721 resultados para multiscale governance
Resumo:
Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.
Resumo:
Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.
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Public and private actors increasingly cooperate in global governance, a realm previously reserved for states and intergovernmental organizations (IOs). This trend raises fascinating theoretical questions. What explains the rise in public-private institutions and their role in international politics? Who leads such institutional innovation and why? To address the questions, this paper develops a theory of the political demand and supply of public-private institutions and specifies the conditions under which IOs and non-state actors would cooperate, and states would support this public-private cooperation. The observable implications of the theoretical argument are evaluated against the broad trends in public-private cooperation and in a statistical analysis of the significance of demand and supply-side incentives in public-private cooperation for sustainable development. The study shows that public-private institutions do not simply fill governance gaps opened by globalization, but cluster in narrower areas of cooperation, where the strategic interests of IOs, states, and transnational actors intersect.
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University systems rely on organizational and governance structures to balance the interest, missions, and needs of constituent campuses. This report examines organizational and governance structures of four public university systems. It explores the organizational structures of governing boards and administrative offices, as well as the role of system offices in coordinating across constituent campuses and protecting mission differentiation.
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This paper is designed to provide a first approach to some questions raised by the Global administrative Law Project concerning the anti money laundering system, as a global governance project, and how it works in Latin America. We address some interactions between actors at the global, regional and local level. So we have organized our presentation according to those three spaces: 1) global standards, 2) regional efforts and 3) national experiences, where we present the contrast between Brazil and Argentina.
Resumo:
O presente trabalho trata da questão da governance e do empreendedorismo, ou seja, da governance empreendedora, enquanto instrumentos para que um governo local promova o desenvolvimento econômico e social e alcance a sustentabilidade política e econômica, frente ao paradoxo da globalização. Averigüando a possibilidade do exercrcio da governance empreendedora, traz como estudo de caso, o governo santista de 1989 a 1992, conduzido por Teima de Souza. Aborda as políticas públicas formuladas e adotadas no período, referentes às questões ambientais e de saúde, levadas a termo pelo governo local, bem como, problemas pertinentes à questão portuária e de participação popular, procurando identificar na lide governamental os princípios da governance e do empreendedorismo.
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Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas
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Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas
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As primeiras regiões metropolitanas brasileiras foram instituídas de maneira vertical e autoritária como parte da estratégia de desenvolvimento nacional promovida pelo governo militar. Percebidas como instituições não-democráticas e rejeitadas como possível quarto ente federativo, as regiões metropolitanas, desde a Constituição de 1988, foram gradualmente esvaziadas dos seus propósitos originais. Em sua orfandade, os problemas socioeconômicos proliferaram e foram acentuados, e passaram a predominar relações intergovernamentais competitivas em vez de cooperativas. Um dos principais desafios enfrentados pelo modelo federalista brasileiro, em especial quando se trata destas regiões, está relacionado à necessidade de estabelecer maior cooperação e coordenação, tidas como imprescindíveis para garantir um relacionamento mais equilibrado entre os entes federativos, assim como para a efetiva implementação de políticas de enfrentamento das desigualdades e exclusão social nas aglomerações urbanas. Este trabalho analisa o Grande Recife Consórcio Metropolitano de Transportes (CMT), empresa pública multifederativa estabelecida em 2008 entre os governos municipais e estadual da Região Metropolitana de Recife (RMR). Responsável pelo planejamento, gestão e implementação compartilhada da política de transporte público coletivo na RMR, o Grande Recife se tornou realidade com a aprovação e regulamentação da Lei Federal nº 11.107 de 2005, conhecida como a Lei de Consórcios Públicos. O Grande Recife é uma experiência pioneira e inovadora, demonstrando que é possível encontrar uma maneira de superar conflitos e desafios comuns e, ao mesmo tempo, garantir a preservação da autonomia de cada ente, bem como os direitos cidadãos. Neste trabalho consideramos essa experiência de cooperação intergovernamental como um exemplo de multi-level governance (MLG), uma vez que é ilustrativa de um novo arranjo institucional democrático entre distintas esferas governamentais para a gestão compartilhada de um serviço público.
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State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.
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How to deal with the impacts of the exchange rate on the trade balance of Brazil? There is not a single answer to such question. In order to find out some legal approaches for this matter, this paper aims to describe and analyze the role of the IMF, WTO and the governments of Brazil and the United States on the currency misalignments, especially the extraterritorial effects of such misalignment on the Brazil’s bilateral trade with the United States. The article concludes that the Currency Swap Agreements and other bilateral solutions may minimize the distortions that the Brazilian balance of payment against the USA is carrying, due to the lack of legal solutions for the problem of the exchange rate misalignments that Brazil is facing.
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The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.
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Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.
Resumo:
Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.