992 resultados para resource competition
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Gross-to-Net is a payroll calculator modeled after the actual payroll calculation program used for state employees’ pay warrants. This calculator can be used to project changes in deduction amounts and net pay when there are changes in pay amounts, hours worked, mandatory and voluntary deductions, including all pre-tax deductions such as retirement, insurances, deferred compensation or flexible spending plans. Federal and state tax withholding, retirement rates, OASDI and Medicare (FICA), and insurance deductions are calculated using current rates on HRIS Production.
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A Step-by-step guide to dealing with a job loss, starting a new job and everything in between.
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We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
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To better understand the biological controls that regulate sea urchin dynamics, we studied the effects of potential inter- and intra-specific competition for food on several biological variables of the main sea urchin in the Mediterranean (Paracentrotus lividus). We carried out a caging experiment in which we manipulated sea urchin density (natural vs. high density) and herbivorous fish (Sarpa salpa) accessibility (free access vs. exclusion) in a Posidonia oceanica meadow. No evidence of competition between fish and urchins was detected. Neither density-dependent mortality nor changes in the somatic variables were found; however, we detected that intra-specific competition affected the reproductive potential of P. lividus. The gonad index of urchins at high population densities was ca. 30% lower than that of urchins at natural densities. As a spawning event had just occurred when urchins were collected, these differences probably reflect differences in reserve content, which may compromise the following reproductive period and decrease survival in the long term, as the gonads are also used as storage organs. For the time period studied, mortality rates appeared to be independent of local densities. The results indicate that a long-term negative feedback mechanism appears to take place in P. lividus in response to increased population density.
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The gacA gene of the biocontrol strain Pseudomonas fluorescens CHA0 codes for a response regulator which, together with the sensor kinase GacS (=LemA), is required for the production of exoenzymes and secondary metabolites involved in biocontrol, including hydrogen cyanide (HCN). A gacA multicopy suppressor was isolated from a cosmid library of strain CHA0 and identified as the infC-rpmI-rplT operon, which encodes the translation initiation factor IF3 and the ribosomal proteins L35 and L20. The efficiency of suppression was about 30%, as determined by the use of a GacA-controlled reporter construct, i.e. a translational hcnA'-'lacZ fusion. Overexpression of the rsmA gene (coding for a global translational repressor) reversed the suppressive effect of the amplified infC operon. This finding suggests that some product(s) of the infC operon can compete with RsmA at the level of translation in P. fluorescens CHA0 and that important biocontrol traits can be regulated at this level.
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We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.
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The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.
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The New Economic Geography literature allows detailed analysis of the factors that determine the location decisions of firms in integrated markets. However, the competitive process is modelled in a rather rudimentary way, and the empirical evidence has usually been obtained from reduced-form econometric specifications. This study describes a structural model that takes into account strategic interactions between firms. We investigate the relationship between the degree of perceived competition ¿ not only from local firms but from firms in other regions ¿ and geographic concentration. The preliminary results indicate that, in aggregate terms, local firms present stronger competition than firms in other regions. Moreover, it is confirmed that greater geographical concentration of production reduces market power, due to the intensification of local competition; however, its impact on production costs is unclear.
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We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.
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In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.
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[spa] En lo que concierne al cambio climático, los pronósticos de cercanos picos de combustible fósiles parecen buenas noticias pues la mayoría de las emisiones proceden de la quema de combustibles fósiles. Sin embargo, esto podría resultar engañoso de confirmarse las enormes estimaciones de reservas de carbón pues puede divisarse un intercambio de combustible fósiles con baja concentración de carbono (petróleo y gas) por otros de mayor (carbón). Ciñéndonos a esta hipótesis desarrollamos escenarios donde tan pronto el petróleo y el gas natural alcanzan su cénit la extracción de carbón crece lo necesario para compensar el descenso de los primeros. Estimamos las emisiones que se deriva de tales supuestos y las comparamos con el peor escenario del IPCC. Si bien dicho escenario parece improbable concluimos que los picos de petróleo y gas no son suficientes para evitar peligrosas sendas de gases de efecto invernadero. Las concentraciones de CO2 halladas superan con creces las 450 ppm sin signos de remisión.
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Male dominance hierarchies are usually linked to relative body size and to weapon size, that is, to determinants of fighting ability. Secondary sexual characters that are not directly used as weapons could still be linked to dominance if they reveal determination or overall health and vigour and hence, indirectly, fighting ability. We studied the mating behaviour of the minnow, Phoxinus phoxinus, a cyprinid fish in which males develop breeding tubercles during the spawning season. The function of these breeding tubercles is still not clear. Using microsatellite markers, we determined male reproductive success under controlled conditions. The minnows were territorial and quickly established a dominance hierarchy at the beginning of the spawning season. Dominance was strongly and positively linked to fertilization success. Although body size and number of breeding tubercles were not significantly correlated in our sample, both large males and males with many breeding tubercles were more dominant and achieved higher fertilization success than small males or males with few tubercles. We found multimale fertilization in most clutches, suggesting that sperm competition is important in this species. Females showed behaviour that may be linked to spawning decision, that is, male dominance might not be the only determinant of male reproductive success in minnows
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A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix
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Special investigation of the Glenwood Resource Center Client Activity Clearing Account for the period January 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010