thorie volutionnaire des jeux avec des rseaux comprenant plusieurs modles et le rseau de collaboration susmentionn, afin de dterminer les proprits structurelles utiles la promotion de la coopration et les mcanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en vidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber la dfection, les cooprateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'htrognit des rseaux sociaux en termes de degr ainsi que la structure de communauts sous-jacente de ces mmes rseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopration et sa stabilit dpendent non seulement du jeu jou, mais aussi des rgles de la dynamique volutionnaire utilises et du calcul du bnfice d'un individu.
Development and validation of an instrument for evaluating the ludicity of games in health education
Resumo:
Abstract OBJECTIVE Developing and validating an instrument to evaluate the playfulness of games in health education contexts. METHODOLOGY A methodological, exploratory and descriptive research, developed in two stages: 1. Application of an open questionnaire to 50 graduate students, with content analysis of the answers and calculation of Kappa coefficient for defining items; 2. Procedures for construction of scales, with content validation by judges and analysis of the consensus estimate byContent Validity Index(CVI). RESULTS 53 items regarding the restless character of the games in the dimensions of playfulness, the formative components of learning and the profiles of the players. CONCLUSION Ludicity can be assessed by validated items related to the degree of involvement, immersion and reinvention of the subjects in the game along with the dynamics and playability of the game.
Resumo:
The title of this thesis is The importance of using games to teach English in the 3rd Cycle. I choose this topic because I think that games are important in the process of learning and because in my opinion not only students but people in general are more motivated to learn when they are having fun or when they are doing something that is interesting. Some authors argue that games stimulate learners to practise, to activate and extend their English vocabulary, and that most students feel more motivated to learn and learn more easily when they are having fun. Games make demands on learners intelligence and imagination and calls for active participation. That is exactly what 3rd Cycle students and teachers need in order to have success in their studies and work respectively. The 3rd Cycle students have covered the majority of the grammar and functions contents of the English curriculum in the previous Cycles (the 1st and 2nd Cycle) and in the 3rd Cycle the students need most of their time to put into practice what they have learned before. Games are an effective method to put in practice what they have learned before and also through games they have several contexts and different situations to explore in order to show their knowledge or their vocabulary. The 3rd Cycle students need methods that motivate them to learn and to participate in class and since they already study a specific language function. If the teacher uses an enjoyable method like games students will not get bored and they will be more motivate to participate in class.
Resumo:
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.
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In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.
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We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjectschoose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and acostly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are themost frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent withoutrole uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with roleuncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four differenttypes of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse andCompetitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of SocialWelfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additionaltreatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in theexperiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctlyunderstand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions weremost frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim tomeasure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
Resumo:
Performance & Development Solutions (PDS) publishes a variety of newsletters that include some great information about our programs and services. Some of the topics you may find include: Upcoming Seminars Current events or news related to training Recognition of achievements How-to section
Resumo:
Performance & Development Solutions (PDS) publishes a variety of newsletters that include some great information about our programs and services. Some of the topics you may find include: Upcoming Seminars Current events or news related to training Recognition of achievements How-to section
Resumo:
Performance & Development Solutions (PDS) publishes a variety of newsletters that include some great information about our programs and services. Some of the topics you may find include: Upcoming Seminars Current events or news related to training Recognition of achievements How-to section
Resumo:
Performance & Development Solutions (PDS) publishes a variety of newsletters that include some great information about our programs and services. Some of the topics you may find include: Upcoming Seminars Current events or news related to training Recognition of achievements How-to section
Resumo:
Performance & Development Solutions (PDS) publishes a variety of newsletters that include some great information about our programs and services. Some of the topics you may find include: Upcoming Seminars Current events or news related to training Recognition of achievements How-to section
