Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox

In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call this neglected activity "asset freezing": situations in which firms delay lay-offs or invest in specific technologies to support local politicians' re-election objectives. In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic assets can be evaluated based on their degree of "political freezability," which depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Political market and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy

Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy - profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target - to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.

The political ecology of weeds : a scalar approach to landscape transformations

How do plants that move and spread across landscapes become branded as weeds and thereby objects of contention and control? We outline a political ecology approach that builds on a Lefebvrian understanding of the production of space, identifying three scalar moments that make plants into 'weeds' in different spatial contexts and landscapes. The three moments are: the operational scale, which relates to empirical phenomena in nature and society; the observational scale, which defines formal concepts of these phenomena and their implicit or explicit 'biopower' across institutional and spatial categories; and the interpretive scale, which is communicated through stories and actions expressing human feelings or concerns regarding the phenomena and processes of socio-spatial change. Together, these three scalar moments interact to produce a political ecology of landscape transformation, where biophysical and socio-cultural processes of daily life encounter formal categories and modes of control as well as emotive and normative expectations in shaping landscapes. Using three exemplar 'weeds' - acacia, lantana and ambrosia - our political ecology approach to landscape transformations shows that weeds do not act alone and that invasives are not inherently bad organisms. Humans and weeds go together; plants take advantage of spaces and opportunities that we create. Human desires for preserving certain social values in landscapes in contradiction to actual transformations is often at the heart of definitions of and conflicts over weeds or invasives.

Brief cognitive assessment instruments in schizophrenia and bipolar patients, and healthy control subjects: A comparison study between the Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool for Schizophrenia (B-CATS) and the Screen for Cognitive Impairment in Psychiatry (SCIP)

Cognitive impairment in schizophrenia and psychosis is ubiquitous and acknowledged as a core feature of clinical expression, pathophysiology, and prediction of functioning. However, assessment of cognitive functioning is excessively time-consuming in routine practice, and brief cognitive instruments specific to psychosis would be of value. Two screening tools have recently been created to address this issue, i.e., the Brief Cognitive Assessment Tool for Schizophrenia (B-CATS) and the Screen for Cognitive Impairment in Psychiatry (SCIP). The aim of this research was to examine the comparative validity of these two brief instruments in relation to a global cognitive score. 161 patients with psychosis (96 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 65 patients diagnosed with bipolar disorder) and 76 healthy control subjects were tested with both instruments to examine their concurrent validity relative to a more comprehensive neuropsychological assessment battery. Scores from the B-CATS and the SCIP were highly correlated in the three diagnostic groups, and both scales showed good to excellent concurrent validity relative to a Global Cognitive Composite Score (GCCS) derived from the more comprehensive examination. The SCIP-S showed better predictive value of global cognitive impairment than the B-CATS. Partial and semi-partial correlations showed slightly higher percentages of both shared and unique variance between the SCIP-S and the GCCS than between the B-CATS and the GCCS. Brief instruments for assessing cognition in schizophrenia and bipolar disorders, such as the SCIP-S and B-CATS, seem to be reliable and promising tools for use in routine clinical practice.

The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.