International consumption risk sharing

This paper formally examines the implications of international consumptionrisk sharing for a panel of industrialized countries. We theoretically derivethe international consumption insurance proposition in a simple setup and showhow it should be modified in more complicated models. We empirically analyzethe implications of the theory for pairs of countries across frequencies of thespectrum and find that aggregate domestic consumption is almost completelyinsured against idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocksover short cycles, but that it covaries with these variables over medium andlong cycles. The cross equation restrictions imposed by the theory are, ingeneral, rejected. The policy implications of the results are discussed.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Offshoring and directed technical change

To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introducedirected technical change into a Ricardian model of offshoring. A unique final good isproduced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuumof intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant Westto a skill-scarce East. Profit maximization determines both the extent of offshoring andtechnological progress. Offshoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increasesthe relative price of skill-intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilledworkers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor.In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in offshoringopportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West,skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extentof offshoring becomes sufficiently large, further increases in offshoring induce technicalchange now biased in favor of unskilled labor because offshoring closes the gap betweenunskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price effectfueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of offshoring is thus greatestat the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that offshoring and technical change aresubstitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though offshoringimproves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benefit or harm unskilled workers inthe West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.

The vanishing procyclicality of labor productivity

We document three changes in postwar US macroeconomic dynamics: (i) theprocyclicality of labor productivity has vanished, (ii) the relative volatility of employment has risen, and (iii) the relative (and absolute) volatility of the real wagehas risen. We propose an explanation for all three changes that is based on a common source: a decline in labor market frictions. We develop a simple model withlabor market frictions, variable effort, and endogenous wage rigidities to illustratethe mechanisms underlying our explanation. We show that the reduction in frictionsmay also have contributed to the observed decline in output volatility.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Human capital, the structure of production and growth

Do high levels of human capital foster economic growth by facilitating technology adoption? If so, countries with more human capital should have adopted more rapidly the skilled-labor augmenting technologies becoming available since the 1970 s. High human capital levels should therefore have translated into fast growth in more compared to less human-capital-intensive industries in the 1980 s. Theories of international specialization point to human capital accumulation as another important determinant of growth in human-capital-intensive industries. Using data for a large sample of countries, we find significant positive effects of human capital levels and human capital accumulation on output and employment growth in human-capital-intensive industries.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

The ins and outs of unemployment: An analysis conditional on technology shocks

We analyze how unemployment, job finding and job separation rates reactto neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral shocks increaseunemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility; investment-specificshocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hoursworked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for theimpact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements alongits adjustment path. The evidence warns against using models with exogenousseparation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technologyshocks in search and sticky price models.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Targeting fertility and female participation through the income tax

We evaluate the effect of a 2003 reform in the Spanish income tax on fertility and the employment of mothers with small children. The reform introduced a tax credit for working mothers with children under the age of three, while also increasing child deductions for all households with children. Theoretically, given the interplay of these two components, the expected effect of the reform is ambiguous on both outcomes. We find that the combined reforms significantly increased both fertility (by almost five percent) and the employment rate of mothers with children under three (by two percent). These effects were more pronounced among less-educated women. In addition, to disentangle the impact of the two reform components, we use an earlier reform that increased child deductions in 1999. We find that the child deductions affect mothers employment negatively, which implies that the 2003 tax credit would have increased employment even more (up to five percent) in the absence of the change in child deductions.

Award errors and permanent disability benefits in Spain

There is a controversial debate about the effects of permanent disability benefits on labormarket behavior. In this paper we estimate equations for deserving and receiving disabilitybenefits to evaluate the award error as the difference in the probability of receiving anddeserving using survey data from Spain. Our results indicate that individuals aged between55 and 59, self-employers or working in an agricultural sector have a probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it significantly higher than the rest of individuals. We also find evidence of gender discrimination since male have a significantly higher probability of receiving a benefit without deserving it. This seems to confirm that disability benefits are being used as an instrument for exiting the labor market for some individuals approaching the early retirement or those who do not have right to retire early. Taking into account that awarding process depends on Social Security Provincial Department, this means that some departments are applying loosely the disability requirements for granting disability benefits.