A situated analysis of football goalkeepers' experiences in critical game situations.

This study described elite football (soccer) goalkeepers' activity and performance in critical game situations. The 11 best French players (M age = 15.5 yr., SD = 0.5) participated in the study. Interviews focused on goalkeepers' experiences were conducted to identify meaningful events involved in failed actions. Players formulated 23 critical game situations. Verbatim encoding using a thematic analysis indicated that four main categories (coming off the line, goal-line clearance, one-on-one, and diving) represented the most critical situations encountered during matches. The relations among experience and action, inner states, background, attention contents, and intentions were elucidated. The discussion is grounded on the properties of such critical game situations and their implications for improving goalkeepers' performance.

Acylation of chiral alcohols: a simple procedure for chiral GC analysis

The use of iodine as a catalyst and either acetic or trifluoroacetic acid as a derivatizing reagent for determining the enantiomeric composition of acyclic and cyclic aliphatic chiral alcohols was investigated. Optimal conditions were selected according to the molar ratio of alcohol to acid, the reaction time, and the reaction temperature. Afterwards, chiral stability of chiral carbons was studied. Although no isomerization was observed when acetic acid was used, partial isomerization was detected with the trifluoroacetic acid. A series of chiral alcohols of a widely varying structural type were then derivatized with acetic acid using the optimal conditions. The resolution of the enantiomeric esters and the free chiral alcohols was measured using a capillary gas chromatograph equipped with a CP Chirasil-DEX CB column. The best resolutions were obtained with 2-pentyl acetates (α = 3.00) and 2-hexyl acetates (α = 1.95). This method provides a very simple and efficient experimental workup procedure for analyzing chiral alcohols by chiral-phase GC.

Outcomes of minimally invasive simple prostatectomy for benign prostatic hyperplasia: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

PURPOSE: (1) To assess the outcomes of minimally invasive simple prostatectomy (MISP) for the treatment of symptomatic benign prostatic hyperplasia in men with large prostates and (2) to compare them with open simple prostatectomy (OSP). METHODS: A systematic review of outcomes of MISP for benign prostatic hyperplasia with meta-analysis was conducted. The article selection process was conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines. RESULTS: Twenty-seven observational studies with 764 patients were analyzed. The mean prostate volume was 113.5 ml (95 % CI 106-121). The mean increase in Qmax was 14.3 ml/s (95 % CI 13.1-15.6), and the mean improvement in IPSS was 17.2 (95 % CI 15.2-19.2). Mean duration of operation was 141 min (95 % CI 124-159), and the mean intraoperative blood loss was 284 ml (95 % CI 243-325). One hundred and four patients (13.6 %) developed a surgical complication. In comparative studies, length of hospital stay (WMD -1.6 days, p = 0.02), length of catheter use (WMD -1.3 days, p = 0.04) and estimated blood loss (WMD -187 ml, p = 0.015) were significantly lower in the MISP group, while the duration of operation was longer than in OSP (WMD 37.8 min, p < 0.0001). There were no differences in improvements in Qmax, IPSS and perioperative complications between both procedures. The small study sizes, publication bias, lack of systematic complication reporting and short follow-up are limitations. CONCLUSIONS: MISP seems an effective and safe treatment option. It provides similar improvements in Qmax and IPSS as OSP. Despite taking longer, it results in less blood loss and shorter hospital stay. Prospective randomized studies comparing OSP, MISP and laser enucleation are needed to define the standard surgical treatment for large prostates.

Copeptin is associated with kidney length, renal function, and prevalence of simple cysts in a population-based study.

Arginine vasopressin (AVP) has a key role in osmoregulation by facilitating water transport in the collecting duct. Recent evidence suggests that AVP may have additional effects on renal function and favor cyst growth in polycystic kidney disease. Whether AVP also affects kidney structure in the general population is unknown. We analyzed the association of copeptin, an established surrogate for AVP, with parameters of renal function and morphology in a multicentric population-based cohort. Participants from families of European ancestry were randomly selected in three Swiss cities. We used linear multilevel regression analysis to explore the association of copeptin with renal function parameters as well as kidney length and the presence of simple renal cysts assessed by ultrasound examination. Copeptin levels were log-transformed. The 529 women and 481 men had median copeptin levels of 3.0 and 5.2 pmol/L, respectively (P<0.001). In multivariable analyses, the copeptin level was associated inversely with eGFR (β=-2.1; 95% confidence interval [95% CI], -3.3 to -0.8; P=0.002) and kidney length (β=-1.2; 95% CI, -1.9 to -0.4; P=0.003) but positively with 24-hour urinary albumin excretion (β=0.11; 95% CI, 0.01 to 0.20; P=0.03) and urine osmolality (β=0.08; 95% CI, 0.05 to 0.10; P<0.001). A positive association was found between the copeptin level and the presence of renal cysts (odds ratio, 1.6; 95% CI, 1.1 to 2.4; P=0.02). These results suggest that AVP has a pleiotropic role in renal function and may favor the development of simple renal cysts.

A simple halide-to-anion exchange method for heteroaromatic salts and ionic liquids

A broad and simple method permitted halide ions in quaternary heteroaromatic and ammonium salts to be exchanged for a variety of anions using an anion exchange resin (A− form) in non-aqueous media. The anion loading of the AER (OH− form) was examined using two different anion sources, acids or ammonium salts, and changing the polarity of the solvents. The AER (A− form) method in organic solvents was then applied to several quaternary heteroaromatic salts and ILs, and the anion exchange proceeded in excellent to quantitative yields, concomitantly removing halide impurities. Relying on the hydrophobicity of the targeted ion pair for the counteranion swap, organic solvents with variable polarity were used, such as CH3OH, CH3CN and the dipolar nonhydroxylic solvent mixture CH3CN:CH2Cl2 (3:7) and the anion exchange was equally successful with both lipophilic cations and anions.

Evolutionary Games in Networked Populations: Models and Experiments

Cooperation and coordination are desirable behaviors that are fundamental for the harmonious development of society. People need to rely on cooperation with other individuals in many aspects of everyday life, such as teamwork and economic exchange in anonymous markets. However, cooperation may easily fall prey to exploitation by selfish individuals who only care about short- term gain. For cooperation to evolve, specific conditions and mechanisms are required, such as kinship, direct and indirect reciprocity through repeated interactions, or external interventions such as punishment. In this dissertation we investigate the effect of the network structure of the population on the evolution of cooperation and coordination. We consider several kinds of static and dynamical network topologies, such as Baraba´si-Albert, social network models and spatial networks. We perform numerical simulations and laboratory experiments using the Prisoner's Dilemma and co- ordination games in order to contrast human behavior with theoretical results. We show by numerical simulations that even a moderate amount of random noise on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation almost vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is high enough. Moreover, when we consider fixed social-like networks we find that current models of social networks may allow cooperation to emerge and to be robust at least as much as in scale-free networks. In the framework of spatial networks, we investigate whether cooperation can evolve and be stable when agents move randomly or performing Le´vy flights in a continuous space. We also consider discrete space adopting purposeful mobility and binary birth-death process to dis- cover emergent cooperative patterns. The fundamental result is that cooperation may be enhanced when this migration is opportunistic or even when agents follow very simple heuristics. In the experimental laboratory, we investigate the issue of social coordination between indi- viduals located on networks of contacts. In contrast to simulations, we find that human players dynamics do not converge to the efficient outcome more often in a social-like network than in a random network. In another experiment, we study the behavior of people who play a pure co- ordination game in a spatial environment in which they can move around and when changing convention is costly. We find that each convention forms homogeneous clusters and is adopted by approximately half of the individuals. When we provide them with global information, i.e., the number of subjects currently adopting one of the conventions, global consensus is reached in most, but not all, cases. Our results allow us to extract the heuristics used by the participants and to build a numerical simulation model that agrees very well with the experiments. Our findings have important implications for policymakers intending to promote specific, desired behaviors in a mobile population. Furthermore, we carry out an experiment with human subjects playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a diluted grid where people are able to move around. In contrast to previous results on purposeful rewiring in relational networks, we find no noticeable effect of mobility in space on the level of cooperation. Clusters of cooperators form momentarily but in a few rounds they dissolve as cooperators at the boundaries stop tolerating being cheated upon. Our results highlight the difficulties that mobile agents have to establish a cooperative environment in a spatial setting without a device such as reputation or the possibility of retaliation. i.e. punishment. Finally, we test experimentally the evolution of cooperation in social networks taking into ac- count a setting where we allow people to make or break links at their will. In this work we give particular attention to whether information on an individual's actions is freely available to poten- tial partners or not. Studying the role of information is relevant as information on other people's actions is often not available for free: a recruiting firm may need to call a job candidate's refer- ences, a bank may need to find out about the credit history of a new client, etc. We find that people cooperate almost fully when information on their actions is freely available to their potential part- ners. Cooperation is less likely, however, if people have to pay about half of what they gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Cooperation declines even further if people have to pay a cost that is almost equivalent to the gain from cooperating with a cooperator. Thus, costly information on potential neighbors' actions can undermine the incentive to cooperate in dynamical networks.

A model for the evolution of reinforcement learning in fluctuating games

Many species are able to learn to associate behaviours with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in changing environments. Social interactions between population members may, however, require more cognitive abilities than simple trial-and-error learning, in particular the capacity to make accurate hypotheses about the material payoff consequences of alternative action combinations. It is unclear in this context whether natural selection necessarily favours individuals to use information about payoffs associated with nontried actions (hypothetical payoffs), as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff. Here, we develop an evolutionary model in which individuals are genetically determined to use either trial-and-error learning or learning based on hypothetical reinforcements, and ask what is the evolutionarily stable learning rule under pairwise symmetric two-action stochastic repeated games played over the individual's lifetime. We analyse through stochastic approximation theory and simulations the learning dynamics on the behavioural timescale, and derive conditions where trial-and-error learning outcompetes hypothetical reinforcement learning on the evolutionary timescale. This occurs in particular under repeated cooperative interactions with the same partner. By contrast, we find that hypothetical reinforcement learners tend to be favoured under random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where trial-and-error learners are maintained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error learning even in the absence of costs of cognition, which illustrates that cost-free increased cognition can be counterselected under social interactions.

A simple model to describe the thixotropic behavior of paints.

We propose a simple rheological model to describe the thixotropic behavior of paints, since the classical hysteresis area, which is usually used, is not enough to evaluate thixotropy. The model is based on the assumption that viscosity is a direct measure of the structural level of the paint. The model depends on two equations: the Cross-Carreau equation to describe the equilibrium viscosity and a second order kinetic equation to express the time dependence of viscosity. Two characteristic thixotropic times are differentiated: one for the net structure breakdown, which is defined as a power law function of shear rate, and an other for the net structure buildup, which is not dependent on the shear rate. The knowledge of both kinetic processes can be used to improve the quality and applicability of paints. Five representative commercial protective marine paints are tested. They are based on chlorinated rubber, acrylic, alkyd, vinyl, and epoxy resins. The temperature dependence of the rheological behavior is also studied with the temperature ranging from 5 ºC to 35 ºC. It is found that the paints exhibit both shear thinning and thixotropic behavior. The model fits satisfactorily the thixotropy of the studied paints. It is also able to predict the thixotropy dependence on temperature. Both viscosity and the degree of thixotropy increase as the temperature decreases.

The Banzhaf Value in the Presence of Externalities

[eng] We propose two generalizations of the Banzhaf value for partition function form games. In both cases, our approach is based on probability distributions over the set of possible coalition structures that may arise for any given set of agents. First, we introduce a family of values, one for each collection of the latter probability distributions, defined as the Banzhaf value of an expected coalitional game. Then, we provide two characterization results for this new family of values within the framework of all partition function games. Both results rely on a property of neutrality with respect to amalgamation of players. Second, as this collusion transformation fails to be meaningful for simple games in partition function form, we propose another generalization of the Banzhaf value which also builds on probability distributions of the above type. This latter family is characterized by means of a neutrality property which uses an amalgamation transformation of players for which simple games are closed.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.