Estimating Bayesian decision problems with heterogeneous priors

In many areas of economics there is a growing interest in how expertise andpreferences drive individual and group decision making under uncertainty. Increasingly, we wish to estimate such models to quantify which of these drive decisionmaking. In this paper we propose a new channel through which we can empirically identify expertise and preference parameters by using variation in decisionsover heterogeneous priors. Relative to existing estimation approaches, our \Prior-Based Identification" extends the possible environments which can be estimated,and also substantially improves the accuracy and precision of estimates in thoseenvironments which can be estimated using existing methods.

Median problems in networks

The P-median problem is a classical location model par excellence . In this paper we, firstexamine the early origins of the problem, formulated independently by Louis Hakimi andCharles ReVelle, two of the fathers of the burgeoning multidisciplinary field of researchknown today as Facility Location Theory and Modelling. We then examine some of thetraditional heuristic and exact methods developed to solve the problem. In the third sectionwe analyze the impact of the model in the field. We end the paper by proposing new lines ofresearch related to such a classical problem.

The evolution of personally disadvantageous punishment among cofoundresses of the ant Acromyrmex versicolor

Cofoundresses of the desert fungus garden ant Acromyrmex versicolorexhibit a forager specialist who subsumes all foraging risk priorto first worker eclosion (Rissing et al. 1989). In an experimentdesigned to mimic a "cheater" who refuses foraging assignment whenher lot, cofoundresses delayed/failed to replace their forager,often leading to demise of their garden (Rissing et al. 1996). Thecheater on task assignment is harmed, but so too is the punisher,as all will die without a healthy garden. In this paper we studythrough simulation the cofoundress interaction with haploid, asexualgenotypes which either replace a cheater or not (punishment), underboth foundress viscosity (likely for A. versicolor) and randomassortment. We find replacement superior to punishment only whenthere is no foraging risk and cheating is not costly to groupsurvival. Generally, punishment is evolutionarily superior,especially as forager risk increases, under both forms of dispersal.

Merger failures

This paper proposes an explanation as to why some mergers fail, based on the interactionbetween the pre- and post-merger processes. We argue that failure may stem from informationalasymmetries arising from the pre-merger period, and problems of cooperation andcoordination within recently merged firms. We show that a partner may optimally agree tomerge and abstain from putting forth any post-merger effort, counting on the other partnerto make the necessary efforts. If both follow the same course of action, the merger goesahead but fails. Our unique equilibrium allows us to make predictions on which mergers aremore likely to fail.

Regulating financial conglomerates

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combinea bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate s risk-taking incentivesdepend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn isdetermined by the conglomerate s liability strucure. We examine optimal capitalrequirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates,and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies.For a given risk profile, integrated conglomerates have a lower probability offailure than either their standalone or decentralised equivalent. However, whenrisk profiles are endogenously selected conglomeration may extend the reachof the deposit insurance safety net and hence provide incentives for increasedrisk-taking. As a result, integrated conglomerates may optimally attract highercapital requirements. In contrast, decentralised conglomerates are able to holdassets in the socially most efficient place. Their optimal capital requirementsencourage this. Hence, the practice of regulatory arbitrage , or of transferingassets from one balance sheet to another, is welfare-increasing. We discuss thepolicy implications of our finding in the context not only of the present debateon the regulation of financial conglomerates but also in the light of existingUS bank holding company regulation.

Institutional constraints on organizations: The case of Spanish car dealerships

We study the effect of organizational choice and institutions on the performance ofSpanish car dealerships. Using outlet-level data from 1994, we find that verticallyintegrateddealerships showed substantially lower labor productivity, higher labor costs andlower profitability than franchised ones. Despite these gaps in performance, no verticallyintegratedoutlet was separated until 1994, yet the few outlets that were eventuallyseparated systematically improved their performance. We argue that the conversion ofintegrated outlets into franchised ones involved significant transaction costs, due to aninstitutional environment favoring permanent, highly-unionized employment relations. Inline with this argument, we find that the observed separations occurred in distributionnetworks that underwent marked reductions in worker unionization rates, following thelegalization of temporary labor contracts.

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Organisational values as "attractors of chaos": An emerging cultural change to manage organisational complexity

Business organisations are excellent representations of what in physics and mathematics are designated "chaotic" systems. Because a culture of innovation will be vital for organisational survival in the 21st century, the present paper proposes that viewing organisations in terms of "complexity theory" may assist leaders in fine-tuning managerial philosophies that provide orderly management emphasizing stability within a culture of organised chaos, for it is on the "boundary of chaos" that the greatest creativity occurs. It is argued that 21st century companies, as chaotic social systems, will no longer be effectively managed by rigid objectives (MBO) nor by instructions (MBI). Their capacity for self-organisation will be derived essentially from how their members accept a shared set of values or principles for action (MBV). Complexity theory deals with systems that show complex structures in time or space, often hiding simple deterministic rules. This theory holds that once these rules are found, it is possible to make effective predictions and even to control the apparent complexity. The state of chaos that self-organises, thanks to the appearance of the "strange attractor", is the ideal basis for creativity and innovation in the company. In this self-organised state of chaos, members are not confined to narrow roles, and gradually develop their capacity for differentiation and relationships, growing continuously toward their maximum potential contribution to the efficiency of the organisation. In this way, values act as organisers or "attractors" of disorder, which in the theory of chaos are equations represented by unusually regular geometric configurations that predict the long-term behaviour of complex systems. In business organisations (as in all kinds of social systems) the starting principles end up as the final principles in the long term. An attractor is a model representation of the behavioral results of a system. The attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system; it simply depicts where the system is headed based on its rules of motion. Thus, in a culture that cultivates or shares values of autonomy, responsibility, independence, innovation, creativity, and proaction, the risk of short-term chaos is mitigated by an overall long-term sense of direction. A more suitable approach to manage the internal and external complexities that organisations are currently confronting is to alter their dominant culture under the principles of MBV.

Strategies for an integrated distribution problem

The problems arising in the logistics of commercial distribution are complexand involve several players and decision levels. One important decision isrelated with the design of the routes to distribute the products, in anefficient and inexpensive way.This article explores three different distribution strategies: the firststrategy corresponds to the classical vehicle routing problem; the second isa master route strategy with daily adaptations and the third is a strategythat takes into account the cross-functional planning through amulti-objective model with two objectives. All strategies are analyzed ina multi-period scenario. A metaheuristic based on the Iteratetd Local Search,is used to solve the models related with each strategy. A computationalexperiment is performed to evaluate the three strategies with respect to thetwo objectives. The cross functional planning strategy leads to solutions thatput in practice the coordination between functional areas and better meetbusiness objectives.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

Gestión de la competencia en el sector público

Este trabajo analiza el papel de la competencia en la gestión pública, para lo cual toma como referencia la organización burocrática basada en centros de gasto que no cobran por sus servicios y suelen ser demasiado grandes e ineficientes. Para introducir competencia, se da libertad de elección a usuarios y productores, a la vez que se les responsabiliza de los costes que ocasionan sus decisiones. Se genera así un provechoso control mutuo entre usuarios y proveedores, que hace menos necesario el control jerárquico, de tipo vertical. Sin embargo, la eventual presencia de monopolios y asimetrías informativas puede ocasionar graves distorsiones y suele exigir una regulación activa, que es costosa y provoca búsqueda de rentas. Para corroborar la relevancia de este equilibrio de costes y beneficios, el trabajo analiza doce servicios públicos en los sectores de la sanidad, la educación y la justicia. Se constata la presencia de dificultades asociadas a monopolios, asimetrías informativas y búsqueda de rentas y se argumenta que, como consecuencia, se tienden a adoptar soluciones de naturaleza intermedia. Coherentemente con este argumento, se observa que en los servicios analizados o bien se emplean incentivos de baja intensidad o se restringen los derechos de decisión, de modo que no se aplican todos los elementos propios de la competencia pero tampoco se prescinde de ellos por completo. Por la moderación de los incentivos que genera, este uso incompleto de la competencia permite, además, que se puedan regular las actividades correspondientes mediante las fórmulas típicas de la Administración Pública, basadas en la reglamentación de decisiones recurrentes y la colegiación y supervisión jerárquica de un número pequeño de decisiones no regladas.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies

This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on differentrationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such ascomputerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of companyaccounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronicfiling and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developmentsfavour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies incountries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhancethe value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems.Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used bycompanies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs andbenefits that should guide policy in this area.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.