997 resultados para discrimination power
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[s.c.]
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Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2014
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The impact of a power plant cooling system in the Bahía Blanca estuary (Argentina) on the survival of target zooplanktonic organisms (copepods and crustacean larvae) and on overall mesozooplankton abundance was evaluated over time. Mortality rates were calculated for juveniles and adults of four key species in the estuary: Acartia tonsa Dana, 1849 and Eurytemora americana Williams, 1906 (native and invading copepods), and larvae of the crab Chasmagnathus granulata Dana, 1851 and the invading cirriped Balanus glandula Darwin, 1854. Mean total mortality values were up to four times higher at the water discharge site than at intake, though for all four species, significant differences were only registered in post-capture mortality. The findings show no evidence of greater larval sensitivity. As expected, the sharpest decrease in overall mesozooplankton abundance was found in areas close to heated water discharge.
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Broad-snouted caiman (Caiman latirostris) hatchlings present a consistent sexual dimorphism in their cranium shape and size. Male hatchlings have smaller crania than females. Using multivariate statistical analyses it is possible to discriminate sex in broad-snouted caiman hatchlings by their cranial shape with a reasonable efficiency. The understanding of sexual dimorphism of crocodilian hatchlings might be possibly improved by experimental approach considering, genetic and phenotypic variables such as incubation temperature and clutch of origin.
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We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade is realized through decentralized pairwise bargaining. Cartels are coalitions of buyers or sellers that limit market participation and compensate inactive members for abstaining from trade. In a stable market outcome, cartels set Nash equilibrium quantities and cartel memberships are immune to defections. We prove that the set of stable market outcomes is non-empty and we provide its full characterization. Stable market outcomes are of two types: (i) at least one cartel actively restrains trade and the levels of market participation are balanced, or (ii) only one cartel, eventually the cartel that forms on the long side of the market, is active and it reduces trade slightly below the opponent's.
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We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.
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In this paper we check whether generator's bid behavior at the Spanish whosale electricity market is consistent with the hypothesis of profit maximization on their residual demands. Using OMEL data, we find the arc-elacticity of the residual demand around the system marginal price. The results suggest thet the larger firms are not actually profit-msximization. We argue how the regulatory environment may drive these results. Finally, we repeat the analysis for the first session of the intra-day market where presumably firms may not have the same incentives as in the day-ahead market.
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"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del fitxer adjunt."
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We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
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Recently there has been a great deal of work on noncommutative algebraic cryptography. This involves the use of noncommutative algebraic objects as the platforms for encryption systems. Most of this work, such as the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld scheme, the Ko-Lee scheme and the Baumslag-Fine-Xu Modular group scheme use nonabelian groups as the basic algebraic object. Some of these encryption methods have been successful and some have been broken. It has been suggested that at this point further pure group theoretic research, with an eye towards cryptographic applications, is necessary.In the present study we attempt to extend the class of noncommutative algebraic objects to be used in cryptography. In particular we explore several different methods to use a formal power series ring R && x1; :::; xn && in noncommuting variables x1; :::; xn as a base to develop cryptosystems. Although R can be any ring we have in mind formal power series rings over the rationals Q. We use in particular a result of Magnus that a finitely generated free group F has a faithful representation in a quotient of the formal power series ring in noncommuting variables.
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The role of ecological constraints in promoting sociality is currently much debated. Using a direct-fitness approach, we show this role to depend on the kin-discrimination mechanisms underlying social interactions. Altruism cannot evolve under spatially based discrimination, unless ecological constraints prevent complete dispersal. Increasing constraints enhances both the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals and the level of altruistic investments conceded in pairwise interactions. Familiarity-based discrimination, by contrast, allows philopatry and altruism to evolve at significant levels even in the absence of ecological constraints. Increasing constraints further enhances the proportion of philopatric (and thereby altruistic) individuals but not the level of altruism conceded. Ecological constraints are thus more likely to affect social evolution in species in which restricted cognitive abilities, large group size, and/or limited period of associative learning force investments to be made on the basis of spatial cues.
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Procamallanus petterae n. sp. from Plecostomus albopunctarus and Spirocamallanus pintoi n. sp. from Corydoras paleatus are described. procamallanus petterae n. sp. differs from all other species of the genus by having a buccal capsule without spiral bands, with five teeth-like structures on its base and four plate-like structures near the anterior margin; length ratio of oesophagus muscular/glandular 1:1.4; spicules short, 21µ m and 16µ m long and tails ending abruptly in a sharp point, in both sexes. Spirocamallanus pintoi n. sp. is characterized by having 6 to 8 spiral thickenings in the buccal capsule of male and 9 to 10 in female, occupying 2/3 of the length of the capsule; length of glandular oesophagus more than twice the muscular; spicules short, the right 94µ m and the left 82µ m long.