A Syntax-based approach to measuring the degree of inconsistency for belief bases

Measuring the degree of inconsistency of a belief base is an important issue in many real world applications. It has been increasingly recognized that deriving syntax sensitive inconsistency measures for a belief base from its minimal inconsistent subsets is a natural way forward. Most of the current proposals along this line do not take the impact of the size of each minimal inconsistent subset into account. However, as illustrated by the well-known Lottery Paradox, as the size of a minimal inconsistent subset increases, the degree of its inconsistency decreases. Another lack in current studies in this area is about the role of free formulas of a belief base in measuring the degree of inconsistency. This has not yet been characterized well. Adding free formulas to a belief base can enlarge the set of consistent subsets of that base. However, consistent subsets of a belief base also have an impact on the syntax sensitive normalized measures of the degree of inconsistency, the reason for this is that each consistent subset can be considered as a distinctive plausible perspective reflected by that belief base,whilst eachminimal inconsistent subset projects a distinctive viewof the inconsistency. To address these two issues,we propose a normalized framework formeasuring the degree of inconsistency of a belief base which unifies the impact of both consistent subsets and minimal inconsistent subsets. We also show that this normalized framework satisfies all the properties deemed necessary by common consent to characterize an intuitively satisfactory measure of the degree of inconsistency for belief bases. Finally, we use a simple but explanatory example in equirements engineering to illustrate the application of the normalized framework.

Government decisions before and during the First World War and the living standards in Germany during a drastic natural experiment

The First World War hit Germany severely, particularly the agricultural sector, because the outbreak came unexpected and its duration exceeded all expectations. Many resources necessary for agricultural production were required by the war economy and led to shortages and shrinking supplies. Many agricultural laborers were drafted and the blockade imposed by the allies prevented Germany from a great deal of imports. As a consequence, the nutritional situation was devastating, particularly after 1916, and hit all groups of the German society. The period under observation provides one of most drastic natural experiments in the 20th century. This study uses anthropometric data from German soldiers who served in the Second World War to trace living standards between the 1900s and the 1920s. In contrast to other approaches, this paper is able to distinguish between social groups by occupation, religious denominatio\n, regional origin, and city size. The results suggest that although all social strata were hit by famine conditions, the height of farmers, urban citizens, Catholics, and especially individuals born in the highly integrated food-import regions along the coast and the banks of the Rhine declined most.

Globalization and the State in Contemporary Crime Fiction:A World of Crime

Why has crime fiction become a global genre? How do writers use crime fiction to reflect upon the changing nature of crime and policing in our contemporary world? This book argues that the globalization of crime fiction should not be celebrated uncritically. Instead, it looks at the new forms and techniques writers are using to examine the crimes and policing practices that define a rapidly changing world. In doing so, this collection of essays examines how the relationship between global crime, capitalism, and policing produces new configurations of violence in crime fiction – and asks whether the genre can find ways of analyzing and even opposing such violence as part of its necessarily limited search for justice both within and beyond the state.

The attractive female body weight and female body dissatisfaction in 26 countries across 10 world regions: results of the International Body Project I

This study reports results from the first International Body Project (IBP-I), which surveyed 7,434 individuals in 10 major world regions about body weight ideals and body dissatisfaction. Participants completed the female Contour Drawing Figure Rating Scale (CDFRS) and self-reported their exposure to Western and local media. Results indicated there were significant cross-regional differences in the ideal female figure and body dissatisfaction, but effect sizes were small across high-socioeconomic-status (SES) sites. Within cultures, heavier bodies were preferred in low-SES sites compared to high-SES sites in Malaysia and South Africa (ds = 1.94-2.49) but not in Austria. Participant age, body mass index (BMI), and Western media exposure predicted body weight ideals. BMI and Western media exposure predicted body dissatisfaction among women. Our results show that body dissatisfaction and desire for thinness is commonplace in high-SES settings across world regions, highlighting the need for international attention to this problem.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Le statut de la liberté dans l’existentialisme, par-delà la théorie critique

Dans la philosophie existentialiste de Sartre, l’existence précède l’essence. C’est-à-dire que c’est la réalité humaine vécue qui définit l’homme, et non une essence abstraite qui précèderait l’existence. L’essence de la vie humaine ne serait donc pas à la portée de la philosophie, qui voudrait établir une essence qui transcenderait la réalité humaine. Pour Sartre, cette tentative d’établir une essence est vaine. L’homme n’est pas simplement, mais a à être. Sartre entrevoit dans cette exigence la seule vraie possibilité de la liberté : la liberté c’est précisément le néant qui est au cœur de l’homme et qui contraint la réalité humaine à se faire au lieu d’être. Cette notion de la liberté absolue de l’homme est très forte et a évidemment suscité la critique. Sartre s’est attiré notamment la désapprobation des penseurs de l’École de Francfort. Ils lui reprochent de ne pas rendre justice aux déterminations spécifiques qu’impose le contexte historique, social et matériel. Sa notion de liberté viendrait dissocier l’horizon des possibilités des processus qui les fixent et, du coup le mène à cautionner tacitement le statut quo, en empêchant la liberté de servir de critère pour critiquer la domination existante. Une philosophie existentialiste reste-t-elle possible par-delà cette critique? La croyance en le caractère absurde de la vie humaine et l’exigence à se faire pour donner un sens à l’existence peuvent-elles tenir sans postuler la liberté absolue? Ou bien cette liberté doit-elle nécessairement être circonscrite par une théorie sociale critique, sans quoi l’existentialisme colportera clandestinement le maintien du statu quo?

The evolution of strategy: thinking war from antiquity to the present

Latin had no word for "strategy", but the East Romans, whom we call the Byzantines, did. This book tracks the evolution of the concept of warfare being subjected to higher political aims from Antiquity to the Present, using Greek, Latin, French, Spanish, Italian, English and German sources. It tracks the rise, fall, and resurrection of the belief in the Roman and later the medieval and early modern world that warfare was only legitimate if it pursued the higher goal of a just peace, which in the 19th century gave way to a blinkered concentration on military victory as only war aim. It explains why one school of thought, from Antiquity to the present, emphasised eternal principles of warfare, while others emphasised, in Clausewitz's term, the "changing character of war". It tracks ideas from land warfare to naval warfare to air power and nuclear thinking, but it also stresses great leaps and discontinuities in thinking about strategy. It covers asymmetric wars both from the point of view of the weaker power seeking to overthrow a stronger power, and from the stronger power dealing with insurgents and other numerically inferior forces. It concludes with a commentary of the long-known problems of bureaucratic politics, non-centralised command and inter-service rivalry, which since the 16th century or earlier has created obstacles to coherent strategy making.

Introduction to politics of climate change: discourses of policy and practice in developing countries

This Themed Section aims to increase understanding of how the idea of climate change, and the policies and actions that spring from it, travel beyond their origins in natural sciences to meet different political arenas in the developing world. It takes a discursive approach whereby climate change is not just a set of physical processes but also a series of messages, narratives and policy prescriptions. The articles are mostly case study-based and focus on sub-Saharan Africa and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). They are organised around three interlinked themes. The first theme concerns the processes of rapid technicalisation and professionalisation of the climate change ‘industry’, which have sustantially narrowed the boundaries of what can be viewed as a legitimate social response to the problem of global warming. The second theme deals with the ideological effects of the climate change industry, which is ‘depoliticisation’, in this case the deflection of attention away from underlying political conditions of vulnerability and exploitation towards the nature of the physical hazard itself. The third theme concerns the institutional effects of an insufficiently socialised idea of climate change, which is the maintenance of existing relations of power or their reconfiguration in favour of the already powerful. Overall, the articles suggest that greater scrutiny of the discursive and political dimensions of mitigation and adaptation activities is required. In particular, greater attention should be directed towards the policy consequences that governments and donors construct as a result of their framing and rendition of climate change issues.

Ecuador Paraiso Escondido virus, a new flavivirus isolated from New World sand flies in Ecuador, is the first representative of a novel clade in the genus flavivirus

A new flavivirus, Ecuador Paraiso Escondido virus (EPEV), named after the village where it was discovered, was isolated from sand flies (Psathyromyia abonnenci, formerly Lutzomyia abonnenci) that are unique to the New World. This represents the first sand fly-borne flavivirus identified in the New World. EPEV exhibited a typical flavivirus genome organization. Nevertheless, the maximum pairwise amino acid sequence identity with currently recognized flaviviruses was 52.8%. Phylogenetic analysis of the complete coding sequence showed that EPEV represents a distinct clade which diverged from a lineage that was ancestral to the nonvectored flaviviruses Entebbe bat virus, Yokose virus, and Sokoluk virus and also the Aedes-associated mosquito-borne flaviviruses, which include yellow fever virus, Sepik virus, Saboya virus, and others. EPEV replicated in C6/36 mosquito cells, yielding high infectious titers, but failed to reproduce either in vertebrate cell lines (Vero, BHK, SW13, and XTC cells) or in suckling mouse brains. This surprising result, which appears to eliminate an association with vertebrate hosts in the life cycle of EPEV, is discussed in the context of the evolutionary origins of EPEV in the New World.The flaviviruses are rarely (if ever) vectored by sand fly species, at least in the Old World. We have identified the first representative of a sand fly-associated flavivirus, Ecuador Paraiso Escondido virus (EPEV), in the New World. EPEV constitutes a novel clade according to current knowledge of the flaviviruses. Phylogenetic analysis of the virus genome showed that EPEV roots the Aedes-associated mosquito-borne flaviviruses, including yellow fever virus. In light of this new discovery, the New World origin of EPEV is discussed together with that of the other flaviviruses.

Just which Reality do you Mean? Users' Experiences of Virtual Spaces

Virtual Reality is a relatively new technology in the relatively young field of computer science. The design of Virtual Reality has only recently come into discussion, as well as the implications for this sort of design. I hope to determine how a user can work most efficiently and accurately in a Virtual World. By studying this, I hope to help in the standardization of Virtual Reality design.

Watching the World Cup, one data point at a time

Retirado do blog de Marc Pickren do dia 13 jun. 2014.

Watching the World Cup, one data point at a time

Sound the vuvuzelas, the World Cup is officially here. The biggest sporting event in the world is set to break all kinds of viewing records. Sporting in the digital world is just as much about stats as it is about the game itself. Enter Brandwatch. The social media analytics company has taken it upon itself to track social media statistics for the entire run of the World Cup with their new real-time data visualization tool.

Ballast water: a review of the impact on the world public health

Since the nineteenth century ships have been using ballast water (BW) for safety, stability, propulsion and maneuverability, as well as to redress loss of fuel weight and water consumption, and to maintain structural stress at acceptable levels. Ballast water has been spreading many non-native species around the globe, but little is known about the extent and potential significance of ship-mediated transfer of microorganisms. The global movements of ballast water by ships create a long-distance dispersal mechanism for human pathogens that may be important in the worldwide distribution of microorganisms, as well as for the epidemiology of waterborne diseases. Only a few studies have been carried out on this subject, most of them involving ballast water containing crustacean larvae and phytoplankton. Specialized microbiological studies on these waters are necessary to avoid a repeat of what happened in 1991, when epidemic cholera was reported in Peru and rapidly spread through Latin America and Mexico. In July of 1992, Vibrio cholerae was found in the USA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determined that it came from ballast water of ships whose last port of call was in South America. In Brazil, just a few studies about the subject have been performed. An exploratory study by the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency (Agencia Nacional de Vigilancia Sanitaria - ANVISA) found in ballast water different microorganisms, such as fecal coliforms, Escherichia coli, Enterococcus faecalis, Clostridium perfringens, coliphages, Vibrio cholerae O1 and Vibrio cholerae non-O1. Until now, Brazil has been focusing only on organisms transported to its territory from other countries by ballast water, to avoid their establishment and dissemination in Brazilian areas. Studies that can assess the probability that water ballast carries pathogenic microorganisms are extremely important, as is the examination of ships that arrive in the country. Treatment of the human infections caused by BW exists but none is completely safe and efficient.