999 resultados para modèles de choix discrets
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Présenté au 36e congrès de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).
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A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.
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We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.
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La causalité au sens de Granger est habituellement définie par la prévisibilité d'un vecteur de variables par un autre une période à l'avance. Récemment, Lutkepohl (1990) a proposé de définir la non-causalité entre deux variables (ou vecteurs) par la non-prévisibilité à tous les délais dans le futur. Lorsqu'on considère plus de deux vecteurs (ie. lorsque l'ensemble d'information contient les variables auxiliaires), ces deux notions ne sont pas équivalentes. Dans ce texte, nous généralisons d'abord les notions antérieures de causalités en considérant la causalité à un horizon donné h arbitraire, fini ou infini. Ensuite, nous dérivons des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de non-causalité entre deux vecteurs de variables (à l'intérieur d'un plus grand vecteur) jusqu'à un horizon donné h. Les modèles considérés incluent les autoregressions vectorielles, possiblement d'ordre infini, et les modèles ARIMA multivariés. En particulier, nous donnons des conditions de séparabilité et de rang pour la non-causalité jusqu'à un horizon h, lesquelles sont relativement simples à vérifier.
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By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.